"Dr. Death" and other Timor conspiracies<\/p>\n
or<\/p>\n
"Dr. Death" and the conspiracy against East Timor
\n
\nAboeprijadi Santoso
\nRadio Netherlands
\nAmsterdam<\/p>\n
U.S. documents on President Gerald Ford's endorsement for
\nIndonesia's military takeover of the former Portuguese colony of
\nEast Timor, declassified on the 25th anniversary of the invasion,
\nare a fresh reminder of the human cost of a great political
\ndebacle.<\/p>\n
For the Dec. 7, 1975 invasion was an aggression that directly
\nled to the occupation of the territory for the next quarter
\ncentury, much of which could only have been sustained by a force
\nthat resulted in human rights abuses on a massive scale.<\/p>\n
The thrust of the "Ford-Kissinger-Soeharto" conspiracy might
\nhave been widely assumed, but now the details are published for
\nall to see.<\/p>\n
While then-president Ford and secretary of state Henry
\nKissinger did not regard the issue of East Timor as a
\nparticularly important one, president Soeharto on Dec. 6, 1975
\nwanted them to know that Jakarta had planned action, and sought
\ntheir response.<\/p>\n
Only days earlier, on Dec. 3, he had given the green light to
\nhis generals for the attack on East Timor. As the U.S. guests
\nsignaled their "understanding," the invasion was delayed until
\nthey returned home, and began during the early morning hours of
\nDec. 7.<\/p>\n
The first exchange took place amid cold war tension that
\naccompanied the fall of Saigon at Camp David in the U.S. on July
\n5, 1975, with Ford and Kissinger confirming their commitment on
\ndetente with the Soviet Union.<\/p>\n
But they were worried about the consequences of Vietnam's
\nvictory and concerned about keeping Indonesia as a strategic
\nally, while president Soeharto stressed the importance of U.S.
\neconomic aid for Jakarta to ensure stability in Asia.<\/p>\n
The issue of Portuguese decolonization of East Timor was only
\nraised as a final point. "The only way (to solve it) is to
\nintegrate into Indonesia," Soeharto said, promising "Indonesia
\nwill not use force against other countries."<\/p>\n
But, he added, "those who want independence are communist-
\ninfluenced (Fretilin) (so) the problem is how to manage the self-
\ndetermination process with a majority wanting unity with
\nIndonesia."<\/p>\n
By November, Kissinger had approved Indonesia's strategy to
\nhandle that problem. In a confidential memo to then-president
\nFord, he said, "Jakarta has been maneuvering to absorb the colony
\nthrough negotiations with Lisbon and covert military operation
\nshowing considerable restraint."<\/p>\n
"Actually, it's a kind of Lawrence of Arabia campaign," the
\noperation commander, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Dading Kalbuadi, proudly
\ntold this writer in 1995, referring to the infamous British
\nofficer who attempted to win the heart and mind of the locals to
\nwin control of Arabia.<\/p>\n
In reality, Jakarta had stimulated the open conflict among the
\nTimorese parties -- which Kissinger described as just "a small-
\nscale civil war" -- by public broadcast via Radio Kupang,
\npolitical infiltration, local mobilization and military campaign
\nfrom Atambua in a special operation using the local Raja's, spies
\nand combat troops.<\/p>\n
By mid-September, however, these efforts led to all-out war
\nwith heavy fighting in Maliana and Batugade, followed by another
\nbattle and the massacre of a handful of Australian journalists in
\nBalibo.<\/p>\n
That was Indonesia's first aggression against other country --
\ncontradicting Soeharto's promise at Camp David in the form of a
\nbrutal violation of Indonesia's own 1945 Constitution.<\/p>\n
Yet Kissinger concluded that "a merger with Indonesia is
\nprobably the best solution if the inhabitants agree." Since the
\nU.S. took the position of eschewing any involvement in East
\nTimor, its role was passive. All Kissinger, a Hungarian, worried
\nabout was that Jakarta would use U.S.-supplied weapons.<\/p>\n
By Dec. 6, at the second summit in Jakarta, East Timor was
\nagain a minor issue for the U.S., but Soeharto argued that by now
\n"Indonesia found itself facing a fait d'accompli."<\/p>\n
With Portugal unable to control the situation, Fretilin
\nprevailed and unilaterally declared independence, ending more
\nthan 400 years of occupation. So "to establish peace and order,"
\nSoeharto urged, "we want your understanding if we deem it
\nnecessary to take rapid or drastic action."<\/p>\n
Without inquiring about Jakarta's plan, Ford promptly
\nresponded by saying "we will understand, and will not press you
\non the issue."<\/p>\n
Soeharto gave the U.S. leaders only the vaguest indication of
\nhis plans. By contrast, weeks earlier, his generals provided
\nCanberra's diplomats with a barrage of more or less accurate
\ninformation concerning Jakarta's covert operation from August to
\nOctober 1975.<\/p>\n
Australian documents released last year suggest it was a trick
\nto make Australia appear complicit in Jakarta's aggression.<\/p>\n
In any case, Soeharto had already met twice with then-PM Gough
\nWhitlam, and found the Australians ready to accept Jakarta's
\npreference for annexing East Timor into Indonesia; indeed, when
\nthe Australian journalists were murdered in Balibo, Canberra did
\nnot even raise a formal protest.<\/p>\n
By early December, after Jakarta gained urgently needed clear
\nconsent from its most important Western allies, its army opened
\nup a dark chapter in East Timor's history -- its most violent
\nsince the bloody purges of 1965-1966, as it turned out.<\/p>\n
Fretilin's declaration of independence on Nov. 28, 1975 had
\nactually taken Jakarta by surprise and triggered the invasion.<\/p>\n
Timorese eyewitnesses, during interviews in Lisbon in 1993 and
\n1994, said the attacks were brutal and involved "indiscriminate
\nkillings" at Villa Verde and other parts of Dili.<\/p>\n
Such was the nature of the war -- according to anonymous
\nIndonesian officers in 1995 -- that the army, facing a popular
\nguerrilla insurgency campaign, was often unable to distinguish
\nbetween people who were Fretilin, and those who were not.<\/p>\n
As the war dragged on into the early 1980s, it was neither "a
\nsmall guerrilla war" as Soeharto expected, nor the one in which
\nJakarta could "succeed quickly," as Kissinger hoped.<\/p>\n
Kissinger, whom the Timorese acidly dubbed "Dr. Death," has
\nrecently made reconciliation with the Timorese leaders Xanana
\nGusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta.<\/p>\n
It should be noted here that then-foreign minister Adam Malik
\n-- the only Indonesian politician who recognized East Timor's
\nrights to independence -- did not seem actively involved in all
\nkey events. A freedom fighter in August 1945, Adam might have
\nrecognized that Jakarta's adventure in Timor contradicted much of
\nthe spirit of Indonesia's own struggle for national sovereignty
\nagainst colonial aggression.<\/p>\n
If Adam Malik deserves a tribute, Soeharto and the generals
\nwho continued the war after the invasion, should be held
\nresponsible for the human catastrophe that followed.<\/p>\n
As people fled Dili and Baucau, the army attempted to pacify
\nthe rest of the country by force. In the end, more than 100,000
\npeople perished in the Matebian hills from a combination of war
\nand starvation when Indonesian troops encircled them during the
\nlate-1970s.<\/p>\n
With the U.S. and Australian key documents brought to light,
\none can only wonder what took place on Dec. 3, 1975 when Soeharto
\nmet with his top officers -- Ali Moertopo, Yoga Sugama and Benny
\nMoerdani -- and decided to invade East Timor.<\/p>\n
Given the consequences of the invasion, the four generals
\ncould be charged with war crimes.<\/p>\n
Despite the human catastrophe caused by the invasion, the East
\nTimorese resisted and, ultimately, chose independence. The
\nexperience should serve as a stark lesson for those leading
\nmilitary operations in Aceh today.<\/p>",
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