Dr. Sundhaussen has an affection for ABRI<\/p>\n
By Dewi Anggraeni<\/p>\n
MELBOURNE, Australia (JP): Dr. Ulf Sundhaussen, the author of
\nThe Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967, is
\ngenial and oozes compassion. Not only does he have an intimate
\nknowledge of the Indonesian Armed Forces, he also has an obvious
\naffection for the institution.<\/p>\n
Currently Associate Professor in Comparative Government at the
\nUniversity of Queensland in Australia, Dr. Sundhaussen stumbled
\ninto studying the Indonesian military by accident.<\/p>\n
Born in Frankfurt and brought up in Berlin, Germany, he went
\nto the only university in what was then West Berlin, The Free
\nUniversity.<\/p>\n
\"It was an improvised university, because the only Berlin
\nuniversity was in East Berlin. By 1948, students and professors
\nfrom the university walked out and set up The Free University in
\nWest Berlin,\" he explained.<\/p>\n
Young Sundhaussen had been forced out of school by poverty
\nbrought about by the war, and was a bricklayer and coal miner for
\neight years before resuming his studies.<\/p>\n
He majored in International Relations and Comparative
\nGovernment.<\/p>\n
His first contact with Indonesia was when his comparative
\ngovernment professor spoke about different styles of government
\nand mentioned Indonesia. Sundhaussen found the method of
\nmusyawarah (deliberation) very interesting.<\/p>\n
\"Before then I had no knowledge of Indonesia, apart from where
\nit was geographically.\"<\/p>\n
He then began to seek out articles about Indonesia in
\nnewspapers. It was towards the end of the Guided Democracy in the
\nearly 1960s that he became increasingly captivated, despite the
\nlack of encouragement from fellow students and professors.
\nAcademic attention to Southeast Asia then stretched only as far
\nas what is now Myanmar.<\/p>\n
After his First-class Honors thesis on Konfrontasi, he decided
\nto do his Ph.D on Indonesia also. Unable to obtain any
\nsupervision in Germany, he went to Monash University in
\nMelbourne, Australia, in 1965.<\/p>\n
While he intended to look into parliamentary systems, everyone
\nsuggested that he study the Indonesian army. Sundhaussen thought
\nthat every second American scholar would have been working on the
\narmy, but discovered it was regarded as too hot a topic and
\ndecided to have a try. He sent in his visa applications to the
\nimmigration, and waited. No answer was forthcoming.<\/p>\n
Sundhaussen laughed at the suggestion that back then visa
\napplications took a long time to process.<\/p>\n
\"If you were an immigration officer, would you be brave enough
\nto give a research visa to someone who wanted to study the role
\nof the army in politics?\" he asked.<\/p>\n
He was about to give up when the late General Suwarto (check
\nname), then Commandant of Seskoad (Army Staff and Command College
\nin Bandung), visited Melbourne. The two men met, and the general
\nasked Sundhaussen about his current project. Sundhaussen told the
\ngeneral his plans.<\/p>\n
Luckily the two men became friends and a short time later
\nSundhaussen arrived in Bandung for a two-year stay. He traveled
\nto other cities in Indonesia, meeting and talking to those in the
\nmilitary. They provided him with unusual insight into the
\nmilitary psyche.<\/p>\n
\"It was a very good learning experience,\" commented
\nSundhaussen.<\/p>\n
Apart from The Road to Power, Sundhaussen has also written
\nmonographs, numerous articles, and collaborated with another
\nwriter on the biography of General Nasution. He has published
\nnumerous academic papers on systems of governments in other
\ncountries. He avoids confining himself to one country and tries
\nto view each country in the global context.<\/p>\n
\"I feel that my interest in other countries has taught me more
\nabout Indonesia,\" he said.<\/p>\n
Currently he is writing a book on the collapse of military
\nregimes.<\/p>\n
Q: In your opinion, when did ABRI gain power in Indonesia?<\/p>\n
A: In Indonesia, the military moved gradually into a position
\nof power. In many countries you have a military coup, crushing
\nthrough the gate of the presidential palace, so to speak. In
\n1950, the military in Indonesia made a decision they were not
\ngoing to do just that, because it would have started a string of
\nviolence brought about by a coup, a counter coup, a counter
\ncounter coup and so on.<\/p>\n
Simatupang and others wanted to develop a professional army,
\nsupport parliamentary democracy and stay away from politics.
\nHowever, the politicians began to harass them, so by 1955, they
\nfought back. They demanded that the politicians behave
\nprofessionally as well.<\/p>\n
In 1957, after several attempts at forming coalitions, the
\npoliticians fell out without forming another.<\/p>\n
Q: That was the end of parliamentary democracy.<\/p>\n
A: Yes. The army did not want to do much at all. But Sukarno
\nwas saying then that parliamentary democracy did not work at all,
\nso they had to do something. So he selected another cabinet under
\nDjuanda, who was not connected to any party, and the army would
\nprovide the backbone. Martial law was introduced where Sukarno
\nmade decisions in the center and the army implemented them. No
\ntoppling of government. There was a vacuum, and they stepped in
\nto help out. By 1959, the 1945 Constitution was reintroduced. It
\nwas Nasution who proposed it at the end of 1957. Sukarno should
\nhave liked to come up with something himself, but neither he nor
\nhis friends from Murba came up with anything.<\/p>\n
Q: So the 1945 Constitution was reintroduced by default?<\/p>\n
A: Yes, because they couldn't think of anything else.<\/p>\n
The army was then filling a vacuum, and afterwards became a
\njunior partner in the Guided Democracy set up. There was the
\npresident, then the army, then the PKI. The other parties did not
\ndo much at all.<\/p>\n
Q: By your definition, the army also filled a vacuum in 1965.<\/p>\n
A: Yes. Here was a president who had ruined the country, not
\nlistening to the people, wanting to go on with konfrontasi, a war
\nhe could not win, using up all the resources. He also refused to
\naccept the policies of the MPRS. So he had to go. There was no
\ncoup. Probably a creeping coup, if anything.<\/p>\n
Q: There was, nonetheless, a bloodbath.<\/p>\n
A: Yes, but the bloodbath had nothing to do with the power
\nchange. The bloodbath occurred because the PKI was seen to have
\nmasterminded the alleged coup of 1st October. So Soeharto and
\nNasution wanted to bring the culpable ones to justice. Then
\nSukarno said, \"The deaths of the generals were just ripples in
\nthe sea of revolution. We will not have any trials.\" So the army
\nand many other people as well, took the law into their own hands.
\nHence the bloodbath, as the situation got out of hand. A great
\nnumber of innocent people were killed at that time.<\/p>\n
Q: So during Sukarno's rule, the military role was not as
\nprominent as it became under Soeharto?<\/p>\n
A: No, it was not. The relationship between Sukarno and the
\narmy was not an easy one, when the army was created back in 1945.<\/p>\n
Q: What happens now under Soeharto?<\/p>\n
A: Soeharto has done what many military leaders who became
\nheads of governments did. He wanted the military to obey him yet
\nhave no way to interfere in politics. Officers were given
\npositions in the public and diplomatic services, yet they were
\nnot allowed input in the process of decision making.<\/p>\n
Q: Is that what is meant by professionalizing the military?<\/p>\n
A: Yes. They were trained to be obedient to the hierarchy and
\ntheir seniors.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless there is inconsistency. He tells the military to
\nbe a professional military, yet he gives the officers jobs that
\nare not military in character.<\/p>\n
When you were trained to give orders and obey orders, yet had
\nto socialize in an environment where negotiations and gentle
\npersuasions are practiced, wouldn't you find yourself in a
\ndifficult situation?<\/p>\n
Q: What is lost in the process of professionalizing the army?<\/p>\n
A: During Nasution era, he emphasized that those in the
\nrebellions such as DI-TII, Permesta and others were fellow
\ncitizens. They were not to be eliminated, but won back. In the
\nprofessionalized military, that has been unlearned.<\/p>\n
Q: The dwifungsi has been an uncomfortable dual function then?<\/p>\n
A: Yes. There is an inner contradiction that is very difficult
\nto overcome. The architect of the New Order or Pancasila
\nDemocracy can hold the system together because he himself is an
\nenormously prestigious man. But when he goes, this system is
\nunlikely to survive in its present form.<\/p>\n
Q: What will happen then?<\/p>\n
A: I can't say exactly, not being a prophet, but I can
\nspeculate a little. We have to accept that the military is not
\nfully in control. A coup is impossible unless the incumbent
\ngovernment has already lost legitimacy. A government who seems to
\nbe doing its job will have the support of the people. In order to
\nmake a coup you need the cooperation of civilians.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, the military is not the master of its
\ndecision when it comes to the question of what to do next. Should
\nwe pack up and return to the barracks, stay on and coopt people
\ninto our ranks, what should we do? It's not only up to the
\nmilitary men.<\/p>\n
Q: We don't have any civilians ready to take over government?<\/p>\n
A: Exactly. What we need is a civilian counter elite ready and
\nwilling to take over. People who have ideas and policies, and who
\nare acceptable to the military.<\/p>\n
Q: The criterion of acceptability to the military is crucial?<\/p>\n
A: Certainly. We have seen in many parts of the world, where
\nthe military elite is ready to go, and the civilian counter elite
\nis ready to take over. But then the military elite finds out that
\nas soon as the civilian elite takes over, military officers will
\nbe arrested and charged with human rights violations and so
\nforth. Naturally they refuse to hand over. These people have a
\nsense of survival.<\/p>\n
The way I see it, even if the military in Indonesia is ready
\nto return to the barracks and they want to strike a deal with a
\ncivilian elite, who is there to negotiate with them?<\/p>\n
Q: Haven't the military elements in Golkar been eroding?<\/p>\n
A: Yes they have, but to what extent? Twenty-five years ago
\nthere were all sorts of people saying they were going to take
\nover Golkar. It hasn't happened.<\/p>\n
Q: Who is a likely candidate?<\/p>\n
A: I would say neither Golkar nor PPP are capable of devising
\na stable government. The one interesting phenomenon is the
\nseemingly good relationship between PDI and NU. If that holds,
\nthat could be the nucleus of a civilian counter elite to form a
\ngovernment. There are all sorts of organizations, forums and so
\non, who are doing good things. But they are essentially a group
\nof intellectuals with very little mass support. We have seen what
\nhappened to PSI.<\/p>\n
While many groups are doing good and valuable things, they are
\nstill not beyond personal animosity. If you want to work towards
\na democratic government as a common goal, you must put that
\nbehind you and work towards that common goal.<\/p>\n
Note:<\/p>\n
Murba: A socialist party founded in Yogyakarta on Nov. 7,
\n1948. In January 1965, it was disbanded, but the New Order
\ngovernment rehabilitated the party in October 1966.<\/p>\n
PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party). It
\nwas banned following the abortive coup on Sept. 30, 1965.<\/p>\n
Konfrontasi: confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia in
\n1963 as Indonesia accused Malaysia of being a British neo-
\ncolonialism project.<\/p>\n
MPRS: The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly,
\nestablished by President Sukarno in 1959. In 1971 the first
\ngeneral elections under the New Order Government took place to
\nelect members of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly (MPR).<\/p>\n
DI-TII: Darul Islam-Tentara Islam Indonesia or Islamic Troops.
\nThis hard-line group was formed in 1948 and had continuously
\ntried to topple the government until it was totally wiped out in
\n1965.<\/p>\n
PRRI\/Permesta: Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia
\n(the Indonesian Revolutionary Government of Republic Indonesia),
\nproclaimed on Feb. 15, 1958 by Achmad Husein, who was not
\nsatisfied with the existing government. The rebels were
\noutstripped in the same year but it was not until 1961 that the
\ngroup was totally eliminated.<\/p>\n
Dwi fungsi: or Dual Function, a concept on the dual role of
\nthe Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) which allows its members to
\nhold seats in the government and take part in administering the
\ncountry.<\/p>\n
Golkar: Golongan Karya, literally meaning the workers' group.
\nIt is the ruling faction.<\/p>\n
PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party),
\none of the three political groups in the country.<\/p>\n
PDI: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party),
\nthe smallest political group in the country.<\/p>\n
NU: Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Moslem organization
\nwith about 30 million members.<\/p>\n
PSI: Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party), a
\npolitical party founded in 1948 by Sutan Sjahrir, the first prime
\nminister. It was disbanded in 1960.<\/p>",
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