Failed generals will also be failed political leaders<\/p>\n
Ziad Salim, Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara<\/p>\n
After a successful legislative election, the issue of ex-
\nmilitary men in politics suddenly became a hot topic, prompted,
\nno doubt, by the emergence of two ex-generals as presidential
\ncandidates and the return of Golkar as the leading party in the
\nnew Legislature.<\/p>\n
Many see this new development not only as a
\nreturn to the bad old days under another general but a potential
\nthreat to Indonesian democracy. After all, Indonesia was under
\nthe two Gs (General and Golkar) for nearly 32 years, ending with
\na total economic and socio-political collapse of the country.<\/p>\n
However, worrying though it may be, there is no reason to
\nexclude ex-militaries in politics. They are citizens and as such
\nhave the right to participate in politics. In fact, ex-militaries
\nparticipate in politics regularly without any detriment to
\ndemocracy (De Gaulle was a general; and so were George Washington
\nand Eisenhower; and the next powerful man of Singapore will be a
\nman with a nickname \"B.G\" or Brigadier General, Lee Hsien Loong).<\/p>\n
In Indonesia, the military people are all around us and many
\nIndonesians have military men (alive or dead) as members of their
\nimmediate families. The whole history of Indonesia from
\nIndependence is written in the blood of the brave military men
\nand women. It is no coincidence that Gen. Soeharto could rule
\nunquestioned for nearly 32 years.<\/p>\n
Indonesians love uniforms and handsome \"men\" in uniforms (from
\nschool children to the ubiquitous \"satpams\" or private security
\nguards). Even Sukarno, who was not a military man, understood
\nthis political culture and psychology of his people and was
\nalmost always invariably seen in military uniform and a baton
\nwith all his medals dangling from his chest.<\/p>\n
So, the issue of ex-military men in politics, in general, is
\nnot whether they should enter politics but whether they can
\nreform or reorient themselves to the civilian ways or rid
\nthemselves of their old habits (i.e., their authoritarian
\ninclination and tendencies).<\/p>\n
As shown above, some certainly can, but the records of ex-
\nmilitaries in politics in the Middle East, Spain and Latin
\nAmerica indicate that for many the old habits die hard. The
\nrecords of ex-military men unable to respect the values of
\ndemocracy, civil society and human rights of their people are
\nlegend and the list is long, stretching from Franco to Pinochet
\nto Soeharto at home.<\/p>\n
In the case of the Indonesian ex-generals, specifically, given
\nthe Indonesian political culture (where military connection is
\ndeeply ingrained and cultural attitude towards the military is
\nrather ambivalent), the issue against them is not (necessarily)
\nbecause they are ex-generals but that they are failed generals,
\nfailed managers and failed leaders!<\/p>\n
The distinction is not hair splitting but crucial if the issue
\nagainst them is going to be objective. As has been shown above,
\nas ex-militaries, they have the right to enter politics and the
\npolitical culture of Indonesia is such that scaring off the
\nvoters with this issue will not work. Only the records of their
\nprofessional failures and incompetence will betray them because
\nthey are still fresh in peoples' collective memories and can be
\nobjectified and demonstrated as a matter of public records.<\/p>\n
Indeed, their failures have begun to be exposed recently
\n(including in these pages) and the call for a systematic exposure
\nof their records as part of the presidential campaigns has
\nalready been made.<\/p>\n
The exposure will reveal where they were, what they knew and
\nwhat they did (or did not do) during the times when the Indonesia
\nsuffered the worst pains and indignities (the 1998 Black May
\nincidence and the subsequent turmoil; the national humiliation
\nand the loss of East Timor along with the humanitarian disaster
\nand human rights violations that followed; the resurgent
\nseparatism and inter-ethnic killings in many parts of the
\ncountry; the imposition and the mismanagement of military
\nemergencies in Aceh; and lest forgotten, the Bali and other
\nbombings).<\/p>\n
All these occurred \"on their watch\", i.e., when the same
\nambitious ex-military men in question were in charge either
\njointly or separately.<\/p>\n
Their failures are not ordinary failures. They are what we
\ncall management failures committed by officials at high level of
\npolitical power and authority (i.e., failure to anticipate, to
\nprevent and to act). At this level, they cannot say they did not
\nknow or they were not informed or were misled or blame
\ncircumstances. At this level, it is their jobs to know, to be
\ninformed, to control and anticipate all circumstances. \"Hands
\ngetting caught in the cookie jar\" or having a witness are not the
\ncriteria for guilt at their levels.<\/p>\n
When things go wrong, at this level, it is their professional
\nresponsibility to take the blame, bow down and bow out.
\nEspecially that they were also part of the governments that
\ncreated the problems from the beginning (as in the case of East
\nTimor where the military was up, front and center), who were also
\ngiven a chance to solve them as ministers. That they failed (not
\nonly in their jobs and in taking responsibilities but also as
\nministers because one was a fired ex-minister and the other
\njumped before being pushed), this kind of failures are not and
\nshould not be easily overlooked.<\/p>\n
The above should be enough to shame any man and that is why
\ntheir very acts of coming around to try to seduce us to vote for
\nthem on the promise and premise of better leadership are
\nespecially galling.<\/p>\n
If they could not handle all those sad and dangerous events
\nand crises when they were in charge and had the power and the
\ntools of the state in their hands, what assurances do we have
\nthat they will know what to do next?<\/p>\n
They had their chances to govern but failed and now want a
\nsecond chance. They are not motivated by pity and empathy for the
\nsufferings of their fellow Indonesians but by big personal
\nambitions and dreams of redeeming themselves of their past
\nfailures and incompetence.<\/p>\n
But they have emerged publicly through a flawed internal party
\npolitics sanctioned by the Indonesian democracy itself, exactly
\nas feared by Fareed Zakaria (International Editor of Newsweek) in
\nhis latest book, The Future of Freedom, where it is shown that
\ndemocracy itself is fully capable of producing a man not beholden
\nto democracy. Only their own personal ethics and sense of shame
\ncan stop them from re-imposing themselves on unsuspecting
\nIndonesians.<\/p>\n
They themselves should have the pride and ethic to \"just fade
\naway\" (to use the phrase made famous by the great American
\nGeneral, McArthur, who did just that and as practiced at home by
\nthe great Indonesian General, Nasution).<\/p>\n
The sad thing about the fate of Indonesian democracy after the
\nrecent election is that it has brought out two failed ex-generals
\nand failed ex-ministers as presidential candidates and the party
\nonce behind the collapse of Indonesia as the number one party
\nagain, at great financial, material and emotional costs to the
\ncountry.<\/p>\n
Sadder yet, the poor, struggling country, still not yet out of
\nthe lingering effects of their former mischiefs but having been
\nseduced to believe and to have faith in democracy, will again be
\nasked to vote for one of them under a collective grand illusion
\nthat ex-generals are tough and can reinstate the \"good old days\".<\/p>\n
The writer, who formerly worked with several international
\ndevelopment organizations, can be reached at
\nzeeoddone@hotmail.com<\/p>",
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