Evaluating the regional autonomy policy<\/p>\n
By Dewi Anggraeni<\/p>\n
MELBOURNE (JP): In the early 1990s countries in Asia such as
\nthe Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan and South Korea began their
\nregional autonomy processes, yet this trend seemed to elude
\nIndonesia at that time. There was even a strong suspicion among
\nthe political elite that regional autonomy would lead to national
\ndisintegration. Finally, with the fall of the New Order, the
\nsubsequent government could no longer deny the push for autonomy
\nfrom the grass roots.<\/p>\n
Seven months after the introduction of the regional autonomy
\npolicy, a review of it was the focus of a recent conference held
\nby six Australian universities on July 7-8.<\/p>\n
Several case studies were presented: those of Irian, South
\nSulawesi, Bangka Belitung, West Sumatra, and Bali.<\/p>\n
Andi Mallarangeng, Chair of the Policy Committee for
\nPartnership of Governance Reform in Indonesia and lecturer at the
\nInstitute of Government Studies, was among those who threw some
\nlight on the teething problems in the implementation of regional
\nautonomy.<\/p>\n
In South Sulawesi, regionalization has seen the revival of
\nmany sentiments suppressed during the past three decades; among
\nthem regarding ethnicity. The Mandarese, a major ethnic group in
\nthe western part of South Sulawesi (one of its prominent
\npersonalities being the late Baharuddin Lopa), feel
\ndisenfranchised. South Sulawesi has 24 seats on the local
\ncouncil, yet none was allocated to Mandarese. Consequently, they
\nhave demanded their own province in the western part of the South
\nSulawesi.<\/p>\n
Those who want Sulawesi to return to the old kingdoms such as
\nLuhu and Bone, demand provinces oriented according to the former
\nborders of those kingdoms.<\/p>\n
There are also religion-based aspirations, such as that led by
\nthe son of the late Kahar Muzzakar, leader of the DI-TII Islamic-
\nbased movement, who is keen on implementing the Islamic syariah
\nin South Sulawesi. While they have never demanded an Indonesian
\nIslamic state, they harbor ambitions to form an East Indonesian
\nIslamic State. The revived romantic appeal of an East Indonesian
\nState has also driven groups of students to lobby for an
\nindependent Sulawesi. All these demands have to be managed wisely
\nand effectively.<\/p>\n
Andi Mallarangeng stressed that regional autonomy has brought
\nsubstantial advantages to South Sulawesi. It has empowered the
\nlocal heads, governors and mayors to make decisions clearly
\nbeneficial to their respective regions. It has also raised the
\nprofiles of the regions to the national level. The mayor of
\nMakassar is the vice chair of the Association of Mayors of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
From Bali, Nyoman Riasa of the Indonesian Australian Language
\nFoundation said that the Balinese, while having a strong sense of
\nregional identity, are also aware that a Republic of Bali is
\nhardly viable.<\/p>\n
\"In 1998, after the May riot in Jakarta, the Balinese saw how
\nvulnerable they were to situations in other areas surrounding
\nBali. With no supplies coming from Java, food became scarce.
\nPeople were worried they would eventually ... starve.\"<\/p>\n
In Bali, the greater concern is more about how to obtain a
\nlarger share of the revenue generated by Bali and in Bali.<\/p>\n
However, the disparity of economic capability in different
\nregions makes some local governments more prepared and others
\nless so. Nyoman Riasa believes that Badung and Gianyar local
\nregency administrations are the most equipped in this case, given
\ntheir revenue sources to absorb the costs incurred, as well as
\nbeing able to take advantage of the policy.<\/p>\n
\"Badung regency is so well-off it even subsidizes other
\nregencies,\" Nyoman Riasa explained. If these arrangements could
\nbe maintained, all would be well. However recently the Badung
\nregency government hinted that it would like to reduce these
\nsubsidies, which naturally alarmed the other regencies.<\/p>\n
Both the regencies of Badung (with Kuta, Legian, Seminyak,
\nNusa Dua and Jimbaran), and Gianyar (with Ubud and Mas) draw the
\nbulk of their revenues from the tourism industry. While tourism
\nseems to be a solid source of revenue, it has proven to be
\nsomewhat vulnerable at times of political instability.<\/p>\n
What is more, Nyoman Riasa said, some aspects of Balinese
\nculture, such as Catur Guru and the caste system, which are
\nreliant on submissiveness, are open to manipulation by those in
\npower. In an interpersonal situation, a person of higher caste
\ncan immediately gain the upperhand vis-a-vis his or her
\ninterlocutor by adopting specific pronouns and verbs in speaking
\nBalinese.<\/p>\n
During pre-autonomy days, an effective leveler was the use of
\nthe much more egalitarian Indonesian language. One aspiration of
\nthe regionalists however, is to revive their unique culture.
\nWould this imply a return to undemocratic social practices?
\nWasn't it the onset of democracy that opened doors to regional
\nautonomy? There are clearly more questions than answers.<\/p>\n
While demands in terms of regional autonomy may not
\nnecessarily affect Indonesia in the national context, in the
\ncurrent economic circumstances, they could prove very expensive.
\nThe policy needs an overhaul of the national legal structure and
\nan implementation mechanism has to be instituted.<\/p>\n
The government seems to lack the ability to look ahead and
\npredict outcomes and problems, Andi observed.<\/p>\n
\"When the state ministry for regional autonomy was disbanded,
\nwe suggested that an authorized body be instituted to replace it.
\nBut the government instituted a directorate general instead,
\nwhich has very little authority in terms of supervision and
\nmonitoring.\"<\/p>\n
Citing the complexities, Arief Budiman, a professor of the
\nUniversity of Melbourne, said that while Indonesia may not
\ndisintegrate, it may not remain solid either \"because there will
\nalways be tension and problems.\"<\/p>\n
Both Arief and Robert Cribb of the University of
\nQueensland expressed guarded optimism about regional autonomy in
\nIndonesia, among others because autonomy laws can make local
\ngovernments vulnerable to control by powerful outside or local
\nforces, either big corporations, multinationals or army units.<\/p>\n
\"Another danger is the growth of criminality within units that
\nare too small to police themselves properly,\" Cribb added.<\/p>\n
One big problem with regional autonomy, Cribb said, is that
\n\"no one has come up with really good ideas that can revitalize
\nthe center in Indonesian politics.\"<\/p>\n
Maybe Indonesia needs to go through a period of regionalism,
\nhe said, \"and once the advantages of regionalism has been
\nexhausted, perhaps it can return to a greater degree of
\ncentralization, because central authority also has its own
\nadvantages.\" If the decentralization is managed in a way that
\nIndonesia doesn't fall apart, then probably that kind of cycle
\ncan be established,\" Cribb said.<\/p>\n
The writer is a journalist and novelist based in Melbourne,
\nAustralia.<\/p>",
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