End of a chapter<\/p>\n
By disbanding the Coordinating Agency to Support the
\nStrengthening of National Stability (Bakorstanas) and all its
\nunits in the regions, President Abdurrahman Wahid has closed
\nanother chapter in the military's domination of the government in
\nthis country. Bakorstanas, and even more so its precursor, the
\nOperational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order
\n(Kopkamtib), were the tools through which the military exercised
\nits combined role of defense and politics. These were the
\nomnipotent agencies through which the military flexed its muscles
\nso effectively in controlling the country for more than three
\ndecades.<\/p>\n
Although it was supposed to have played the role of
\ncoordinator, Bakorstanas was headed at the national level by the
\ncommander-in-chief of the military, and at the regional levels by
\nthe chiefs of the regional military commands. Except at the
\nnational level, where the military chief reported to the
\npresident, the heads of the regional agencies (Bakorstanasda)
\nbecame the de facto local rulers, with the power to override the
\ncivilian administrations \"in the interests of the nation\". In
\npractice, the agency and its regional units became tools for then
\npresident Soeharto and his military commanders to ensure full
\ncontrol over the country.<\/p>\n
The history of Bakorstanas and its predecessor Kopkamtib is
\nfilled with much blood, all spilled in the name of maintaining
\nnational security. Kopkamtib was established in late 1965 to
\nbring the nation back from the brink of chaos in the wake of an
\nabortive coup blamed by the Army on the communists. Soeharto,
\nthen a young Army general, headed the agency and his power was
\nboosted on March 11, 1966, when then president Sukarno signed
\naway all his powers, virtually at gunpoint, giving the agency
\ncarte blanche to do whatever was necessary to restore order and
\npeace.<\/p>\n
Things were never the same from that point on. Soeharto used
\nthat power not only to crush the communists, but also to assume
\npower a year later. Soeharto retained Kopkamtib, which Sukarno
\nestablished in a time of emergency, to help him secure his grip
\nover the country and sustain his power. Kopkamtib became a
\nruthless agency which rounded up Soeharto's political opponents,
\nincluding student activists in the 1970s and 1980s. The agency's
\npublic notoriety reached such a point that in 1988 Soeharto
\nreplaced Kopkamtib with a new agency, called Bakorstanas.<\/p>\n
With a new name and a supposedly more humane face, the new
\nagency essentially played the same role as Kopkamtib. Like its
\npredecessor, Bakorstanas and its regional units possessed immense
\npower that should have raised questions about its legitimacy.<\/p>\n
It is only appropriate that President Abdurrahman now has
\ndecided to abolish Bakorstanas, since his democratically elected
\ngovernment no longer has any use for such an agency. And with the
\nseparation of the National Police from the Indonesian Military
\n(TNI) last April, internal security should now fall fully under
\nthe authority of the police. There can be no more questions about
\nwho is in charge of internal security during times of noncrisis.
\nThe military's involvement in internal security should be
\nrestricted to when the country, or particular regions, is in a
\nstate of emergency.<\/p>\n
By abolishing Bakorstanas, the President has effectively
\nclipped the power of the military, which many people in the past
\nmeekly accepted. Abdurrahman has done this with little fanfare
\nand even less prior warning. But this is the same President who
\nhas also single-handedly maneuvered to replace a number of
\nmilitary top brass whose democratic credentials were dubious,
\nrestoring civil supremacy over the military in the process. This
\nis the President who has made good on his promise to fight for a
\ncivil society, in a style that often confuses his supporters and
\ndetractors.<\/p>\n
If the President is consistent, his next target will be the
\ncomplex network of the Army's territorial arms, from the regional
\nto the district commands. They too overlap with the duties of the
\npolice, and they too have had their share of power abuses.<\/p>\n
The President's detractors within the TNI have tried to
\nportray his maneuverings to bring the military under control as
\nmeddling in their internal affairs. Others have suggested that
\nthe endless criticism of TNI is aimed at destroying the military.
\nBut even the harshest criticism of the military pales in
\ncomparison to the atrocities TNI has committed in the past
\nagainst its own people. The military has been guilty of some of
\nthe most heinous crimes, and has literally gotten away with
\nmurder.<\/p>\n
It seems far too preposterous to conclude that the President's
\nmaneuvers and the public criticism are part of a systematic
\ncampaign to destroy TNI. No sane citizen, not even those who have
\nsuffered the worst of the military's atrocities, could envisage a
\nnation without a military. These criticisms reflect the
\nincreasing public demand for greater public accountability from
\nthe military, which is essential in any democracy. They are
\nintended to pressure TNI to mend its ways. The sooner TNI adapts
\nto the changing times, the quicker the criticism will dissipate,
\nand the faster TNI will regain the public's respect.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/end-of-a-chapter-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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