Enough of democratizing, time for institutionalizing<\/p>\n
James Van Zorge, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Over the coming months and years, Indonesians and those who
\ngovern should come to the realization that the office of the
\npresidency and the men and women who occupy it -- foremost the
\nPresident -- needs to be given greater resources in order to lead
\nmore effectively in an era of democratization. To not recognize
\nso would be folly; to argue against it would be an injustice.<\/p>\n
Since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia's politicians
\nand lawmakers have successfully concocted a participatory
\ndemocracy. In the path of sweeping constitutional changes, new
\nelectoral laws and the introduction of regional autonomy that
\nwere engineered by the Habibie Administration, reformist measures
\ntaken by his successors have been, with few exceptions,
\nconsistently in tune with the public's desire to move steadfastly
\naway from the country's autocratic past.<\/p>\n
With most of the democratic \"hardware\" now in place, the next
\ngoal in Indonesian politics should be creating the \"software\" for
\nensuring better governance.<\/p>\n
For example, newcomers and old players alike inside the
\nnational and local parliaments need more training and funding to
\nimprove their capabilities and capacities to legislate.
\nOtherwise, what was once an institution that was neither given
\nthe powers nor expected to perform will not be able to perform
\nnow that it has been empowered.<\/p>\n
A similar, perhaps even more compelling argument -- although
\nfor exactly the opposite reason -- could be made about the
\nIndonesian presidency. Whilst the challenge for parliament is
\nbeing able to find the means to govern better and more
\nresponsibly with its newly-found powers, the President's one is
\nthat of adapting his office and staff to a system -- still in its
\nstage of infancy -- in which he is required to share power.<\/p>\n
During the bygone years of autocracy, the President was the
\nSupreme Commander of Everything. Former President Soeharto's
\ngovernment was his, and his alone. Soeharto's cabinet of
\ntechnocrats played the role of being presidential advisors. The
\nbureaucracy and parliament played the role of rubber-stamp
\ninstitutions in subservience to the President. Critics were
\nsidelined, or worse, and those who did not provide the rubber
\nstamp were stamped out.<\/p>\n
Now enter democracy: What President Susilo's predecessors
\nfailed to grasp, but what he must quickly understand and act
\nupon, is the need for him to become master of a new paradigm.<\/p>\n
Unlike Soeharto, President Susilo must find ways to influence
\nlegislators: No longer an instrument of the president, today's
\nlegislators are -- for various reasons -- often at odds with the
\nexecutive. Such is the reality of any democracy.<\/p>\n
Having to work with a coalition cabinet, the President must
\nalso deal with ministers and secretaries of state agencies that
\noften hold party affiliations different from his and are --
\nbecause of inter- and intra-bureaucratic politics -- inclined to
\npursue agendas that diverge with the President's. The fact that
\nPresident Susilo has coined his cabinet as Kabinet Indonesia
\nBersatu should make us wonder whether he understands the fact
\nthat, although he appointed his ministers, they are not
\nnecessarily his own men. Expecting his ministers to understand
\nand act in accord with what he sees as being in the national
\ninterest or within the better interests of his office would, at
\nbest, be naove.<\/p>\n
Even more daunting, the President must also contend with
\ndecentralization, which means trying to conduct an ever-growing
\nchorus of governors and local legislators who see themselves as
\ncompetitors -- rather than partners -- of the national
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
For sure, being a democratic leader is no cakewalk --
\nanywhere. Presidents in most democracies find it extraordinarily
\nchallenging to meet the unreasonable expectation that, somehow,
\nthey alone have the power to solve a nation's ills.<\/p>\n
President Susilo should be reminded of the story where, in the
\nearly summer of 1952, before the heat of the U.S. presidential
\ncampaign, President Truman used to contemplate the problems of
\nthe general-become-President should Eisenhower win the
\nforthcoming election. \"He'll sit here, and he'll say, 'Do this!
\nDo that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike -- it won't be a bit
\nlike the Army. He'll find it very frustrating\".<\/p>\n
Still, there are important differences between being the
\nPresident of United States and that of Indonesia. One is that the
\nAmerican president has an institutional complex that supports his
\noffice. The Indonesian president has none.<\/p>\n
In the United States, for example, the President has an
\nimpressive and extensive array of agencies at his disposal that
\nare staffed by professionals whose sole function is to serve the
\nPresident. Overall, the institution of the presidency in
\nWashington includes 2,500 people with policy-making
\nresponsibilities with a yearly budget of between US$300-$350
\nmillion.<\/p>\n
Some of the more important professional units working on
\nbehalf of the President of the United States include the Office
\nof Legislative Affairs, the National Security Council, the
\nCouncil of Economic Advisors, the Office of Science and
\nTechnology Policy, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
\nthe Council on Environmental Quality, the Office of National Drug
\nControl Policy and, more recently, the Office of Homeland
\nSecurity.<\/p>\n
In contrast, the Indonesian President has scant resources.
\nAlthough there is an experienced corps of administrative
\npersonnel working at the Palace, there are no professional
\nagencies that serve the President. Although the incumbent
\nPresident of Indonesia is certainly better off than, say, Thomas
\nJefferson, who had a staff of only one secretary and a messenger,
\nhow can one reasonably expect a modern president in an emerging
\ndemocracy to perform without professional staff working by his
\nside? If one had to pity poor Ike, how should we feel for
\nPresident Susilo?<\/p>\n
There are promising signs that perhaps help is coming. Since
\nPresident Susilo has taken office, there have been discussions
\ninside his so-called \"Team 11\" of the need for creating the
\nequivalent of a \"West Wing\" in the Palace. These Palace
\nconfidantes have the right instincts; hopefully, President Susilo
\nshares the same.<\/p>\n
Yet, there are already critics of these plans to create the
\n\"software\" that the President needs to get his job done. One
\nminister has argued that there are legal complications. But why
\ndiscuss the problems, not the solutions? Some argue that the help
\nhe needs can come from within the cabinet.<\/p>\n
This specious thinking fails to recognize the realities of
\nbureaucratic and coalition politics and, how they work against
\nthe better interests of a president. Others doubt the need. At
\nbest, we could presume that these naysayers do not understand the
\ncomplexities of managing a modern government; at worst, we might
\nsurmise that their underlying motives are of a more sinister
\nnature.<\/p>\n
The writer is a senior partner of Van Zorge, Heffernan &
\nAssociates, a government relations consulting firm based in
\nJakarta.<\/p>",
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