Don't shun Indonesia's soldiers<\/p>\n
In its war on terrorism, the U.S. is guilty of a very serious
\noversight. It needs to promptly reconsider a needless ban,
\nimposed by the U.S. Congress in 1999, on military-to-military
\ncontacts between America and Indonesia.<\/p>\n
This broad but not absolute injunction was supposed to
\nmotivate the Indonesian military to accept civilian control and
\nto bring those responsible for atrocities in East Timor to
\njustice. There has been some progress on both these fronts,
\nalthough probably it has had little to do with the U.S. ban. Yet
\nthere remains resistance in Congress to lifting it.<\/p>\n
The fundamental question that needs to be asked is whether the
\nsupposed U.S. goal of inducing the Indonesian military to become
\nmore apolitical, professional, and disciplined will be furthered
\nby the absence of contact with America's professional soldiers?
\nOr will it be achieved more slowly, or perhaps not at all? The
\nanswer seems obvious to us. Moreover, the U.S. is missing a
\nchance to win friends among moderates in the Indonesian officer
\ncorps and to gain vital help from them in fighting terrorism in a
\nlarge, potentially unstable Asian nation.<\/p>\n
Military influence within the government has waned and in the
\nlong term will continue to wane. However, in the interest of
\nfostering national unity, President Megawati Soekarnoputri has
\nbrought the generals into her inner circle, ensuring that they
\nwill have a significant say in all policies.<\/p>\n
There are some signs that both Megawati and the generals
\nallied to her would like to recreate some aspects of the
\nSoeharto-era alliance between the ruling party and the military.
\nHowever, resistance to this will likely come both from within the
\nranks and from broader society. U.S. engagement of the military
\ncould help to consolidate the reforms made so far and strengthen
\nthe institutions needed for civilian control.<\/p>\n
Terrorist threats are no joke. Indonesians have traditionally
\npracticed a moderate form of Islam, but in recent years more
\nradical groups like the Laskar Jihad have sprung up, receiving
\nsupport from some factions of the military. It has emerged a plot
\nby al-Qaeda-linked forces to attack the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta
\nwas foiled last year, and Indonesians were involved in regional
\nnetworks which had tentacles in Malaysia, Singapore and the
\nPhilippines.<\/p>\n
The Megawati government hasn't been as aggressive as the U.S.
\nwould like in monitoring these activists and arresting them when
\nenough evidence of their plans can be collected. Last December an
\nappropriations bill opened the way for the U.S. to resume a
\nmodest amount of counter-terrorism training for Indonesians, and
\nthe U.S. military is doing all it can to remain engaged with
\nJakarta while remaining within the letter of the law. But it
\nshouldn't have to operate this way.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has long been a key U.S. friend in Southeast Asia,
\nand despite the occasional hiccups, it has made remarkable
\nprogress toward democracy in recent years. That the U.S. is
\nhampering its own efforts to promote reform and stability at
\nprecisely the moment when it could do the most good is a serious
\nmistake that should be rectified quickly.<\/p>\n
-- The Asian Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/dont-shun-indonesias-soldiers-1447899208", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }