East Timor policy needs rethinking<\/p>\n
By Jusuf Wanandi<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The Habibie government proposal in mid-1998 to
\ngrant special autonomy status to East Timor was a measure too
\nlittle and too late. Although it specified full home rule, with
\nthe exception of defense, foreign affairs and monetary policies,
\nwhich would continue to be handled by the central government, the
\nproposal is no longer acceptable to most East Timorese.<\/p>\n
Had this been proposed two years earlier, it might have been
\naccepted. After what developed in East Timor and in the whole
\ncountry since Soeharto's resignation in May 1998 the plan is no
\nlonger relevant. Above all, for the proposal to be acceptable in
\nthe first place, the government should have first consulted with
\nthe local people of East Timor. Instead, the process has been
\ndriven by talks with the Portuguese at the United Nations.<\/p>\n
The best option would have been something along the lines of
\nthe Matignon Accord between France and New Caledonia, in which a
\n10 year transition was stipulated, with a referendum at the end
\nof that term to decide whether the people of New Caledonia would
\nchoose to stay within France or become independent. In the New
\nCaledonia case, locals chose to retain links with France, because
\nof the presence of French expatriates and because France has been
\ngenerous to them in all fields.<\/p>\n
Over the last two years or so, scholars and graduate students
\nof East Timor abroad have held two meetings, namely in Stockholm
\nand Washington D.C, to discuss the future of East Timor and its
\nrelationship with Indonesia. They have consulted leaders within
\nEast Timor, Indonesia and abroad.<\/p>\n
They came to the same best-case scenario proposal in line with
\nthe Matignon Accord. Participants held the view that perhaps a
\ntransition period of five to 10 years would be feasible before a
\nreferendum could be held to decide the future status of East
\nTimor. They said leaders from both the proindependence and
\nprointegration factions, including Mgr. Carlos Belo, Jose
\nAlexandre "Gusmao" Xanana and Mario Carrascalao, agreed on the
\noutline of their proposal, because they all recognized the
\nconstraints involved in any solution.<\/p>\n
One factor is the critical need for a transition period.
\nAuthentic efforts for reconciliation between all the factions are
\nnecessary before a referendum can be held without creating a
\ncivil war in East Timor. Preparations are also needed for
\ntraining and education of the bureaucracy, politicians and others
\nto administer the territory. If in the future East Timor opts for
\nindependence, financial sources (domestic or foreign) should be
\nsecured. Local resources can only cover 10 percent of the routine
\nbudget needs of the territory, with the rest subsidized by the
\ncentral government.<\/p>\n
Last, but not least, "normalization" and "good relations" with
\nIndonesia are critical for East Timor's survival in the future
\nbecause of its geographical location. If Indonesia is unfriendly
\ntoward East Timor, the latter will not have a peaceful and stable
\nfuture. Reconciliation with Indonesia should include
\nreconciliation with the Indonesian Military (TNI), a body that
\nhas had a traumatic and schizophrenic relationship with East
\nTimor. This relationship with Indonesia should also include in
\nthe longer term membership of East Timor in the Association of
\nSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN).<\/p>\n
While these deliberations were taking place, in January 1999
\nHabibie announced a reversal of his earlier policy of full
\nautonomy status for East Timor. He shocked the world with his
\nannouncement to offer independence to East Timor by January 2000,
\nif the East Timorese reject an offer of autonomy. Yet, this
\nproposal appears to have been considered among his personal staff
\nas far back as 1998, or earlier. The rationale is that East Timor
\ncosts Indonesia too much in international prestige.<\/p>\n
Moreover, as it is a minority that is not loyal to Indonesia,
\nthey question why Indonesia should continue to subsidize the
\nterritory. They believe that this policy is not going to have an
\nimpact on other anticentripetal tendencies (such as in Aceh or
\nIrian Jaya), because East Timor is a special case.<\/p>\n
Habibie should be aware that his policy on East Timor may not
\nbe for the good of the East Timorese, and that his suggestion has
\nbeen used as an excuse for a change in policy that, in fact, has
\nresulted in greater uncertainties, and has created the
\npossibility of a civil war in East Timor. The abrupt change in
\npolicy has created confusion and a feeling of despair and
\nbetrayal on the part of the prointegration faction. The military,
\nor elements of it, even though from the outside it appears to be
\nsupporting the change in policy, is likely to sabotage the deal,
\nbecause of the sacrifices they have made to take over and
\nmaintain East Timor as part of Indonesia, and because it has been
\ncompletely ignored in the new deal.<\/p>\n
If one takes into consideration that five out of 13 regencies
\nin the West of the province are pro-Indonesia, it could be
\nimagined that a protracted conflict is to be expected. This has
\nbegun with killings by pro-Indonesia militias that have either
\nmoved out of the control of the Indonesian forces or are
\nindirectly encouraged by them.<\/p>\n
Habibie's proposal for immediate independence is a proposal
\nthat is not final, because the new People's Consultative Assembly
\n(MPR) after the elections has the sole authority to declare the
\nseparation constitutionally, since it was the MPR that
\nestablished East Timor as the 27th province in 1978. Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri, head of the Indonesian Democratic Party of
\nStruggle (PDI Perjuangan), a potential winner in the general
\nelection, has already rejected Habibie's policy reversal.<\/p>\n
The idea of a transition period prior to a referendum may have
\nbeen overrun by events and the new policy and the agreement for a
\nplebiscite by the UN in August. But, it is not a forgone
\nconclusion that everything will run smoothly in the next few
\nmonths. A civil war, the worse case scenario, cannot be
\ncompletely ruled out, despite the presence of 250 UN police
\nofficers. The general election in June could result in a
\ncoalition government that may politically reject the agreement
\nwith the Portuguese and prepare a new set of policies different
\nthan those of Habibie. After all, the Habibie government is only
\na transitional one and after the general election will become a
\nlame duck government unable to implement new policies or old ones
\nnot supported by the new government.<\/p>\n
It is also not a foregone conclusion that the People's
\nConsultative Assembly session to elect the new president will be
\nheld in November, leaving a vacuum for too long. The new House of
\nRepresentatives (DPR) may decide on a new time-table that could
\nestablish a new government within three months after the results
\nof the elections and the installment of the new DPR sometime at
\nthe end of June or early July. In that sense the solution to the
\nEast Timor problem is as yet not final.<\/p>\n
The writer is chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Centre
\nfor International and Strategic Studies.<\/p>",
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