Don't forget Aceh<\/p>\n
The nation's preoccupation with the war in Iraq this past week
\nhas diverted our attention away from many equally, if not more
\npressing, issues that are so much closer to home. One of the
\ncasualties of this severe lack of attention toward domestic
\nproblems is the peace process in Aceh, now well into its third
\nmonth, and seemingly in danger of being derailed.<\/p>\n
The irony is that while we are all venting our anger at the
\nwar in Iraq -- at times very passionately -- very few of us are
\ndisturbed by the growing prospect that Aceh could soon revert to
\nanother full-blown armed conflict, thanks to our own failure to
\ngive it the attention it deserves.<\/p>\n
Many who have campaigned and worked for peace in Aceh duly
\nnoted that Indonesia would have made significant progress had the
\nnation -- the government, the public and the media -- devoted as
\nmuch attention to it as it has lavished on the war in Iraq.<\/p>\n
Instead, because of this attention-deficit, the agreement on
\nthe cessation of hostilities that the Indonesian government
\nsigned with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) armed rebel group in
\nGeneva in December is now on the verge of collapsing.<\/p>\n
The peace agreement in Aceh has entered a crucial, and
\nprobably the most difficult, phase since Feb. 9.<\/p>\n
Under the terms of the agreement, the Indonesian Military
\n(TNI) is required to relocate its forces and redefine its mandate
\nfrom that of a striking force to a defensive one. GAM, for its
\npart, must begin placing its weapons in designated sites.<\/p>\n
If the first two months of the agreement were marked by a
\ndisplay of strong goodwill by both the government of Indonesia
\nand GAM, that has been sorely lacking since the phase to
\ndemilitarize Aceh began in February.<\/p>\n
The goodwill, built through the confidence-building measures
\nsince the signing of the agreement, has now given way to mutual
\ndistrust and misgiving on both sides. TNI is refusing to
\nrelocate, and GAM is simply refusing to lay down its weapons.<\/p>\n
Having come this far in implementing the agreement, we are now
\nseeing signs that both camps are not only reluctant to go the
\ndistance. There are also indications that both are trying to
\nbotch, undermine or even sabotage the peace process.<\/p>\n
The killing, torture and kidnapping have resumed. Armed
\nclashes between the two forces have also taken place more
\nfrequently. And both camps have been engaging in provocative
\nstatements or actions, which are not helpful at all.<\/p>\n
The latest act of provocation was the decision by the Army to
\nhold its leadership meeting in the industrial town of Lhokseumawe
\nthis week. The Army could have picked any of the other 29
\nprovinces, but its choice of Aceh could only have been
\npolitically motivated, designed to provoke GAM.<\/p>\n
But then, GAM is also culpable for constantly provoking TNI,
\nby taking advantage of the temporary lull since December to
\nopenly campaign for its goal of independence.<\/p>\n
Rather than trying to calm the situation, both sides have been
\nguilty of heightening tension in Aceh, contrary to the letter and
\nspirit of the December agreement.<\/p>\n
At this rate, unless something is done to reverse the process,
\nthe peace agreement could fall apart, and for all we know Aceh
\nwill burn once again. If that were to happen, it would probably
\nbe a long time before Aceh could see real peace.<\/p>\n
For all its shortcomings, the December agreement, brokered by
\nthe Geneva-based Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), remains the best and,
\nprobably, only viable road map to peace in Aceh.<\/p>\n
The agreement makes no pretension about how peace should be
\nbuilt, for this is ultimately for the Aceh people, through the
\nAceh all-inclusive dialog, to decide.<\/p>\n
The future of Aceh cannot be decided by the Indonesian
\ngovernment and GAM alone, neither of which has any legitimate
\nclaim to representing the people in the province. The future of
\nAceh must be decided by the people of Aceh alone.<\/p>\n
But for that to happen, the province must first be
\ndemilitarized, which is what this Geneva agreement aims to do.<\/p>\n
The December agreement has given us a glimpse of what a
\npeaceful Aceh could look like. The people of Aceh, for example,
\nhave now started to enjoy life with less fear. It would be sad
\nindeed if this opportunity for peace were now to be squandered
\nonly because some armed men decided it was against their own
\ninterests.<\/p>\n
The Aceh peace process must be salvaged.<\/p>\n
This is one area where public pressure could be effective in
\nmaking a real difference, certainly much more effective than the
\nprotests against the war in Iraq.<\/p>\n
We are not suggesting that we should forget Iraq, but let us
\nnot forget that we have our own pressing problems at home to tend
\nto. As long as we still consider Aceh to be part of the republic,
\nwe have a responsibility to ensure that the people there can live
\nin peace.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/dont-forget-aceh-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}