Educational background not vital to presidency<\/p>\n
The following is the second of two articles on presidential
\ncandidacy prepared by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, acting head of the
\nDivision for International and Regional Affairs at the Center for
\nPolitical and Regional Studies, the Indonesian Institute of
\nSciences (LIPI), Jakarta.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): As a democratic leader, President B.J. Habibie
\nshould accept that the result of the June 7 general election will
\nbe a vote of no confidence toward him, his government and Golkar,
\nas also mentioned by a few of Golkar's young leaders. Until now,
\nGolkar has received only 10.1 percent of the votes in the capital
\ncity of Jakarta, the place of the central government and the
\ncenter of political activities in the country. So far, Golkar has
\nalso only received about 18 percent of the national votes. On the
\nother hand, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI
\nPerjuangan) has won 39 percent of the votes in Jakarta and about
\n38 percent nationally. It means that he must concede defeat and
\ncongratulate Megawati and allow her to have the first chance of
\nestablishing a new coalition government. Lawyer Todung Mulya
\nLubis said on many occasions that Megawati must be given the
\nfirst chance to form a new government, and it is time for the
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly (MPR) members to have a dynamic
\ninterpretation about the Constitution, particularly on the
\nelection of president. According to Lubis, it is not necessary
\nthat the president be elected through 50 percent plus one
\npercent, but it is possible that we have a minority government
\nled by Megawati if the party wins the elections with almost 40
\npercent of the votes.<\/p>\n
Megawati and her party also have so many weaknesses. For
\nexample, Megawati is seen as a non-academic leader, who rejected
\npeople's demands that the Constitution be amended, Soeharto be
\nbrought to trial, the Indonesian Military's (TNI) dual function
\nbe ended and the discussion be opened regarding the form of the
\nIndonesian state as either a unitary or federal one. From her
\neducational background, Megawati has no university degree.<\/p>\n
However, there is no article mentioned in the 1945
\nConstitution that the presidential candidate must have a
\nuniversity degree. It is probable that Megawati would be able to
\nbecome a successful president in this second transitional period.
\nShe is supported by people from every social, economic,
\npolitical, religious, ethnic and educational background, so that
\nshe can become a symbol of national unity in a pluralistic
\nsociety.<\/p>\n
As far as the party platform on the military's dual function
\nis concerned, PDI Perjuangan has been accused as very ambiguous.
\nHowever, if we read all the 48 political parties' platforms on
\nthis issue, only 33 political parties show an interest. From that
\nnumber, a few political parties still support the dual function,
\nwhile most want to end it gradually, including National Mandate
\nParty (PAN), PDI Perjuangan and National Awakening Party (PKB).
\nOnly one, the Democratic People's Party (PRD), stated clearly
\nthat they want to end the military's dual function now or never.<\/p>\n
If Megawati and PDI Perjuangan reject to end the dual
\nfunction, it will not only go against people's interests, but
\nalso the interests of the military. The military has shown its
\neagerness to change its role in Indonesian politics, from a
\ndominant power to being one which has an influence in politics.<\/p>\n
To have an influence does not necessarily mean to be on the
\nfront line, but could also mean in the back. The military only
\nwants to have role-sharing with the civilian government. So as
\nsuch, we can only give them the role as guardian or defender of
\nthe state, rather than as guardian of the government.<\/p>\n
We also have to avoid inviting the military to take sides in
\npolitics, because once civilians invite the military to have a
\nsay in Indonesian politics, the military will step-by-step
\ndominate the scene as they did from 1957 to the end of Soeharto's
\nreign. The involvement of the military in politics is also
\nagainst their own interest, as stated by Gen. Wiranto who said
\nthe military would resign from everyday politics.<\/p>\n
Until now, there have also been pressures from the political
\nelite and the masses to put Soeharto on trial. Muslim scholar
\nNurcholish Madjid was of the opinion that Megawati's reluctance
\nto put him on trial was based on her personal and family
\nbackground, rather than political background.<\/p>\n
According to Nurcholish, although students pushed Soeharto to
\nput Megawati's father, first president Sukarno, on trial in the
\nmid-1960s, Soeharto rejected the idea with the reasons that we
\nmust respect and cover up for our elder leader. It was probable,
\nhowever, that Soeharto's refusal to put Sukarno on trial was not
\nonly because of his respect toward him, but also because Soeharto
\nwas afraid that Sukarno might open his mouth about what happened
\nduring the 1965\/1966 period and March 11, 1966 Letter of
\nExecutive Order (Supersemar) given by Sukarno to Soeharto.<\/p>\n
But what Soeharto did to Sukarno was even worse and has
\nhaunted the Sukarno family. Sukarno was put under house detention
\nin Wisma Yaso, now a military museum on Jl. Gatot Subroto in
\nSouth Jakarta, and was not allowed to see people, let alone his
\nfamily.<\/p>\n
The problem is, how will we treat Soeharto? On this subject,
\nwe can learn from some countries experiencing transitions from
\nauthoritarianism to democracy. In Pakistan and Rumania, for
\nexample, presidents Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Nicolai Caecescu were
\nrespectively hung and executed just after the fall of their
\ngovernments.<\/p>\n
In some Latin American countries, the new civilian government
\ngave amnesty to those who committed crimes. There was also a pact
\nbetween old and new governments that the new one promised to
\nprovide enough of a budget to the military to be able to perform
\nas the guardians of the state -- not as the guardians of the
\nregime.<\/p>\n
Another example is South Korea, where former presidents and
\nmilitary generals, Roh Tae-woo and Chun Do-hwan, were brought to
\ntrial by the Kim Young-sam government, then put in jail for a
\nshort time and released by the new Kim Dae-yung government.<\/p>\n
Some political elite prefer we follow the Koreans' steps,
\nparticularly if Megawati wins the presidential election. We
\ncannot expect too much from President Habibie to bring Soeharto
\nto trial because of his closeness with his former professor and
\nmentor. The slowness of the investigation by the Attorney
\nGeneral's Office on the alleged corruption, collusion and
\nnepotism practices of the Soeharto family is one of many examples
\nhow the Habibie government is reluctant to put Soeharto on trial.<\/p>\n
It will depend on the MPR members to decide whether they will
\nvote for Megawati or Habibie. When choosing between the two
\nleaders, the members must analyze what the cost and benefits will
\nbe regarding people's feelings, the economic recovery, the unity
\nof Indonesia and the future of this nation and its people.<\/p>\n
The two presidential candidates each have their own
\nweaknesses, but we cannot reject a leader because she is a woman,
\nis not a university graduate nor an expert in technology. The
\nresult of the general election shows the people demand a change
\nof government. As such, it is against their interest to maintain
\na status quo government which has lost a legitimacy from the
\npeople.<\/p>",
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