'Djuanda model' may be suitable for today's Indonesia: Legge<\/p>\n
The endless political tumult has placed Vice President
\nMegawati Sukarnoputri in the spotlight and with it a resurging
\ninterest in her father, Sukarno, the late first president of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
John Legge, former professor of history at Monash University,
\ndean of the Faculty of Arts, spoke to The Jakarta Post's
\ncontributor Dewi Anggraeni in Melbourne, about Sukarno. Prof.
\nLegge is the author of A Biography of Sukarno, first published in
\n1972 and a second edition was brought out in 1985.<\/p>\n
Question: To have written a biography of Sukarno you must have
\nobserved his life in great detail. How would you describe
\nSukarno?<\/p>\n
Answer: The book was written shortly after the change of
\nregime from Sukarno to Soeharto. It was written very much against
\nthe background of guided democracy. I argue in the book that
\nSukarno had three periods during which he made history by
\ngrasping the initiative and changing the course of events.<\/p>\n
What periods are they?<\/p>\n
The first of these was in the late 1920s as chairman of the
\nIndonesian National Party (PNI). He made lots of speeches,
\ntraveled around Java talking about nationalism as the uniting
\nideological theme. He was able to bring together other streams of
\nnationalism like Islam and Marxism. He was a very visible figure
\ndeveloping a nationalist ideology. That period came to an end
\nwith his arrest and imprisonment.<\/p>\n
The second was the period of Japanese occupation. The Dutch
\ncalled him a Japanese collaborator, but I think in reality he was
\nfairly effective in manipulating the occupying government to look
\nfavorably on his nationalist stance. He developed his well-known
\npresence through his access to radio, and he used this privilege
\nin a clever way. He spoke somewhat ambiguously, in ways
\nunderstood by his listeners but not by the Japanese.<\/p>\n
Did he ever make a blunder, something not uncommon in an
\nuncertain era?<\/p>\n
There were questionable parts in this period, for instance his
\nacceptance of recruiting romusha laborers. He had to tread very
\ncarefully during the period of Japanese occupation.<\/p>\n
What is the third period?<\/p>\n
The third period is 1957-1959, when constitutional democracy
\nhad largely broken down. Before 1957 there had been short-lived
\ngovernments, weak coalitions, regional revolts.<\/p>\n
He stepped forward outside the Constitution, formed a
\ngovernment. As he put it, \"President Sukarno has commissioned
\ncitizen Sukarno to form a government\". That was the government of
\nDjuanda.<\/p>\n
During the next two years, he gradually moved toward
\nabolishing, by decree, the 1950 Provisional Constitution, and
\nreturned to the Constitution of 1945. This was the beginning of
\nguided democracy.<\/p>\n
There are some disagreements about the degree to which this
\nwas due to his own initiatives and how much it was Nasution's or
\nthe Army's.<\/p>\n
What do you think?<\/p>\n
My view is that there was a bit of both. Sukarno did take a
\nleading role, but he did this with the agreement of Nasution and
\nthe Army's leadership, and with their aid. Of course this created
\na very strong presidency.<\/p>\n
Under the 1950 Constitution he had been a figurehead
\npresident. The 1945 Constitution placed a great deal of power in
\nthe hands of the president.<\/p>\n
Over the next few years the Communist Party became bigger and
\nstronger. Sukarno had no real power base of his own so he had to
\noperate a bit like Gus Dur does now, within the framework of
\ncontending political pressures, the Army being one and the PKI
\n(Indonesian Communist Party) another. So Sukarno had to balance
\nthese two. I see him during that period as responding to events
\nrather than making them.<\/p>\n
So I see these periods as being the time when he changed
\nthings. During the first two he was more powerful, after that
\nthings got a little out of hand, right up until the events of
\n1965, when Soeharto stepped in, and with Supersemar (the order
\nsigned by Sukarno on March 11, 1966), delegated authority to
\nSoeharto so the latter could take action himself. Sukarno however
\nremained president formally until 1968, when Soeharto became
\nofficially president.<\/p>\n
So from 1959 onwards he began to lose his grip on power?<\/p>\n
He was president during the period of guided democracy, but
\nit was a very fragile and divided political situation, in which
\nyou can say nobody had a real grip on power.<\/p>\n
Do you think it was a mistake of Sukarno's to attempt to bring
\nthese unlikely forces together?<\/p>\n
Well, he didn't have a choice. That was the way the political
\nbalance was at that time.<\/p>\n
Where did he go wrong, or how did he misjudge the situation?<\/p>\n
I wouldn't say that it was a matter of going wrong or a case
\nof misjudgement. After Independence, Indonesian politics became
\nvery volatile.<\/p>\n
There were a whole series of governments under the provisional
\nconstitution, the coalitions were largely between Masyumi and
\nPNI. Nobody had dominant power. It was a matter of compromise.<\/p>\n
Sukarno felt that a return to the 1945 Constitution would make
\nfor a stronger presidency and he would have greater authority to
\ncontrol the situation. Having done that, things didn't improve
\nmuch. To stop the Army and the PKI from openly clashing, Sukarno
\nwaged large nationalist campaigns, first against the Dutch in
\nWest Irian, and then against the new state of Malaysia.<\/p>\n
But those were economically costly and resulted in hyper-
\ninflation. Indonesians claimed to feel that Sukarno was too
\ntolerant of inflation and of economic decline.
\n Is there anything that Sukarno did that may be relevant to
\ntoday's situation?
\n In 1957 Sukarno appointed Djuanda as prime minister. The
\ngovernment was effectively run by the prime minister and the
\nCabinet. Last year Gus Dur (as President Abdurrahman Wahid is
\naffectionately called) did suggest something of that kind, when
\nhe suggested that Megawati be responsible for running the
\ngovernment while he remained President.<\/p>\n
That didn't work out. In reality the Djuanda model might be
\nappropriate for Indonesia considering Gus Dur's present state.<\/p>\n
Can you see some parallels between Sukarno and Gus Dur?<\/p>\n
There may be more significant parallels between their
\nsituations, rather than between them as individuals. Soeharto had
\nthe army behind him. Both Sukarno and Abdurrahman Wahid have had
\nto deal with volatile political situations. Neither of them could
\nreally be on top, having to cope with a variety of political
\npressures, regional ambitions and resistance.<\/p>\n
Sukarno had to handle resistance from North Sumatra and North
\nSulawesi while today Gus Dur has to find solutions for Aceh and
\nWest Papua.<\/p>\n
Where were Islamic groups during the Sukarno days?<\/p>\n
In the fifties there were Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) as
\nthe two major Muslim parties, in addition to some other minor
\nones. They were part of 'the big four' which emerged from the
\n1955 election.<\/p>\n
In the 1960s, Masyumi, having become involved in regional
\nrevolt and subsequently outlawed, was virtually out of the
\npicture.<\/p>\n
During the period of guided democracy, the power of the Army
\nand the PKI became greater than that of political parties.<\/p>\n
Would you say Islamic groups were disenfranchised at that
\ntime?<\/p>\n
I would say it was pretty close in the case of Masyumi, but NU
\ncontinued to play a role.<\/p>\n
And they were disenfranchised again during Soeharto's rule?<\/p>\n
Yes. Soeharto's government was basically a military regime.
\nInitially Soeharto was concerned with development, but over time
\nhe became much more authoritarian. Everybody was disenfranchised.<\/p>\n
Are there parallels or contrasts between Sukarno and Soeharto?<\/p>\n
Apart from the fact that they are both Javanese, they are not
\nalike. Soeharto took power from Sukarno with the backing of the
\nmilitary. Sukarno never had the chance to do that, so he had to
\ncontrol the situation through political maneuvers. That was very
\nunlike Soeharto. And in policy terms Sukarno was uninterested in
\npursuing an adequate economic policy, unlike Soeharto in the
\nearly years of his rule.<\/p>\n
Would you say that the disenfranchisement of Islamic groups
\nduring Sukarno and Soeharto has something to do with the current
\nnational crisis?<\/p>\n
Yes. The banning of Masyumi removed its members from power
\nentirely, but the values they represented are still around.<\/p>\n
Do you see Sukarno as a person who was able to invoke or evoke
\npatriotism in Indonesia?<\/p>\n
I would say that he was very important in emphasizing and
\nkeeping alive the idea of an Indonesian nation. Some would argue
\nthat Indonesia is not naturally a nation, considering its ethnic,
\ngeographical and economic diversity. Yet we have a perception of
\na nation.<\/p>\n
Has that kind of sentiment, a perception of belonging to a
\nnation, now faded?<\/p>\n
I don't think so. Indonesia is really a manufactured nation,
\nor to use Benedict Anderson's term, it had to be \"imagined\" as a
\ncommunity. Sukarno's contribution was to stress the idea of
\nnationalism and to keep alive the perception of an independent
\nnation.<\/p>\n
If you could say it in several sentences, what do you see as
\nthe core problems that may cause the disintegration of Indonesia?<\/p>\n
Apart from regional differences that have always been there,
\nthe authoritarian nature of Soeharto's rule has naturally
\ngenerated the ideas of reformasi (political reform). What we see
\nnow is the reaction against years of Soeharto's rule.<\/p>",
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