Elections law has no basis to end status quo<\/p>\n
Satya Arinanto, Lecturer, Faculty of Law University of Indonesia,
\nJakarta, arinanto@cbn.net.id<\/p>\n
After a long debate, the House of Representatives and the
\ngovernment finally passed the elections law into effect on Feb.
\n18. Previously, at the end of 2002, the House and the government
\nhad passed Law No. 31\/2002 on political parties.<\/p>\n
However, we still have to wait for at least three other bills
\n-- those on the election of the president and vice president, on
\nthe structure and the status of the People's Consultative
\nAssembly and the national and local legislative bodies, and the
\nbill of the constitutional court.<\/p>\n
And we also still have to wait for around more than 100
\nregulations which need to be issued by the General Elections
\nCommission.<\/p>\n
Since the New Order era, the pro-democracy movement has been
\nincreasingly calling for genuinely free and fair elections. As
\nobserved by Anders Uhlin in his book Indonesia and the 'third
\nwave of democratization': The Indonesian pro-democracy movement
\nin a changing world (1997), there may be disagreement on the
\nadvantages and disadvantages of the various forms of electoral
\nsystem and the ideal number of political parties, but there is
\ngeneral agreement that Golkar's dominant position, and state and
\nmilitary intervention in elections must come to an end.<\/p>\n
The New Order elections are now seen as meaningless events
\nwhich only served to provide some legitimacy for the
\nauthoritarian regime. According to Uhlin, as long as independent
\nopposition parties and candidates cannot compete on equal terms,
\nelection fraud continues to be widespread and the legislature
\npowerless, most pro-democracy actors would support an election
\nboycott.<\/p>\n
One of the most crucial issues in the drafting of the
\nelections law is which electoral system will be used in the 2004
\ngeneral election?<\/p>\n
According to Gary W. Cox in his book Making Votes Count:
\nStrategic coordination in the world's electoral systems (1997),
\nseveral general features of electoral coordination illustrate,
\namong other things, the mixture of common and opposed interests;
\nthe possibility of success or failure: and the rapidity with
\nwhich vote intentions change when coordination takes off. The
\nexamples' focus on strategic voting in presidential elections is
\ntoo limited, however.<\/p>\n
Moreover, Cox stated that modern representative democracy
\npresents at its core a series of coordination problems that arise
\nas natural consequences of electoral competition for governmental
\noffices. A group with enough votes to elect a particular number
\nof candidates in a given (legislative or executive) race will
\nelect those candidates only if it can make its votes count by
\nconcentrating them appropriately.<\/p>\n
One way to avoid spreading votes too thinly is to limit the
\nnumber of candidates. But which potential candidates,
\nrepresenting what shades of opinion will withdraw in favor of
\nwhich others? Which candidates will bear the brunt of strategic
\nvoting and which will be its beneficiaries?<\/p>\n
The new elections law governs such matters as general
\nprovisions; participants; the right to vote; the organizing
\ncommittee; the district and the number of representatives; the
\nnomination process; the campaign procedures; the voting and
\ncounting; and the determination of the election result.<\/p>\n
Also provide for is the recall of elected candidates;
\nsupervision, law enforcement, and monitoring; criminal sanctions;
\ntransitory provisions; and concluding provisions.<\/p>\n
The lawmakers agreed to choose the \"limited\" open proportional
\nsystem, a system supported primarily by the two major political
\nparties, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI
\nPerjuangan) and Golkar.<\/p>\n
Problems after the passing of the law are expected. One is the
\nplan by some political parties to seek a judicial review from the
\nSupreme Court. Based on the Fourth Amendment to the 1945
\nConstitution and Supreme Court Practice Direction No. 2\/2002, the
\nSupreme Court is to function temporarily as a constitutional
\ncourt until Aug. 17, 2003. One of the constitutional court's
\nfunctions is to undertake judicial reviews.<\/p>\n
The political parties that are unhappy with the new elections
\nlaw also think that it will only benefit the big political
\nparties, especially the PDI Perjuangan and Golkar. But in all
\nevents, Golkar will benefit more than the PDI Perjuangan.<\/p>\n
For example, the law does not forbid a defendant in court
\nproceedings from being nominated as a legislator. It also enables
\npublic officials to actively participate in election campaigns.
\nMany observers believe that these two articles are the result of
\nhorse trading between the two major political parties.<\/p>\n
So despite the hopes raised by the recognition of the open
\nlist system, at least in the near future we are not likely to see
\nhigh quality democracy, especially during the 2004 general
\nelections. And the election outcome will probably continue to
\nmaintain the status quo in Indonesian politics.<\/p>",
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