Dual leadership of parties and public office not in conflict<\/p>\n
Leadership within political parties is still lacking. Last week
\nPresident Megawati Soekarnoputri said she would not resign as
\nchair of her party amid debate over whether public officials
\nshould resign as leaders of political parties. The Jakarta Post's
\nreporter Asip A. Hasani talked to political scientist Ichlasul
\nAmal of Yogyakarta's Gadjah Mada University and sociologist
\nDaniel Sparingga of Surabaya's Airlangga University. The
\nfollowing are excerpts of the interview with professor Ichlasul:<\/p>\n
Question : There have been demands that President Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri resign as chairwoman of her Indonesian Democratic
\nParty of Struggle and that other high ranking officials should
\nalso give up their party posts. Your comment?<\/p>\n
Answer: What's important is their conscience, because there is no
\nlaw regulating this. Why should they give up their political
\nparty posts as civil servants do? It is not as simple as it
\nsounds.<\/p>\n
Actually, public positions such as those of the president, the
\nvice president and ministers are political positions, just like
\npositions in political parties. They are not bureaucratic
\npositions. So, I don't think worries about such dual positions
\nare that significant.<\/p>\n
Q: But public officials are expected to devote their time to
\ntheir state duties...<\/p>\n
A: Actually, state duties depend more on the persons themselves.
\nIf one becomes a public official, one should automatically detach
\noneself from the interests of one's political party. It is
\nuseless for an official to give up his post in his party if he
\ncontinues to chair his party's meetings in secret.<\/p>\n
A political party could introduce its own regulation about
\nthis issue given the absence of such a law.<\/p>\n
Q: But an official could abuse his position for his party's
\ninterests...<\/p>\n
A: I don't think this is a correct assumption. In the United
\nStates, for example, donations to political parties come from
\nprivate companies. The government does not give direct donations
\nto these parties. There are exceptions, of course. For example, a
\ngovernment project for a dam construction is awarded to a
\nparticular company. In turn, that company will then reward the
\nofficial involved by donating to his political party. In the case
\nof projects funded by foreign parties, however, the bidding is
\ntight so that the likelihood of this is reduced to a minimum.<\/p>\n
So, the fear about dual positions is not related to whether a
\npublic official is a functionary of a political party or not
\nbecause in many countries it is common that someone from a
\npolitical party assumes a government position.<\/p>\n
Q: Isn't this practice common only in countries with a parliamentary
\nsystem?<\/p>\n
A: You're right. The United States adopts a presidential system
\nand (former president) Clinton was not party chairman ... So when
\nhe became president, he would still have, at least, an emotional
\nbond with the party. Now take President George W. Bush.
\nBusinessmen who have donated to his party are now U.S. envoys.<\/p>\n
In Indonesia this issue is related to Megawati and Hamzah Haz.
\nAs Megawati is both the President and chairwoman of the
\nIndonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), she
\nhopes to control her legislators so none will defect despite
\nthe fact that the mechanism for replacing deviant members has now
\nbeen abolished. So if Megawati, Hamzah or Cabinet ministers give
\nup their posts in the political parties, there could be political
\ninstability once their parties start to resist their leadership.<\/p>\n
One weakness of the multi-party system adopted in the 1950s is
\nthat minor parties could, in the parliamentary system, cause
\ninstability if their numbers were big enough. Although triggered
\nby a different factor, Gus Dur's (former president Abdurrahman
\nWahid) impeachment by the People's Consultative Assembly was
\nreminiscent of the (political strife in the ) 1950s.<\/p>\n
Q: In the presidential system, the President should not be afraid of
\nbeing ousted by the legislature. So why should Megawati need to
\nmake sure she can control her people in the political party and
\nin the legislature?<\/p>\n
A: Well, in a presidential system, the House cannot oust a
\nPresident and whatever the Cabinet does is not dependent on what
\nhappens in the House. Unfortunately, our constitutional system is
\nnot clear. We adopt the presidential system on one hand but on
\nthe other we agree that the Assembly convenes once a year to
\nevaluate the government's performance. In this respect, we're
\nadopting the parliamentary system. In the same way, regents must
\nmake an accountability report to the regional legislative
\nassemblies.<\/p>\n
Q: Political parties like PDI Perjuangan have objected to their
\nparty leaders having to give up their party positions because
\nthey are still needed. For instance Megawati's charisma is still
\nneeded and still unrivaled in PDI Perjuangan. Your comment?<\/p>\n
A: True, nearly all political parties rely on the charismatic
\ninfluence of political figures. Yet these charismatic leaders
\ntend to violate the law.<\/p>\n
Q: Is the Golkar Party a better organization as it seems less
\ndependent on the charisma of party figures?<\/p>\n
A: Well, Golkar has its own history. Golkar voters are more
\nestablished and it used to be fully supported by the New Order'
\nadministration and bureaucracy. Golkar once had former President
\nSoeharto as its most prominent figure but this was not
\nattributable to Soeharto's charisma, but to his decision power.
\nIn the next election, I believe Golkar will not be able to
\ncollect as many votes as it had previously because its bond with
\nthe bureaucracy is now not very clear.<\/p>\n
Q: If officials remain party leaders and at the same time they tend
\nto abuse the law how can we have clean government?<\/p>\n
A: The most important thing is the budgetary procedure must be
\nreally transparent. There is a lack of transparency in the non-
\nbudgetary revenues. The ministries keep these non-budgetary
\nfunds. Then there is also non-budgetary spending related to the
\ntravel expenses of officials abroad. Garuda often covers these
\nexpenses, such as Gus Dur's visit to the United States. The logic
\nis that when one company gives some pocket money, or whatever, to
\na government official, of course, it hopes to get something in
\nreturn from this official. If all spending and receipts are
\ntransparent and must go through a budget procedure, chances for
\ncollusion will be minimized.<\/p>",
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