East Timor policy causes havoc<\/p>\n
By Bantarto Bandoro<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Ever since the government announced in January
\nthat it would give East Timor either autonomy or independence,
\nhardly a day has passed without people discussing the province.<\/p>\n
But no one predicted that the announcement would create such
\nhavoc in the province. Neither does anyone really know the idea
\nbehind the government's policy, since it was issued at a time
\nwhen the government was attempting to regain confidence amid the
\npersistent economic crisis.<\/p>\n
The situation in the territory, which was relatively calm
\nbefore the announcement, quickly deteriorated into a new war
\nbetween proindependence and prointegration groups.<\/p>\n
Certainly, Indonesia should not leave the territory
\narbitrarily. It has a two-pronged responsibility to begin with.
\nOn an international level, it has to reach an agreement with
\nPortugal. But the latest report reveals that despite progress, no
\nsignificant deal has been reached. On a national level, the
\ngovernment faces two fronts, namely reducing violence in the
\nterritory and create a conducive climate at the negotiating table
\nby sponsoring talks between the leaders of the warring groups.<\/p>\n
The latter came into being when hostile East Timor factions
\nsigned a peace accord a week ago which is expected to halt the
\nviolence between the warring groups. The accord is seen as a
\nbeginning of renewed concerted efforts to put back on track the
\nprocess to determine the future of East Timor. It can also be
\nsaid that the peace accord and political settlement are not ends
\nin themselves, but the beginning of a process. This would mean
\nthat a peace-building component needs to be included in the
\noverall framework of the settlement, and the objective should be
\nto prevent further conflict and the reemergence of instability.<\/p>\n
The signing of a peace accord means that the warring factions
\nshould be committed to enforcing the accord throughout the
\nterritory. But perhaps their tasks go further than that. They
\nshould demonstrate the political will to lay foundations for
\nreconciliation, restore stability and trust through a continued
\ndialog process necessary to implementing the peace accord.<\/p>\n
Peace is not static. It is a dynamic and fluid process that
\nrequires nurturing and support. Military commander Gen. Wiranto
\nwas perhaps right when he appealed to the warring factions to
\nmake known the peace accord to all supporters in villages,
\nmountains and forests. On paper this may be possible, but on a
\npractical level no one is sure that it can be easily achieved.
\nThe accord can successfully be disseminated and effectively
\nimplemented if only three conditions are met.<\/p>\n
First, there should be an awareness that the idea of winning
\nand losing has to be abandoned and replaced, and the idea of
\nmoving away from the present position has to be stressed. It
\nmeans not to look back, not to let the past dictate or write the
\nfuture, but to encourage and to speak about a common future.<\/p>\n
In other words, as the accord lays ground for tension
\nreduction, there is a need to start a process for the
\ntransformation of conflict in the course of which opposing
\ninterests become a problem to be solved jointly. Such a process
\ncould involve the adaption to a new condition including the
\nadaption of new values. The warring parties should direct their
\nefforts to achieve further common understanding.<\/p>\n
Second, there is a need for awareness on the part of the
\nwarring parties that conflict is an integral part of human
\nrelations that does not have to be violent. Their awareness
\nshould reflect their wholehearted commitment to steadily move the
\nconflict cycle they are facing away from violence and harness its
\nmore positive aspects in such a way as to benefit rather than
\nharm society in the territory. This could be a (long-term) goal
\nfrom which immediate benefits are not to be expected. The
\ncessation of war among prointegration and proindependence groups
\nis just the first step to a longer process toward the restoration
\nof peace and stability in the territory. The warring factions
\nmust remember this and allow themselves to be discouraged.<\/p>\n
Third, awareness on the part of the military to halt whatever
\nsupport it renders to the prointegration faction and allow the
\nwarring groups to select and follow the best route to their
\ndestination and not to contaminate the process leading toward
\ntheir desired direction. For the sake of an effective
\nimplementation of the East Timor accord, it is also important for
\nthe military not to exacerbate enmity between warring groups. One
\nmust remember that the military is part of the solution, because
\nmany believe it was and still is an active participant in the
\nconflict.<\/p>\n
The aforementioned perhaps reflects the hopes of those who
\nreally wish to witness the impartial and effective execution of
\nthe accord, including those of the signatories. Priorities must,
\nof course, be given to a political and acceptable solution. The
\nsearch for peace is political research conducted by diplomatic,
\nnot destructive, means. This demands laborious and tedious
\nnegotiation with all parties to the conflict. The signing of the
\npeace accord is certainly welcome, and therefore it should also
\nbe endorsed by all important players.<\/p>\n
The accord is sure to help lessen psychological pressure and
\ntension among faction leaders. This is, of course, important and
\nnecessary but not quite sufficient to help eliminate enmity and
\ncreate peace and stability on the ground level. For those on the
\nbattleground level, peace is not simply an absence of war. For
\nthem, perhaps peace can be sustained only if they keep the threat
\nalive. This is exactly what is happening on the ground. Violence
\nremains and continued to escalate even two days after the signing
\nof the peace accord (The Jakarta Post, 23 April, 1999). Perhaps
\nthe warring parties are unaware that their leaders shook hands
\nfor the purpose of peace. The clashes indicate that the situation
\nremains precarious and vulnerable. Whether peace prevails depends
\non the willingness of the warring parties to abide by the terms
\nof the accord.<\/p>\n
Familiarization of the accord among warring parties will be a
\ndifficult undertaking, since hatred and suspicion have been
\npresent for decades. To draw the warring parties to a stage where
\nthey can see and feel what peace really is will be even more
\ndifficult. Fighting, killing and violence have become part of
\ntheir day-to-day activities for more than 10 years.<\/p>\n
The signing of the peace accord is of course a positive sign.
\nBut one must remember that peace will not be preserved simply by
\ntheir proclaimed love for it. It is perhaps not an exaggeration
\nto say that for the warring groups, peace is the product of daily
\ncombat and ever-renewed vigilance. If one prescribes to such a
\nbelieve then it would be extremely difficult for the parties to
\narrive at a compromise. There is little prospect that the peace
\naccord will alter the attitude of those fighting on the ground
\nand this also means that the accord will have limited success
\nbecause it makes no reference to disarming the factions.<\/p>\n
Conflict, tension and fighting in the territory will
\ndefinitely continue in a mode short of total war despite the
\npeace accord and progress in the negotiation brokered by the
\nUnited Nations. But if there is to be a resolution, it appears it
\ncould result only from exhaustion after a lengthy test of
\nendurance and arms.<\/p>\n
The peace accord is understood to be meant as a process which
\nwill help the parties in the dispute confront the fact that in
\nsome sense their definition of the problem may need to be
\nrevised. The accord, however, does not explicitly say how the
\ndefinition of their problem should be revised nor address the
\ncause of conflict, and it merely appeals to the warring groups to
\nsupport the peace efforts. Thus, the accord seems to provide only
\na settlement, not a resolution, that is an arrangement adopted by
\nthe parties to deal with the matter in dispute. It is the
\nreadiness to negotiate the matter.<\/p>\n
In this approach, dispute settlement is the imposition of a
\nresolution on conflicting parties by, for example, coercion or by
\nother kinds of pressure. If the prointegration and
\nproindependence groups' consciously or not prescribe to this kind
\nof approach, then this would mean that the causes of the conflict
\nwere not being dealt with adequately. Therefore, a settlement, if
\never reached, is likely to leave a lingering sense of grievances,
\nwith those on the ground feeling that the accord provides only an
\narrangement and not terms of resolution.<\/p>\n
Of course they would like to have peace, and peace for the
\ngroups -- be they prointegration or proindependence -- continues
\nto be a powerful wish and desire, a passion deeply felt and
\naspired for. But peace can also lead some to \"action\", even if
\nthis is in the form of \"action against\", which may result in
\nfurther deterioration of stability in the territory. The
\nsituation on the ground reveals such a condition. Thus the East
\nTimor peace accord will most likely fail to prevent the warring
\ngroups from taking action against each other.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the implementation of the peace accord does not only
\ncreate problems of political will; there is also the question of
\npractical means. For example, the accord stipulates that all
\nconflicting parties are obliged to take \"necessary measures\" to
\nimplement the peace accord involving both armed and unarmed
\nsupporters.<\/p>\n
This obligation cannot be fulfilled because of the absence of
\nassurances, on the ground level, that the warring groups will not
\nattack each other once they show their goodwill by, for example,
\nsurrendering their arms. The imposition of the accord without any
\nassurances will only bring insecurity instead of security to the
\nterritory.<\/p>\n
One must acknowledged the fact that there is a lack of mutual
\ntrust and cooperation between warring groups, perhaps because the
\nintegration process in 1976 was created through war and violence,
\nand therefore mutual trust and cooperation is unlikely to be
\nachieved easily in the future, even when the decision on the
\nfuture of the territory is fixed.<\/p>\n
The 1999 East Timor peace accord is indeed a historic document
\nand provides ground for new hope and conditions in the territory.
\nBut no one knows whether all East Timorese prescribe to the peace
\nconveyed in the document.<\/p>\n
If this is the case, the East Timor peace accord will
\ndefinitely lead to no peace, and the question of what peace
\nreally means for the people of East Timor will remain unanswered,
\neven after they have chosen one of the options offered by the
\ngovernment of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The writer is with Department of International Affairs, Centre
\nfor Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta<\/p>",
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