Election '97: Lessons for the victor<\/p>\n
By Irman G. Lanti<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The last general election this century has come
\nto an end. And Golkar, as in the previous five elections held in
\nthe New Order era, emerged the winner.<\/p>\n
Procuring more than 74 percent of the votes, Golkar was
\nunrivaled by PPP, who obtained less than 25 percent of the votes
\n(albeit a dramatic increase from the 1992 election), and PDI, who
\nwas crushed in this election. Beyond the percentage of votes and
\nnumber of seats in the House of Representatives won by the three
\ncontenders, the 1997 election has yielded several lessons for the
\ngroups as well as for the government.<\/p>\n
Unlike previous elections, tension was high before and during
\nthe campaign, as well as after the voting period. The election
\nprocess in Indonesia has always been less than peaceful. One
\nexample is Lapangan Banteng in 1982, in which a clash between
\nsupporters of one group and security forces resulted in the loss
\nof life.<\/p>\n
But the level of tension during the 1997 campaign was
\nunprecedented. Prior to the campaign, a riot broke out in
\nPekalongan. In this traditional PPP area, the people reacted
\nagainst what was considered an early start to campaigning by
\nGolkar in the area.<\/p>\n
During the campaign there were a number of riots throughout
\nthe country. In Jakarta, it was considered hazardous to travel in
\nthe city during campaigning. A riot in Banjarmasin claimed the
\nlives of more than 100 people and resulted in the destruction of
\npublic facilities, amounting to billions of rupiah damage. Even
\nafter the seemingly peaceful election day, a riot broke out in
\nSampang Madura due to dissatisfaction with the voting process.
\nElection-related riots also occurred in Serang.<\/p>\n
The PPP and PDI parties have expressed their disappointment
\ntoward the alleged rigging of the election process. PPP has
\nthreatened not to sign the report of election results in a number
\nof areas. PDI has hinted that it would nullify the election
\nresults altogether by not fulfilling the small number of seats it
\nhas acquired.<\/p>\n
All of these problems are lessons for Golkar, which has run
\nthe government throughout the New Order administration. It seems
\nthat Golkar has gained an easy victory. But in reality, the
\nvictory is a result of the unprecedented level of social costs
\nthat the government has to pay. While Golkar has set the record
\npercentage for all New Order elections, the price incurred is
\nalso the highest. If Golkar wishes to maintain its enormous
\npopularity in the future, there are a number of caveats it must
\nobserve.<\/p>\n
The social cost of winning the election is increasing. The
\nnational educational development has resulted in better
\nanalytical skills and capabilities of Indonesians. The society is
\nbecoming more critical toward deception and more resistant of
\ncoercion. Ways and means that have proven successful in the past
\nmay prove dangerous in the future. Riots surrounding the 1997
\nelection were due to dissatisfaction with the alleged unfair
\nbehavior of the dominant party and the government concerning the
\nwhole election process.<\/p>\n
Secondly, dissatisfaction will increase if Golkar, as the
\ndominant group, fails to fulfill its campaign promise to
\neradicate corruption and collusion, to alleviate poverty, and to
\nreduce socioeconomic gaps. Golkar will become less popular if the
\nproblems in the political-economic system of Indonesia persist.<\/p>\n
Thirdly, Golkar's close association with the government has
\ncreated problems as well as advantages. The advantages are
\nclearly manifested in large votes for Golkar. The problems range
\nfrom allegations of vote-rigging by local government officials in
\nfavor of Golkar and numerous attacks on government officials due
\nto this allegation. Another problem is the PPP's and PDI's
\nrefusal to sign election results. If these problems remain
\nunaddressed larger skirmishes can be expected in the future.<\/p>\n
Fourthly, interference in the affairs of political parties has
\nproven counterproductive. The meager vote acquired by PDI
\nresulted in a record low number of seats won by a party in the
\nparliament throughout the New Order. This may create a procedural
\n-- if not a legal -- problem in the parliament. PDI might not be
\nable to fulfill all parliamentary functions, which comprise
\neleven commissions, one inter-parliamentary body, and one
\nchairperson of the House. The legislature may face a crisis if
\nthe present rule, which requires the consensus of all
\nparliamentary factions to make certain decisions, is maintained
\nbecause PDI is not represented.<\/p>\n
International pressure has put Indonesia on the defensive,
\nespecially regarding the recent election. The international
\ncommunity regards the election in Indonesia as a mere
\njustification that the present regime be considered democratic.
\nThe ousting of Megawati attracted the attention of several
\ninternational groups, who said the election did not represent a
\nreal democratic process. Reports of manipulations and unfair
\ntreatment further justified this opinion. Tougher international
\npressure on Indonesia is expected if the problems surrounding the
\nelection continue to be neglected by the government, the most
\npowerful political force in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The writer is a political analyst residing in Jakarta.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/election-97-lessons-for-the-victor-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }