East Timor's history ignored<\/p>\n
Sri Pamoedjo Rahardjo<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles on East Timor.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The results associated with the rapid
\ndevelopment of East Timor included an increase in the local
\npopulation's health status and survival rate. The number of
\nchildren entering their teenage years increased rapidly. Despite
\nimmense amount of funds poured into the province, the size of the
\nlocal economy was not large enough to absorb an increased labor
\nforce.<\/p>\n
Evidence showed that in the early 1990s, unemployment in East
\nTimor among East Timorese youth was quite high. Many of them
\ncould not be absorbed by the local economy. This anomaly was due
\nto a population boom, particularly as a result of the generation
\nborn before and during the invasion of those who had survived.
\nThey demanded a better life as a result of their improved
\neducation and had developed a better awareness of their rights.<\/p>\n
The demographic changes had obviously worried government
\nofficials at the central level. Social safety valve strategies
\nwere hurriedly introduced.<\/p>\n
One strategy was to introduce a continuing education scheme
\nfor East Timorese. The youths were encouraged to pursue higher
\neducation. The scheme was meant not only to improve the quality
\nof the local human resources, but also to delay the demographic
\npressures entering the labor market. Another strategy was the
\noffer of jobs to qualified East Timorese from some state
\nenterprises. However, only a few qualified East Timorese were
\nabsorbed in the labor market outside East Timor.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the schemes were not packaged and disseminated
\nwidely to the public. Consequently, many did not understand and
\nappreciate the strategy. Dissatisfaction among youths continued
\nto rise. These social disorders apparently affected the growth
\ncapacity of the local economy. The mass of the local indigenous
\neconomy remained small.<\/p>\n
In order to maintain a conducive climate for development, the
\ngovernment had warranted national stability as a political
\nscheme. In conjunction with these efforts, security measures were
\nalso imposed in East Timor. In order to maintain internal
\nsecurity, the Armed Forces helped the local government quell
\nlocal threats.<\/p>\n
At that time, the government had always maintained that local
\ndisturbances should not get out of hand because they could become
\na threat to the entire nation. The antiquated assumptions against
\ninsurgencies and disturbances developed from the experience of
\nlow economic development levels in the 1950s and 1960s.<\/p>\n
Similar disciplinary actions may have been implemented
\nthroughout Indonesia by local authorities. But in East Timor, the
\nsame disciplinary action was received by some with hatred. The
\ndivision worsened when the churches became deeply involved; they
\ninterpreted these actions as an act of oppression toward a
\nminority group. Soldiers who were defending the Republic with
\ntheir own lives were seen as human rights violators. There is
\nless media exposure on the fate of soldiers on a military mission
\nthan on alleged human rights abuses.<\/p>\n
Similar responses are exacted from soldiers in other countries
\nwhen they try to defend their countries from the threat of
\nattack. To take a few examples, Filipino soldiers fought back
\nwhen they were attacked by Moslem insurgent groups. American
\nsoldiers even reacted with abuse during the Vietnam war as in the
\ninfamous My Lai massacre. An over reaction on the part of Israeli
\nsoldiers toward Palestinian civilians was also found. Yet, these
\nactions were generally considered appropriate.<\/p>\n
All of a sudden, poorly informed UN officials heard the cry
\nfor "help" from the affected East Timorese. A series of fact-
\nfinding visits by foreign dignitaries, U.S. senators and
\ncongressmen and UN negotiators hurt the Indonesians more than the
\nhelp it purported to offer. The Indonesian diplomats were only
\narmed with their "smiles" which led to nowhere. Had the
\ninternational community put their feet in the shoes of the
\nIndonesians, ill-advised pressure would not have been imposed on
\nthe Indonesian government.<\/p>\n
The world body had been successful in denying Indonesia
\nrecognition of East Timor as part of Indonesia. This was reversed
\nwhen an Indonesian official sent confusing signals with regards
\nto the East Timor issue by agreeing to put the matter to a
\nballot. Tagging prointegration proponents as troublemakers did
\nnot encourage Indonesian leaders to put up a diplomatic fight to
\nretain East Timor. A few months ago, the same person who
\nconfirmed the integration of East Timor as Indonesia's 27th
\nprovince abandoned this stand. No wonder, the prointegrationists
\nout of control actions reflects feelings of abandonment.<\/p>\n
Indonesians should have emulated the ASEAN commitment to
\nachieve harmony in East Timor. After all, Indonesia was committed
\nto ensuring regional security. Peace in the region had been
\nachieved through Indonesia's active involvement in peacekeeping
\nefforts in Cambodia and the Philippines. The country's
\nachievement of relative harmony and peace in East Timor in these
\nlast years was wrested by outsiders from the ASEAN region.<\/p>\n
Indonesians should learn from history how a country
\ndisintegrates. After the Soviet Union introduced Perestroika, the
\nintegrity of the European communist countries began to collapse.
\nNew countries were born. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and
\nYugoslavia disappeared from the world map. The part of Yugoslavia
\nthat refused to comply with disintegration efforts was deemed a
\nSerbian ethnic cleansing scheme. Will Indonesian be next on the
\ndisintegration and disintegrated agenda?<\/p>\n
The presence of Rapid Deployment Forces close to the East
\nTimor's southern border implies a possibility of foreign
\nintervention in the event that Indonesia does not compromise.
\nUnfortunately, our politicians were busy with issues on the
\ndistribution of election seats, and the government, trying hard
\nto be associated with populist moves, forgot the importance of
\nthis threat. This is in contrast to our ASEAN friends' minimum
\nreaction toward the East Timor issue, which shows respect for the
\nsovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The escalated conflict in East Timor could have been avoided,
\nhad the international community been willing to respect the
\nbackground of the Indonesian presence in East Timor. The
\nunderlying fact is that the move was not an act of colonization.
\nThe Indonesians were invited to help stop the bloodshed in 1975
\nthat threatened to spill over its boundaries, a move that would
\nhave won approval even from human rights proponents then. The
\nheart of the issue is the perceived inequitable development, the
\nunequal capacity to compete for local opportunities, and an
\nabsence of cultural sensitivity on the part of some individuals
\nin the government and local settlers.<\/p>\n
In conclusion, all Indonesians, including all our brothers and
\nsisters in East Timor, should wake up and resolve to solve
\nthreats toward national disintegration. The lower rupiah value
\nmeans loss of the people's trust in the economy, but it should
\nnot result in a loss of nationalism. With double standards around
\nthe globe, what is justifiable for one country may not be seen as
\nsuch in another. The conflict in Northern Ireland between
\nCatholics and Protestants and in the Middle East between Israelis
\nand Palestinians is just the same wine in different bottles.<\/p>\n
The writer is a social and economic observer.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/east-timors-history-ignored-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }