Elections critical times for nation<\/p>\n
By Jusuf Wanandi<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The evaluation and expectation of the Indonesian
\ngeneral election have changed dramatically in the eyes of the
\nIndonesian public and foreign observers.<\/p>\n
The people have been slow in recognizing Golkar's decline
\ncaused by a rapid erosion of the government's authority, which
\nhas been its main support. This decline is occurring not only in
\nregions that experience ethnic or religious conflicts but is felt
\nacross the whole archipelago as the government's abuse of power
\nwas rampant everywhere. Golkar has to pay the price of being the
\ninstrument of Soeharto's authoritarian rule.<\/p>\n
Golkar's demise has been accelerated by Habibie's
\nshortsightedness in forcing Golkar to nominate him as its sole
\ncandidate for the next presidency. This has given a strong
\nimpetus to the main reformist parties to form a united front
\nagainst Golkar and Habibie. It has also resulted in the creation
\nof alliances among Muslim parties such as The United Development
\nParty (PPP) and the Justice Party to oppose Golkar and Habibie.
\nThis development has vanished Habibie's hope to be able to form a
\ncoalition between Golkar and the Muslim parties, PPP in
\nparticular.<\/p>\n
Golkar's possibility to form a coalition has become almost
\nnil. They can still gather votes by employing money politics but
\nthey no longer can come out as the strongest party.<\/p>\n
The first week of the campaign period was quite peaceful,
\ncontrary to widespread expectations of outbreaks of violence.
\nThis could still happen during the last week of campaigning but
\nit is not likely to create major disruptions to the election
\nprocess. There has been a lot of self-restraint on the part of
\nthe opposition parties because of the good chances they have to
\nwin the elections and to form a new government.<\/p>\n
Predicting the result of any election is always precarious.
\nThis is particularly the case for the 1999 elections because it
\nis the first one held following a period of 30 years of
\nauthoritarian rule. However, if the experience of the 1955
\nelections could provide a clue, it is likely that four or five
\nparties will come out as the main ones, although none of them
\nwill have a majority. And based on the leader's popularity and
\nthe existence of some organizational infrastructure of the
\nparties, a prediction can be made.<\/p>\n
Megawati Soekarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of
\nStruggle (PDI Perjuangan) could gather over 30 percent of the
\nvotes. Its popular support is mainly, but not exclusively, on
\nJava. The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) based National Awakening Party
\n(PKB) could get 20 percent of the votes this time. NU got 17.6
\npercent in 1955 and 18.3 percent in 1971. Its support comes
\nmainly from the rural areas in Java. Amien Rais' National Mandate
\nparty (PAN) could get over 15 percent of the votes, mainly from
\nthe urban centers and the middle class, the younger generation
\nand intellectuals. Golkar could get no more than 20 percent as it
\ncan no longer find support on Java, where it cannot even conduct
\nits campaigns, and a loss of support from the bureaucracy in
\ngeneral. PPP support may dwindle as many Muslim parties have been
\nformed. But it still has a name recognition and could get 10
\npercent of the votes.<\/p>\n
Political developments after the elections are harder to
\npredict. First, there is the question of how to reconcile a
\npresidential system with the need to have a coalition Cabinet,
\nsince no single party is likely to have a majority in the
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly. Second, what kind of coalition
\ncan be established, since the parties involved are new and have
\nnever worked together before?<\/p>\n
Third, the problem of a new coalition could bring further
\nchallenges. For instance, coalition of PDI Perjuangan, PKB and
\nthe Indonesian Military (TNI) faction to form the next government
\ncould be seen as Java-based and could be opposed by the outer
\nislands that are already in an anti-Javanese mood. This happened
\nafter the 1955 elections, that produced the Ali Sastroamidjojo
\nCabinet, which was supported by the Indonesia National Party, NU
\nand president Sukarno.<\/p>\n
The reactions to this took the form of separatism and regional
\nrebellion led by some regional military commanders in 1957-1958
\nin Sumatra and Sulawesi. Today, centripetal tendencies are high
\nand are more serious because they are led by people that are in a
\nmood of defiance.<\/p>\n
Or Megawati, although getting the most votes, could be
\nrejected as a presidential candidate by some groups of the Muslim
\ncommunity because she is a woman. Her acceptability will depend
\non the strength of the opposition and on Gus Dur's (Abdurrahman
\nWahid, NU chairman) support for her. Yet, a polarization between
\nsome of the Muslim groups and the nationalists could happen and
\ncould be destabilizing. To prevent this, Amien Rais' PAN could
\nplay a critical role as a bridge because he is likely to have
\nsome strong support from the outer islands, and is also
\nconsidered to have substantial Muslim support. His participation
\nin the next coalition is, therefore, important.<\/p>\n
Apart from this serious challenge, there are other important
\nchallenges. First, economic reforms should balance market-
\noriented policies with the need for greater social justice,
\nparticularly for the small people that have been marginalized for
\nso long in the process of economic development. Second,
\nconvincing the people that economic recovery will take some time
\nbecause the economy is in a very deep crisis. Third, the armed
\nforces can play a stabilizing role under a legitimate government
\nbut only if they undertake real changes.<\/p>\n
For the short term, the evaluation of the elections is rather
\nupbeat because a decent and fair general election can be expected
\nand the three main reformist parties could have more than 60
\npercent of the votes. However, the postelection period is more
\ndifficult to predict because the coalition will be something new
\nand each member of that coalition does not have much experience
\nin running a government.<\/p>\n
It will not be an easy period, but the nation must go through
\nit. It is critical that as a start, all parties must accept the
\nresult of the elections if it is relatively fair. Next, an
\nagreement should be made among the reformist parties on the
\ndirection of reform and development programs. Then, a broad-based
\ngovernment is important to gain majority support from the people.
\nThis is the chance for the majority of the people to establish a
\ngovernment that has legitimacy and that can overcome the enormous
\nproblems the nation is facing. Unless this becomes a reality, the
\nhope for establishing a nation based on unity, democracy and
\nsocial justice could be lost.<\/p>\n
The writer is chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Centre
\nfor Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/elections-critical-times-for-nation-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}