Examining future role of E. Asia<\/p>\n
By Thitinan Pongsudhirak<\/p>\n
BANGKOK: First, a country simply must be located in the broad
\ngeographical scheme of East Asia. On a map, this would roughly
\ntranslate into the vast territory ringed by the Russian Far East,
\nJapan, down to Australia, New Zealand, and the ASEAN area upward
\nto Myanmar and China.<\/p>\n
Second, a country must have a booming export-led economy, and
\nthe boom must be part of an ongoing trend. This is basically the
\nreason why so many people the world over are paying so much
\nattention to East Asia. Much of the international spotlight would
\nsurely shy away should the region's rapid and continual growth
\ncome to a grinding halt.<\/p>\n
This pre-condition is evident in the cases of sustained
\neconomic boom in coastal China, the so-called ASEAN Four
\ncomprising Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines to a
\nlesser extent, the four Asian \"tigers\" consisting of South Korea,
\nTaiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong.<\/p>\n
Vietnam appears on the threshold of meeting this pre-
\ncondition, provided it can continue to attract foreign investment
\nand utilize cheap labor as an advantage for export-led growth.<\/p>\n
Although Japan has already gone through its boom stage, it is
\nriding on the boom's coat-tails with a much lower but still
\nsteady growth. Japan's ability to overcome the recent Kobe
\ncatastrophe, moreover, testifies to the country's national
\nresolve and latent economic prowess.<\/p>\n
Third, a country must have a political system that bears
\nshades of authoritarianism. In China and Vietnam, this
\nprerequisite seems to need no elaboration. While Hong Kong may be
\nan exception due to British governance, its pending return to
\nChina raises the specter of authoritarian rule. Most obviously,
\nthe Singaporean government has often been dubbed openly as \"soft\"
\nauthoritarian.<\/p>\n
In South Korea and Taiwan, genuine western-style parliamentary
\nsystems have replaced the authoritarian military regimes of the
\nrecent past, but a reversion to authoritarian rule is not
\naltogether inconceivable.<\/p>\n
Thailand, too, has recently developed a pluralistic
\nparliamentary system to succeed authoritarian government. But the
\nfact that the Thais tacitly accepted the coup d'etat of February
\n1991 suggests that the country's denizens may be less democratic
\nthan some people would like to believe.<\/p>\n
Because of the one-party dominance of UMNO (United Malay
\nNational Organization), Malaysia's democracy has found skeptics
\nand outright critics in many quarters.<\/p>\n
Post-Marcos Filipinos take great pride in their democratic
\nsystem, but their democracy has been criticized for the country's
\nsluggish economic growth (until last year when it turned robust).<\/p>\n
Japan, of course, has a thriving democratic system planted by
\nthe Americans after World War II. Yet Japan has often been
\naccused, by no less than its ex-conquerors, of being
\nauthoritarian in its economic policies.<\/p>\n
Hence, there appears to be a connection between varying
\ndegrees and forms of authoritarianism and sustained economic
\ndevelopment, a relationship which is at the heart of all the
\nattention being focused on East Asia.<\/p>\n
Authoritarianism in political governance in varying degrees
\nand in different time periods, it seems, has begotten successful
\ncapitalist development in East Asia. This largely represents the
\nregion's mystique.<\/p>\n
As a corollary to the third, the fourth pre-condition is that
\na country must have a populace whose political and social values
\nare conducive to authoritarian rule.<\/p>\n
In East Asia, while there are diverse cultures and religions,
\nthe Confucian tradition is predominant, partly bolstered by the
\npresence of overseas Chinese. Moreover, the Buddhist, Islamic,
\nand Hindu traditions promote many of the same values of the
\nConfucian.<\/p>\n
As opposed to the western liberal values of democracy, human
\nrights, individual freedom, the rule of law, and equality,
\nConfucian values emphasize \"order and stability as preconditions
\nfor economic growth, and growth as the necessary foundation of
\nany political order that claims to advance human dignity.\"<\/p>\n
Put another way, East Asian states emphasize \"a social
\ncontract between people and state which guarantees basic needs
\nand law and order in exchange for respect for authority and self-
\nreliance without welfarism, a morally clean environment, a free
\nbut responsible press, and the rejection of `the extreme form of
\nindividualism practiced in the West.'\"<\/p>\n
In addition, Confucian values include such key behavioral
\ntraits as the primacy of the family institution, emphasis on
\neducation, deference to authority, hard work, and relatively high
\nsavings.<\/p>\n
The general upshot is that these values promote a kind of
\ncommunitarian-based society and a strong but benevolent state, in
\nstark contrast to the western countries' individualistic society
\nand democratic state besieged by special interest groups and
\nboundless press.<\/p>\n
The similarities in economic performance and political values
\nof the East Asian countries mentioned above would suggest a tidal
\nshift in history. It is small wonder why the \"Pacific Century\"
\nliterature has proliferated astoundingly in anticipation of East
\nAsia's dominance during the 21st century.<\/p>\n
Some thinkers have already suggested that non-western
\ncivilizations such as those of East Asia will no longer be the
\nobjects of history or targets of western colonialism, but will
\njoin the West as movers and shapers of history.<\/p>\n
In other words, because of their phenomenal economic
\nperformance, the countries of East Asia can more than ever before
\ndetermine their own future. Indeed, if the fundamental premise
\nthat power stems from wealth bears any validity, East Asia is
\nabout to get its turn at moving and shaping history.<\/p>\n
In the realm of economics, the \"Asianization\" of East Asia is
\nalready well underway, revolving around Japan and the four NIC
\ncountries. During the six years after the 1985 Plaza Accord,
\nJapan poured more than 25 percent of its foreign direct
\ninvestment into the ASEAN Four countries.<\/p>\n
Similarly, the four Asian Tiger economies in the same period
\nput 45 percent of their total FDI into Malaysia, 29 percent in
\nThailand, 18 percent in Indonesia, and 25 percent in the
\nPhilippines. Moreover, there are multiplying trade and investment
\nties in coastal China with Taiwan and Hong Kong.<\/p>\n
As some have noted, coastal China is but a series of regional
\neconomies, drawing capital, technology, and entrepreneurial
\nskills from Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, ASEAN recently agreed to create a free-
\ntrade area in Southeast Asia by the year 2003. The Malaysian
\nleader, Mahathir Mohamad, has also called for a closer economic
\ncooperation among East Asia countries known as the East Asian
\nEconomic Caucus, which would include ASEAN and South Korea,
\nJapan, and China.<\/p>\n
But whether the 10 or 11 countries of East Asia can coalesce
\nand unite into a reckoning force like history has never seen will
\ndepend on their ability to confront a number of challenges in the
\ncoming years stemming from successful capitalist development
\nitself.<\/p>\n
To put it another way, East Asian countries are in danger of
\nbeing victims of their own economic successes. Unless they can
\nsurmount the challenges posed by successful capitalist
\ndevelopment, their values, their traditional way of life and
\ntheir world-views will soon resemble an era gone with the wind.<\/p>\n
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is a lecturer in the Department of
\nInternational Relations and a fellow at the Institute of Security
\nand International Studies, Faculty of Political Science,
\nChulalongkorn University.<\/p>\n
-- The Nation<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/examining-future-role-of-e-asia-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }