Exhaust all non-military options<\/p>\n
It is certainly with great relief that we welcome President
\nMegawati Soekarnoputri's decision to postpone -- although
\nprobably only temporarily -- what many people fear will be the
\nbiggest military operation in Aceh since Indonesia proclaimed
\nindependence almost 58 years ago.<\/p>\n
As we all know, the government delivered its ultimatum to the
\nFree Aceh Movement (GAM) late last month, enjoining the movement
\nto disarm and drop its campaigns for independence, or face an
\nall-out war in which up to 50,000 government troops would be
\ndeployed against the rebels, who are estimated to number about
\n5,000. That deadline expired on Monday, May 12.<\/p>\n
Sadly, calls on the government not to repeat its past mistakes
\nhave gone unheeded. The Special Area of Aceh was designated a
\nMilitary Operations Zone (DOM) in 1989, when the authoritarian
\nregime of President Soeharto was in power, and by the time the
\ndecree was lifted in 1998, an estimated 10,000 people, mostly
\ncivilians, had died. The horrendous operation failed to destroy
\nGAM, and instead, it only succeeded in increasing the number of
\nGAM sympathizers and substantially damage the credibility of the
\nIndonesian security forces.<\/p>\n
Over the past few days, the government has been under heavy
\npressure to delay launching a military operation against GAM. At
\nthe same time, leaders of the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC),
\nincluding \"sage\" Anthony Zinni, as well as diplomats from the
\nUnited States, the European Union and Japan, put pressure on the
\nGAM leadership in Stockholm to soften their stance. Both efforts
\nseem to have failed.<\/p>\n
The deadline has passed, yet nothing has happened so far.<\/p>\n
At least a couple of reasons could explain this apparent calm
\nbefore the storm. First, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
\n(COHA) that both the Jakarta government and GAM signed in
\nDecember 2002 remains in force, as neither party has formally
\nwithdrawn from the accord. Launching operations at present would
\nbe in violation of the COHA and would raise the risk of
\ncommitting war crimes. Second, leaders at the House of
\nRepresentatives have requested a consultative meeting with the
\ngovernment before military operations are launched. It would
\nprobably be too big a risk for the government to antagonize the
\nHouse at this particular moment.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, what is substantially lacking in this long-
\ndrawn debate about whether or not to go to war in Aceh is a
\nclearly defined, core context of the Aceh problem. The integrity
\nof the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia is not an issue
\nhere, if one is only willing to understand the long history and
\nthe traditional legacy of the proud Acehnese people: It is a
\nhistory of generations of Acehnese born amid war, of decades of
\nbetrayal by consecutive \"outside\" powers, and it has a very long
\nlist of undelivered promises.<\/p>\n
Amid all this, one thing is clear: Military operations will
\nnot be able to address these problems, as has been proven in the
\npast. House leaders should dig deeper into the core of the
\nproblem when they meet with the government before the end of this
\nmonth.<\/p>\n
Together, they should examine and exhaust all the non-military
\noptions that are available and not manipulate the problem into
\nbecoming a political tool to serve their own interests in next
\nyear's general elections.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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