Establishing new councils smacks of scapegoating<\/p>\n
President B.J. Habibie's fondness for setting up councils has
\noften caused controversy, the latest being the Council for the
\nEnforcement of Security and Law. Political analyst J. Soedjati
\nDjiwandono, addresses this issue.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): There is a growing tendency on the part of the
\nHabibie government to govern this country through what the
\nPresident calls \"councils\", in addition to his Cabinet, his
\n\"council of ministers\".<\/p>\n
Habibie established the Council for Economic Resilience, and
\nmost recently the Council for the Enforcement of Security and
\nLaw\", or what can be construed as a \"national security council\".<\/p>\n
His mentor and predecessor, Soeharto, wanted to establish a
\n\"reform council\" shortly before his resignation. But as no one
\nwas willing to join it, he decided to resign.<\/p>\n
Despite Habibie's good intention, not much can be expected
\nfrom this latest innovation. Indeed, the riots in society have
\ntended to create a doubtful or, more likely, a false impression
\nof rampant religious conflict. This may explain the inclusion of
\nreligious leaders on the council.<\/p>\n
However, it seems simplistic to conclude that the burning or
\ndestruction of places of worship of different religions by what
\nmay best be described as mobs is a reflection of religious
\nconflict rather than primarily criminal acts.<\/p>\n
Even if they are instigated by conflicting groups among the
\npolitical elite exploiting religious sentiment or abusing
\nreligion for political ends, as some inside as well as outside
\ngovernment circles have insisted, they remain criminal acts with
\nlittle to do with religion or relations between followers of
\ndifferent religions.<\/p>\n
Quite apart from the nature of the conflicts, they are
\ndefinitely security problems. And as such they are the
\ngovernment's problems. What can one expect from those religious
\nleaders? What can one expect of these people, whose competence
\nshould rightly remain outside practical politics, including
\npolicy-making? And what can one expect from the council as a
\nwhole if it is supposed to be a policy-making body, and yet with
\nno operational authority?<\/p>\n
One may rightly wonder if the establishment of different
\ncouncils is not much more than a government attempt to wash its
\nhands, to pass the buck, and particularly in the case of failure,
\nto put or at least to share the blame with other people or
\nsubordinate state institutions, thus shirking its
\nresponsibilities. It would not be unlike the current pattern of
\nfinding scapegoats for anything that goes amiss.<\/p>\n
Interestingly, some members of the council, as with the
\nprevious council and the combined fact-finding team, are Cabinet
\nministers. Clearly their membership of such councils outside the
\ngovernment will only increase their already heavy burden.<\/p>\n
Such an undertaking may have begun with the formation of the
\nso-called \"voluntary\" civilian guards to assist troops in
\nsafeguarding the recent People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)
\nSpecial Session and thus ensuring its \"success\". It may also
\ninclude the idea of having \"trained people\" helping the police,
\nwhose function is yet to be clearly defined. It would be eerily
\nreminiscent of the Indonesian communists' idea of a \"fifth
\nforce\".<\/p>\n
One thing is clear: It will not solve the security problem and
\nmay make matters worse. It would at best mean trying to solve
\nconflicts by creating new ones.<\/p>\n
It is doubtful if either Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution
\nor Law No. 20\/1982, which provides for the right and obligation
\nof all citizens to take part in the defense of the country, would
\nbe applicable in this case. The nation is not facing any external
\nthreat.<\/p>\n
So who or what are the forces posing a challenge or a threat
\nto the existence and integrity of the state or the nation? If not
\nof external nature, then the \"enemy\" must be internal. But then
\nthe formation of such a force would only play groups of people,
\nthe nation's own citizens, off against one another. This would
\nmean a civil war.<\/p>\n
Worse still, one may be tempted to suspect that the formation
\nof such additional bodies would form part of the government's
\neffort to mobilize what may appear to be popular support, thereby
\nstrengthening its legitimacy. It may also be part of a delaying
\ntactic in the face of what might appear to be insurmountable
\nproblems in hand.<\/p>\n
If the government should at any point feel incapable of
\nrunning or governing the country, or of solving its problems,
\nthen the logical thing to do would be to resign gracefully. After
\nall, when Habibie was made vice president, it is doubtful if he
\nwas meant by Soeharto to assume the top position before the end
\nof the latter's term. The fact is that Soeharto promised to give
\nan accountability report to the MPR in 2003. Who would have
\nthought that he would resign only two months later?<\/p>\n
Soeharto never had a vice president for more than one term.
\nThere is little reason to believe otherwise with regard to
\nHabibie.<\/p>",
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