Eradicating corruption, means first crushing the Oligarchy<\/p>\n
Danang Widoyoko<\/p>\n
The new government has vowed to take real action against corrupt
\nofficials in its first 100 days as a form of "shock therapy" in
\nan effort to gain public trust. But properly enforcing the law
\nagainst such a widespread problem, with so many involved, is
\nnothing short of a monumental task.<\/p>\n
The previous presidents of Indonesia have failed to eradicate
\ncorruption, although a lot of regulations have been reviewed and
\nnew laws enacted. However, corruption in this country has not
\nbeen reduced, but has spread further -- to every level of the
\ngovernment and beyond.<\/p>\n
Policy and institutional reform<\/p>\n
The Anticorruption Law (Law No. 31\/1999) defines corruption as
\nthe abuse of power to enrich oneself, creating state financial
\nlosses. By this definition, the corruption eradication strategy
\nshould then be started by reforming the (state) power.<\/p>\n
One of the first things that needs to be tackled is to
\nestablish regulations that limit individual power and reduce the
\nopportunity to abuse that power. Then the strategy can continue
\nby improving the Anticorruption Law, implementing the
\nAnticorruption Commission, reforming the judiciary and requiring
\ngood governance programs in every government office. This
\nstrategy is known as policy and institutional reform.<\/p>\n
It has been successfully implemented in other countries. One
\nsuch success story was carried out by Roland Abaroa, the mayor of
\nthe Bolivian capital of La Paz. Similar successes have also been
\nachieved by the Hong Kong Anticorruption Commission. That
\ncommission has since become the standard for all anticorruption
\ncommissions elsewhere.<\/p>\n
In the Indonesian context, there actually has already been a
\nsuccessful corruption eradication implemented. It was done not by
\nthe central government, but by Solok Regent Gamawan Fauzi in the
\nprovince of West Sumatra. Gamawan has reformed the local
\ngovernment bureaucracy into a more transparent, efficient and
\naccountable entity. All government services in the regency have
\nbeen made clear and measurable, particularly in terms of time and
\ncost.<\/p>\n
The efficiency measures carried out by Gamawan have greatly
\nincreased the local officials' welfare and thus reduced
\ncorruption in the regency.<\/p>\n
But in general, such policy and institutional reforms in
\nIndonesia have never worked successfully. Dozens and dozens of
\nserious corruption scandals have never been investigated, let
\nalone been adjudicated upon in a court of law. The Corruption
\nPerception Index done each year by Transparency International
\nconsistently shows Indonesia to be one of the most corrupt
\ncountries in the world. So, what is wrong with a policy and
\ninstitutional reform strategy?<\/p>\n
First, the initiative to combat corruption has not come from
\nthe government. Most of the agendas were driven by international
\nfinancial institutions, especially from the International
\nMonetary Fund (IMF), through the signing of Letters of Intent as
\na condition of IMF's support for Indonesia. In this case, the
\nownership of the strategy is on the IMF, not the government of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
Secondly, there is not adequate political will to eradicate
\ncorruption. And yet political will is the important factor behind
\na successful corruption eradication system.<\/p>\n
So, the next important question to be raised is what is an
\nalternative strategy to combat corruption if government political
\nis inadequate?<\/p>\n
To answer this question, we have to look at another definition
\nof corruption to fully understand the situation.<\/p>\n
Political economy of corruption<\/p>\n
Corruption is not only caused by the state's inability to
\nimplement tight monitoring systems, but also because there is not
\nan integrated system of internal supervision in the public
\nsector. That is the reason why reforming the bureaucracy and
\ntightening internal supervision will not automatically reduce
\ncorruption.<\/p>\n
Improving law enforcement by reforming the police, the
\nprosecutors and the courts as is the trend here these days, will
\nnot automatically bring immediate results.<\/p>\n
Corruption has its roots in politics and grows in a power-
\nrelated environment. General definitions of corruption --
\ndescribed as an abuse of power for one's personal interests --
\nclearly shows that corruption is part of the power itself.<\/p>\n
It has become an open secret that corruption and money
\npolitics were rife and widespread during the recent general
\nelections. And in such a corrupt political recruitment system, it
\nis nearly impossible to produce credible leaders. In fact, such
\nan election, where candidates essentially "invest" huge sums of
\nmoney to people that can get them elected, gives birth to
\ncorrupt leaders who almost have to be involved in corruption to
\nrecoup their "investment".<\/p>\n
The systemic corruption here can also be attributed in part to
\nthe strong political and economic oligarchy that continues to
\nthrive. Paul Johnson defines oligarchy as a tiny clique of elite
\nleaders that make the public policy to suit their own private
\ninterests, through direct subsidies, and provide facilities or
\nprotection from other business competitors (Hadiz&Robinson,
\n2004).<\/p>\n
This oligarchy roots corruption in politics and spreads to all
\nof the power dimensions. The oligarchy thus supports the corrupt
\npolitical culture as well.<\/p>\n
The fall of the New Order government was not followed by the
\nfall of the oligarchy. The reform movement has only shifted the
\ntop of the oligarchy. Now, the oligarchy has been revived and
\nadapted to democracy and the pro-market economy.<\/p>\n
The failure of law enforcers in huge corruption scandals like
\nthe Central Bank Liquidity Support (BLBI) case, the release of
\nsuspects in big corruption cases and the flourishing corruption
\nin the privatization program are proof of the continued existence
\nof the oligarchy.<\/p>\n
Therefore, genuine efforts to eradicate corruption in
\nIndonesia should start with the removal of the roots of the
\nproblem. The oligarchy must be crushed.<\/p>\n
Opportunities to eradicate corruption<\/p>\n
The new government has some positive momentum that it can use
\nto eradicate corruption, especially because the president and the
\nvice president had been elected directly by the people with a
\nmandate directly from the people. In this antigraft campaign, the
\nnew government will not be able to depend on the legislative
\nbranch for much help.<\/p>\n
Yet, obstacles to combating corruption will likely come from
\nthe president's own supporters. To be a president, one does not
\nonly need political support, but money as well. The president is
\nexpected to reimburse those who helped him financially, and that
\nwill make the eradication of corruption more difficult.<\/p>\n
So, is there an opportunity to combat corruption in this
\nsituation?<\/p>\n
First, the corruption eradication campaign can start with
\ncoordinating the existing law enforcement agencies. It is the
\ntask of Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to deal with the
\nbig oligarchy-related corruption scandals.<\/p>\n
The KPK should be an independent body and have no political
\nhandicaps that would prevent it from prosecuting high-profile
\ncorruption cases that involve the economic and political
\noligarchy. Moreover, the KPK needs extraordinary discretion.<\/p>\n
The KPK does not need to get permission from the president to
\ninvestigate high-ranking public officials. The government should
\nonly equip the KPK with adequate staff and budget to send the big
\ncorruptors to the jail.<\/p>\n
At the same time, the Attorney General's Office, as a part of
\nthe government, should take the small-scale cases that do not
\nhave "supreme" political handicaps to deal with, like corruption
\ncases found in regional governments. What the Attorney General's
\nOffice has to do is only to monitor and supervise the prosecutors
\nto guarantee that the investigations are going well.<\/p>\n
With the distribution of law enforcement, the President will
\nnot directly challenge the oligarchy of corruption. It is the
\ntask of the KPK to clean up the oligarchy.<\/p>\n
The second strategy that can be done by the government is to
\nestablish an integrated system of public services. The government
\ndid not start the campaign for good governance as the initiatives
\nhad come from donors and the public.<\/p>\n
The eradication of corruption in public service is a strategic
\neffort because the impact will directly benefit the people. The
\nsuccess of eradicating corruption in public services will improve
\npublic trust in the end.<\/p>\n
Both of the above strategies are a part of institutional and
\npolicy reform that need strong political will. The next problem
\nis how to give birth to leaders who have high integrity and
\nstrong political commitment? The answer to this question is
\nactually the third strategy that has its roots in civil society.<\/p>\n
Now is the time for civil society to get deeper into politics
\nrather than just set up monitoring bodies and become watchdogs.
\nThe presence of civil society is particularly crucial in
\nsupporting officials or leaders, who are committed to combating
\ncorruption, such as Gamawan Fauzi. The movement to tackle rotten
\npoliticians, the establishment of political contracts between
\npoliticians and their constituents must be done and supported by
\nother stakeholders.<\/p>\n
Support from the civil society in combating corruption is
\nactually in line with the basic idea of good governance. Good
\ngovernance assumes the balance between the state, the private
\nsector and the civil society. In fact, most of the efforts to
\neradicate corruption are state-oriented and give lots of support
\nto the government, although the government does not have enough
\nof a political will to carry it out.<\/p>\n
Deputy Coordinator of the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW)<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/eradicating-corruption-means-first-crushing-the-oligarchy-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }