East Timor Indictments : A chance to save reform<\/p>\n
Aboeprijadi Santoso, Journalist, Amsterdam<\/p>\n
Instead of expressing regret over Dili's indictment of
\nIndonesian generals (as East Timor President Xanana Gusmao did)
\nor flatly rejecting it (as Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan
\nWirayuda and President Megawati Soekarnoputri hastily did),
\nJakarta and Dili would do well to review their policies and
\nconsider the long-term implications of the issue.<\/p>\n
A new myth has emerged since East Timor's independence in May
\nlast year. In order to foster a good relationship with Jakarta,
\nit is believed, Dili should avoid sensitive issues, including
\nefforts to bring those responsible for killings, deportation and
\ndestruction in East Timor in 1999 to justice. For Jakarta, having
\nbeen humiliated when it lost East Timor's independence vote,
\nwould only be too happy to welcome a new neighbor that puts the
\nimportance of a good relationship before everything else.<\/p>\n
This myth ignores four intertwined factors, ranging from
\ninternational support for East Timor and for the indictments, to
\nthe need in Indonesia for real reform.<\/p>\n
First, a tiny half-island amidst a great archipelagic
\nneighbor, East Timor's geo-political predicament is unfortunate
\nsince it virtually dictates much of the country's foreign policy
\noutlook. Metaphorically, East Timor has, in fact, opted to become
\na Finland, an independent country living in the shadow of or
\ndependent upon its powerful neighbor, the Soviet Union, rather
\nthan a Baltic state, which evolved from domination to occupation
\nby the same giant.<\/p>\n
But, unlike Finland or the Baltics in the past, post-Cold War,
\nindependent East Timor has obtained the good will and commitment
\nof the international community, which has, in the past, ignored
\nits sufferings, to help the country if its security is at stake.<\/p>\n
A recent proposal by UN Chief Kofi Annan to postpone the
\nwithdrawal of UN troops from East Timor and its endorsement by
\nthe UN Security Council, expresses that awareness acutely. Annan
\nhas explicitly spoken of a real threat by former pro-Jakarta
\nmilitias both inside the country and from Indonesian West Timor.<\/p>\n
While the war on terrorism and the crisis on Iraq have pushed
\nthe case of crimes against humanity committed by the Indonesian
\nofficers and the militias in East Timor in 1999 from the front
\npages, the issue has certainly not been, and will not be
\nforgotten.<\/p>\n
Second, the elections in East Timor in 2001 and 2002 have
\nproved beyond doubt that Xanana Gusmao and Fretilin are the
\ncountry's most legitimate leader and ruling political party.
\nWhatever the differences between the president and the party on
\nthe issue of Dili's indictment of the Indonesian generals, the
\nfact that matters most, is that the judicial authorities in Dili
\nwill continue the proceedings. The ruling party and the local
\npopulace have strongly supported the process. Reports have
\nindicated that the Dili indictment, if it continues to be ignored
\nby Jakarta, may in the long run damage the popular support for
\nthe president, who is sincerely concerned to preserve a good
\nrelationship between his country and Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Local human rights organizations have expressed concerns on
\nthe issue. Perkumpulan Hak's director Jose-Luis de Oliveira has
\npointed out that victims of the 1999 mayhem have begun to ask,
\n"whose president is Xanana Gusmao really?" For a small population
\nwhose majority suffered under the Indonesian Army and had been
\nvictimized by the rampage, that's a pregnant question -
\npotentially critical even for a charismatic leader who liberated
\nhis country from the colonial joke.<\/p>\n
It is too early to conclude on this double institutional
\nleadership, but with a potential threat to the leadership of
\nXanana Gusmao whose presidency, modeled on the Portuguese, is not
\nas strong as the U.S.'s or Indonesia's -- Jakarta cannot simply
\nrely on President Xanana's good will. On the contrary, if Jakarta
\nwishes to help strengthen Xanana's position, it should seriously
\nconsider Dili's indictment.<\/p>\n
Third, East Timor's civil society is not alone in demanding
\njustice on the violence in 1999. There has always been and still
\nis relatively broad international public opinion supporting these
\ndemands, including human rights organizations in Indonesia, which
\ncall for breaking the chain of impunity.<\/p>\n
For a number of generals with leading positions at the
\nministry of defense and the military headquarter in 1999, were
\nneither investigated (including former coordinating minister
\nGen. (ret) Feisal Tanjung) nor tried (former military chief Gen.
\n(ret) Wiranto). Seven independent researchers in a document
\ntitled, Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in
\nEast Timor in 1999, Canberra, 2002 have listed 11 major events,
\n124 officers and militia members as (possible) suspects and
\nseveral institutions and military and police units as possibly
\ninvolved in the violence and its planning.<\/p>\n
Yet of those, only 5 cases were selected for Jakarta's trial,
\none was dropped, and of the 18 suspects tried, most have been
\nacquitted and a few got light verdicts despite a minimum sentence
\nof ten years defined for crimes against humanity.<\/p>\n
Not surprisingly, the Dili indictments, issued by the UN-
\nsponsored Serious Crimes Investigation Unit within the East Timor
\njustice system, has been welcomed and seen as implicit criticism
\nof Jakarta's "fake" trials.<\/p>\n
Fourth, for the Megawati government to cooperate with the
\njustice authorities in Dili would not only be a unique political
\nand moral investment, both internationally and domestically, but
\nit would also be an important contribution, on the part of
\nJakarta, to foster a good relationship between Indonesia and East
\nTimor, and, ultimately, real reform in Indonesian politics and
\nreconciliation with East Timor.<\/p>\n
The political leaders' indignant responses, first, to
\nPresident Megawati attending East Timor independence day, and,
\nsecond, to the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan islands at the World
\nCourt last year, revealed the depth of the humiliation Jakarta
\nfelt, more than it has publicly admitted, since it lost East
\nTimor.<\/p>\n
With the shame so deeply felt about East Timor, a creative and
\nimaginative policy change in Jakarta by responding positively to
\nthe indictment on 1999 violence could restore the country's
\ndignity and may have a liberating effect. But Megawati is not the
\ntype of leader who would initiate a policy break and, with her
\nclose links to the military's top-brass, it is hard to envisage
\nsuch a change.<\/p>\n
Yet that's precisely the point. With the military leaders'
\ngrowing impatient with Aceh and Papua, some have envisioned the
\npossibility of a military strike without presidential consent,
\nignoring that civil supremacy that rests with the president, who
\nis also the commander-in-chief.<\/p>\n
President Megawati could justifiably strike back and restrain
\nher generals. With the Timor atrocities in 1999 now recognized as
\nthe Army's achilles heel, she could acquire the leverage and
\nseize the momentum to liberate the Army from its post-colonial
\ntrauma in order to definitely close Indonesia's Timor chapter.<\/p>\n
For now, the least Jakarta can do, if it is to prevent an
\ninternational tribunal and to restore Indonesia's dignity after
\nthe shameful events of 1999, is to encourage the generals to
\nfully cooperate with the justice authorities and human rights
\ninstitutions in Indonesia and East Timor.<\/p>",
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