EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS<\/p>\n
The following is the executive summary of research results on
\nMaluku from the website of the Jakarta office of the Brussels-
\nbased International Crisis Group, dated Feb. 8 before the
\ngovernment-sponsored peace talks in Malino, Central Sulawesi. The
\nJakarta office is led by political scientist Harold Crouch.<\/p>\n
International Crisis Group
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
The fighting that broke out between Christians and Muslims in
\nAmbon, the capital of Indonesia's Maluku province, on Jan. 19
\n1999 triggered a virtual civil war that soon spread to other
\nparts of the province. At least 5,000 people (perhaps as many as
\n10,000) have been killed and close to 700,000 - almost one-third
\nof the population of 2.1 million - became refugees.<\/p>\n
Peace has yet to be achieved although violence has declined
\nsharply during the last year. Refugees are beginning to return to
\npredominantly Muslim North Maluku (which was separated from the
\nold Maluku province in September 1999) but tensions remain high
\nin Ambon and surrounding islands that are the core of the new
\nMaluku province.<\/p>\n
During the initial phase, each side inflicted heavy
\ncasualties. But in mid-2000 there was a qualitative change when a
\nJava-based fundamentalist Islamic militia, Laskar Jihad,
\nresponding to the perception that Muslims were getting the worst
\nof it, sent several thousand fighters to Ambon. They had received
\nbasic military training from a small group of sympathetic
\nofficers within the Indonesian National Military (TNI) and were
\nsupplied with modern weapons after their arrival in Maluku.<\/p>\n
Supported by elements in the security forces, the Laskar Jihad
\nput the Christian militias on the defensive, inflicted casualties
\non the Christian community and forced thousands of Christians to
\nflee, causing the national government to impose a civil emergency
\nin the two Maluku provinces in June 2000. Although Muslim
\noffensives continued, by early 2001 the level of violence was
\ndeclining and most of the population had been partitioned into
\nChristian and Muslim zones.<\/p>\n
The security forces failed dismally to contain the conflict
\nduring the first eighteen months partly because they were
\nhamstrung by the competing sympathies many Christian and Muslim
\npersonnel felt for co-religionists. After the introduction of the
\ncivil emergency, however, the military adopted a new strategy
\ninvolving establishment of a Joint Battalion (Yon Gab - Batalyon
\nGabungan), a centralized mobile reserve drawn from elite forces
\nof the three services that could be sent quickly to conflict
\nareas.<\/p>\n
In a context where Muslim militias - backed by Laskar Jihad
\nand some military and police personnel - were gaining ground, the
\nYon Gab found itself usually confronting Muslim forces and soon
\ngained a pro-Christian reputation.<\/p>\n
The Yon Gab appears to have contributed to the decline in
\nfighting but credible allegations about the brutality of some of
\nits members besmirched its reputation and aggravated Muslim
\nantagonism. In November 2001 it was withdrawn and replaced by
\narmy special forces (Kopassus).<\/p>\n
In contrast to North Maluku and the southeast part of the
\nMaluku province, shootings and bomb explosions continue on Ambon
\nand nearby islands although attacks on Christian villages and
\ndirect armed confrontations are now rare. Laskar Jihad is less
\nopenly involved in launching direct attacks on Christians and
\nseems to be concentrating more on religious and social-welfare
\nactivities in Maluku although it continues to provide military
\ntraining and has sent fighters to Poso in South Sulawesi.<\/p>\n
Laskar Jihad and another, smaller and more secretive, Muslim
\nmilitia, the Laskar Mujahidin, have been suspected of links to
\nterrorist organizations outside Indonesia including Al-Qaeda
\nthough ICG has found no strong evidence suggesting a significant
\nforeign connection to the troubles in Maluku.<\/p>\n
In addition, military and police deserters - Christian and
\nMuslim - appear to be involved in occasional attacks. On the
\nChristian side, youth gangs are ready to retaliate if the
\nviolence rises. Local speculation suggests that some elements in
\nthe security forces tolerate, or even support, a low level of
\ncontinuing violence in order to induce property-owners to pay
\nprotection money. Continuing emergency conditions also give
\nsecurity personnel other lucrative opportunities.<\/p>\n
During the last year there have been signs that at least some
\nMuslims are losing enthusiasm for Laskar Jihad. In the past
\nMaluku's Muslims have not been especially attracted to
\n\"fundamentalist\" movements, and most do not identify closely with
\nLaskar Jihad. However, many are grateful for its role in fending
\noff Christian militias. Muslims lack confidence in the security
\nforces to maintain order and fear that Laskar Jihad's withdrawal
\nwould leave them vulnerable to revenge attacks. However,
\nChristian leaders see its presence as the key obstacle to a more
\npermanent peace.<\/p>\n
An effective peace agreement still seems far off in Ambon
\nwhere Muslim leaders and Laskar Jihad are convinced that the
\nChristian side started the fighting and demand that its leaders
\napologize on behalf of their community and the brains behind the
\nconflict be prosecuted. Christians are equally convinced that
\nMuslims started the conflict. They also have only limited
\nconfidence in the TNI's capacity to protect them.<\/p>\n
The government's main priority is to ensure that large scale
\nfighting does not resume. To preserve the present \"peace\", it is
\nessential that the security forces behave in a professional and
\nneutral manner. In Maluku, however, the reality is that local
\nforces, both the military and especially the police, are highly
\nvulnerable to \"contamination\", partisan alignment with their own
\nreligious community. Although Yon Gab contributed to the decline
\nin violence during 2001, its brutal excesses alienated Muslims.
\nThe force that replaced it has yet to win the confidence of both
\ncommunities.<\/p>\n
In North Maluku return to \"normalcy\" is much more advanced,
\npartly because the Muslim majority is too large to feel
\nthreatened politically. Although some of the worst massacres took
\nplace on Halmahera in North Maluku, it is now increasingly
\npossible for refugees to return. The security forces are needed
\nto prevent revenge attacks but it is hoped that a \"natural\"
\nreconciliation process can take place.<\/p>\n
In Maluku, especially Ambon, government and military emphasize
\nthat reconciliation should not be \"forced\" and should proceed
\n\"naturally\". This means the partition of Ambon and other regions
\ninto Christian and Muslim zones will not be ended soon. But the
\nlonger partition lasts, the harder reconciliation will be.
\nMeanwhile, limited steps have been taken to provide more
\nopportunities for the communities to meet naturally such as
\nestablishment of markets in \"neutral\" areas of Ambon where
\nChristian and Muslims can intermingle.<\/p>\n
The Baku Bae (reconciliation) movement has sponsored informal
\nmeetings between leaders. However, these initiatives are still in
\nearly stages, and there is no expectation that natural
\nreconciliation will be achieved quickly.<\/p>\n
In January 2002, the national government persuaded leaders of
\nboth communities to participate in a peace conference the
\nfollowing month but the gap between the sides remains wide, and
\nthe search for peace is far from over.<\/p>\n
Recommendations to Indonesian authorities concerning the
\nsecurity forces:<\/p>\n
1. Use elite forces from outside Maluku to keep peace as local
\nforces are inevitably vulnerable to partisan involvement.<\/p>\n
2. While emphasizing reconciliation where possible (North
\nMaluku), give priority in Ambon to apprehending those responsible
\nfor shootings and bombing designed to maintain tension and
\nprovoke retaliatory violence.<\/p>\n
3. Overcome divisions between Muslim and Christian officers
\nbefore giving the police heavy responsibilities.<\/p>\n
4. Avoid behavior that makes an ultimate settlement more
\ndifficult, e.g., by not treating combatants as \"enemies\" to be
\nkilled and by acting strongly against personnel who commit or
\ncondone human rights abuses.<\/p>\n
5. Combat the practice among security forces of condoning low-
\nlevel violence in order to extract protection money by both
\ntaking firm action against offenders and ultimately raising
\nsalaries.<\/p>\n
6. Take more intensive steps to recover military weapons held
\nby both Muslims and Christians and to prevent the import of
\nmodern arms to the Maluku region.<\/p>\n
Recommendations concerning Laskar Jihad and Laskar Mujahidin:<\/p>\n
7. Ensure that the security forces are able to guarantee the
\nsafety of Muslims in Maluku, especially Ambon, before disarming
\nLaskar Jihad.<\/p>\n
8. Take measures to prevent intimidation by Laskar Jihad of
\nMuslims who seek a modus vivendi with the Christian community.<\/p>\n
9. Intensify intelligence operations to identify the
\nmembership of the Laskar Mujahidin and its possible links with
\ninternational terrorist organizations.<\/p>\n
Recommendations concerning legal issues:<\/p>\n
10. Reconstitute the justice system as a priority, including a
\nfunctioning police force, provision of judges, prosecutors and
\ncourt staff, and protection of those involved with cases related
\nto the communal conflict.<\/p>\n
11. While recognizing that the law must be upheld, give
\nprecedence to the peace and reconciliation process when
\nconsidering whether to bring specific prosecutions in a context
\nwhere violence has been perpetrated by people who believe they
\nacted justifiably to defend their community.<\/p>\n
Recommendations on reconciliation:<\/p>\n
12. Continue to devote resources to helping the more than half
\na million refugees from the conflict and seek additional foreign
\nsupport.<\/p>\n
13. Emphasize forward-looking measures rather than
\ndetermination of the \"truth\" about the conflict's beginnings
\nthrough a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Maluku that
\nwould be counter-productive at this stage.<\/p>\n
14. Encourage private efforts for \"natural\" reconciliation
\nsuch as those taken by Baku Bae.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/executive-summary-and-recommendations-1447899208",
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