East Timor: Dutch war crimes replayed<\/p>\n
By Aboeprijadi Santoso<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles on the origins of war
\ncrimes in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
AMSTERDAM (JP): Jakarta's rule in East Timor ended with
\nexcessive violence, as did the Dutch war in Indonesia in the
\n1940s. These two cases carry lessons on the genesis of military
\natrocities.<\/p>\n
Last September, following the victory of the proindependence
\ncamp in the August ballot in East Timor, there were reports that
\nhundreds of people were massacred, dozens missing, many suffering
\nfrom hunger, women raped, some 200,000 people displaced and
\nanother 250,000 deported to East Nusa Tenggara, the western half
\nof Timor island.<\/p>\n
As towns were devastated and infrastructure destroyed,
\nvirtually the entire population suffered from insecurity and
\nsocial dislocation, and a huge amount of public and private
\nproperty was lost.<\/p>\n
It was another Asian \"Year Zero\", which is what occurred in
\nPol Pot's Cambodia. The carnage marked the final chapter of East
\nTimor's decolonization. Like the Dutch war crimes (but unlike the
\nJapanese war crimes, but we will put that aside), these events
\nwere the outcome of the demise of the occupying force as its
\narmy, itself in crisis, resisted the transition to a new state
\nand society. Those officers responsible for the crimes should be
\ntried according to international standards.<\/p>\n
Just as the Dutch came when Indonesia proclaimed its
\nindependence, Jakarta intervened as East Timor was about to take
\nadvantage of its window of opportunity in the 1970s. Most
\npolitical parties in East Timor at the time, including the
\nJakarta-backed Apodeti, wanted a self-determination vote, while
\nthe left-wing Fretilin demanded independence. The 1975 invasion
\nby Indonesia thwarted these aspirations.<\/p>\n
Massive violence, therefore, took place from the very
\nbeginning. The list of massacre sites includes Dili, Tasi Tolu,
\nKraras, the Matebian region, culminating in Santa Cruz, Dili,
\n1991, which opened Timor's Pandora's box. Globalization, with the
\npost-Cold War emphasis on human rights, turned the tables as the
\nworld witnessed images of the Santa Cruz killings and the wave of
\nlocal protests.<\/p>\n
From this point, East Timor became a lost cause for Jakarta --
\njust as the Dutch war was at the end of the 1940s.<\/p>\n
As the tripartite negotiations moved forward without any
\nprospects of an agreement and as neither side in East Timor could
\nwin on the battlefield, the impasse persisted for too long --
\nwith Soeharto's Army maintaining dominance and arresting
\nindependence leader Jose Alexandre \"Xanana\" Gusmao, while the
\nTimorese were winning the global public opinion war.<\/p>\n
That, too, was the Dutch predicament, as its army won in 1948
\nin Yogyakarta and arrested Sukarno, but lost the diplomatic
\nstruggle.<\/p>\n
Once the economic crisis hit and Soeharto fell, it was
\nbasically a matter of time before president B.J. Habibie
\nannounced what was in effect a surrender -- opening the way to
\nthe May agreement and the ballot demanded since 1974.<\/p>\n
It was a dramatic turnaround, though, reflected by Xanana's
\nchanging status from that of guerrilla commander to political
\nprisoner meeting world leaders in Jakarta; and by Jakarta's
\nchanging response from a sort of colonial arrogance to a face-
\nsaving pragmatism.<\/p>\n
This was summed up by its own metaphors to describe East
\nTimor, from an \"itching (in our) armpit\" (Gen. Ali Moertopo in
\n1974); to \"a pebble in our shoes\" (Ali Alatas, 1992); \"nothing
\nbut rocks\" (B.J. Habibie, 1999); and finally \"an appendix we need
\nto get rid of\" (Dewi F. Anwar, 1999).<\/p>\n
These developments were most painful for the Army. East Timor
\nwas too big a stake to lose. But the Army was discredited
\nfollowing the collapse of Soeharto's New Order government. With
\nsome elements of the old regime anxious to avoid another
\nhumiliation, yet well aware the Timorese might choose
\nindependence, armed militias were (re)activated and \"security\"
\nand \"evacuation\" plans prepared.<\/p>\n
As the UN proceeded with the vote, the militia violence
\ncontinued but failed to provoke an armed response by
\nproindependence guerrillas, so the vote continued forward. By
\nAugust, the violence proved counterproductive and the families of
\nsoldiers were evacuated from Dili. Jakarta officials, apparently
\ninformed about what was coming, left Dili even before the ballot
\nresults were announced on Sept. 4.<\/p>\n
As new troops landed at night, danger was felt to be imminent
\nand the press was intimidated into leaving the country. Two days
\nlater, the persecution, deportation and destruction began.<\/p>\n
The mayhem was probably worse than any Dutch war crimes
\ncommitted in the 1940s. The militias were legalized, but acted
\nlike Rambo warriors serving their masters. The extensive
\ndestruction, widespread use of automatic weapons and the
\nparticipation of soldiers proved the militias' links, organized
\nrather than spontaneous, with the Army. It was not a \"civil war\"
\nnor was there anything \"tribal\" about the reign of terror.<\/p>\n
It was disillusioned elements within the Army reviving the
\nscorched-earth tactics learned from the Dutch war, and replaying
\nthe persecution of alleged communists in 1965 and 1966.<\/p>\n
The action in the mid-1960s is fundamental for understanding
\npolitical violence in Indonesia. \"That was the first time the
\nArmy felt they could do anything above the law,\" one expert on
\nIndonesia, Ben Anderson, said. This \"legitimate\" cycle of
\nimpunity continued in East Timor, Priok, Lampung, Irian Jaya and
\nAceh.<\/p>\n
It set the tone in defining the Army's pattern of action.
\nAccording to this pattern, military operations, particularly at
\ntimes of crisis, tend to result in human rights violations and
\nwar crimes.<\/p>\n
The writer is a journalist based in Amsterdam, the
\nNetherlands. He was in East Timor last August and September.<\/p>",
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