Fate of employees of liquidated banks<\/p>\n
From Media Indonesia<\/p>\n
In the last few days the media have reported that thousands of
\nemployees of private banks closed on March 13, 1999, have staged
\ndemonstrations at Bank Indonesia (BI) on Jl. Thamrin, the office
\nof the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) on Jl.
\nSudirman and the office of the National Development Planning
\nBoard on Jl. Diponegoro.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, some 8,000 employees of state banks, which
\nalso have received Bank Indonesia liquidity aid amounting to
\ntrillions of rupiah, have been vying with one another to be laid
\noff because of the large amount of severance pay they would
\nreceive (the highest amount is Rp 700 million for a Class I
\nBranch Manager). These two events are really ironic because they
\nreflect the condition of social justice in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
What will be the fate of the some 17,000 employees of the
\nliquidated banks? How will they feed their families? Many lives
\nobviously are at stake now. Besides these employees of liquidated
\nbanks, the victim of the bank liquidations is the entire
\nIndonesian population because the liquidity aid from Bank
\nIndonesia, trillions of rupiah, is actually the Indonesian
\npeople's money. If this amount were used to eliminate poverty, it
\nwould considerably alleviate poor people's suffering. It is
\ndeplorable that this huge amount of money, extended to both state
\nand private banks as liquidity aid from Bank Indonesia, only has
\nenriched business tycoons.<\/p>\n
The major mistakes committed by Bank Indonesia as this
\ncountry's monetary authority are as follows:<\/p>\n
1. Extending liquidity aid to banks managed by irresponsible
\nbankers.<\/p>\n
2. Fully guaranteeing the money of bank customers but not the
\nfate of some 17,000 employees of liquidated banks. Guaranteeing
\nthe deposits of customers will lead to negative spread, meaning
\nthat the deposit interest rate will be higher than the loan
\ninterest rate. If this condition persists, it will have adverse
\nimpacts on the capital of banks and in turn the capital adequacy
\nratio of the banks will become minus. (Both BRI and BNI feel
\nuneasy receiving the transferred funds from customers of
\nliquidated banks).<\/p>\n
3. No speedy and serious effort has been made to take to court
\nthe owners\/management of liquidated banks or miscreant debtors
\nwho have deliberately turned their debts into backlog debts or
\ngone abroad with the liquidity aid.<\/p>\n
Allow me now to call on the government to assume a fair
\nattitude toward the dismissed bank employees. At least the
\ngovernment can fulfill 50 percent of their demand; i.e. giving
\nthem five times as much severance pay as stipulated in Article 25
\nsubarticle 1 of Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 3\/1996.
\nIndeed, BI and IBRA are responsible for the consequences of bank
\nliquidations. If the closed banks had not previously been given
\nBank Indonesia liquidity aid they would have gone out of business
\nnaturally without interference from the International Monetary
\nFund.<\/p>\n
HARRY S. HARYONO<\/p>\n
Jakarta<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/fate-of-employees-of-liquidated-banks-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }