Disentangling confusions about federalism<\/p>\n
By Hans Antlov<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): At a seminar a few weeks ago, one of the
\nparticipants -- a noted member of the House of Representatives --
\nsaid the Republic of Indonesia would need to be dismantled if the
\nunitary nation were to become a federation.<\/p>\n
Earlier this year, a leading political figure asked whether,
\nin a federated system, a person living in Java would need a
\npassport to go to Maluku. These are just two common
\nmisunderstandings about federalism. There are different kinds of
\nmisinterpretations of what constitutes a federal state and what
\nkinds of benefits it might bring. Some of these statements
\nreflect a lack of knowledge, while others perhaps indicate fear
\nof constitutional change. It would therefore seem important to
\ndisentangle the confusion about federalism.<\/p>\n
The unitary principle grounds sovereignty in the nation as a
\nwhole. A government representing a unitary nation has the right
\nto delegate powers downward to regional and local institutions,
\nthrough legislation, but the regions have no right to any of
\nthese powers. A unitary state can be highly centralized (like
\nFrance), or it can be decentralized with a substantial degree of
\nautonomy for provinces or communes (like Britain or the
\nNetherlands). Regardless of the degree of decentralization, it
\nremains a unitary state. The powers held by local and regional
\norgans have been received from above, and can in principle be
\nwithdrawn through new central legislation, without any need for
\nconsent from the districts or provinces concerned. In practice,
\nhowever, it may be difficult to recentralize a decentralized,
\nunitary state.<\/p>\n
The federal principle divides sovereignty between the
\nconstituent states and the federation as a whole. The
\nconstitution takes the form of a treaty between a certain number
\nof states which defines the division of powers between the states
\nand the federal level. Importantly, constitutional changes cannot
\nbe made unilaterally by the federal government, but have to be
\naccepted by the states. The principle behind a federal
\nconstitution is that each state delegates a certain amount of
\npower upward, to the federal government.<\/p>\n
In a loose federation (generally termed \"confederation\") the
\nconstituent states may have the right to withdraw the powers they
\nhave delegated upwards and resume complete independence.<\/p>\n
In a tighter federation this cannot be done unilaterally, but
\nhas to be negotiated and accepted by all parties concerned. In
\nconfederations, the powers delegated upward are also generally
\nlimited (typically defense and foreign policy), while in tightly
\nknit federations, the powers of the federal government can
\nsometimes be even more substantial than in a decentralized
\nunitary state.<\/p>\n
According to the Norwegian political scientist Xyvind Xsterud,
\nthe difference between a unitary and a federal state is not that
\none is more decentralized than the other, but that the former is
\ndecentralized through legislation whereas the latter is
\ndecentralized by constitution. In a federation, certain matters
\nare thus constitutionally devolved to local units, and the
\ncentral government cannot unilaterally revoke this
\ndecentralization, as it can in a unitary state.<\/p>\n
If Indonesia were a federal state, like it was during a brief
\nperiod between 1949 and 1950, only one paragraph of the
\nConstitution of 1945 would need to be changed: \"The Indonesian
\nState is a unitary state in the form of a Republic.\" This is
\nparagraph 1, and the word \"unitary state\" would need to be
\nreplaced with \"a federation of states,\" or something similar.
\nPresumably a constituent assembly would have to meet, with
\nrepresentatives from each of the federated states (formerly
\nprovinces), in order to adopt, or reconfirm the revised
\nconstitution.<\/p>\n
For all practical purposes, Indonesia could remain the same
\nnation, with a joint flag and national anthem, one citizenship,
\nand a single currency and military defense. It would not need to
\nchange its name, although it could become the Federal Republic of
\nIndonesia or the United States of Indonesia, if this were seen as
\ndesirable. Citizens would certainly not need passports or visas
\nto travel between the states. It is many years since it was
\nnecessary to have passports in order to travel within such
\nfederal states as India, Malaysia, Australia, Canada, the U.S.,
\nor Germany.<\/p>\n
The difference between a unitary and a federal state is more
\nsubtle. Did anyone notice that Belgium or South Africa a few
\nyears ago gave up their unitary status in order to become
\nfederations? And do we think it strange that sovereign nations in
\nEurope are willing to delegate some of their powers to the
\nCouncil of Ministers and the Parliament of the European Union?<\/p>\n
In order for Indonesia to become a federation, two steps are
\nnecessary. First, the constituent state would need to be formed
\nand to recognize each other. The highest legislative and
\nconstitutive bodies in Indonesia would allow provinces or sets of
\nprovinces to have their own autonomy and to form new states, with
\ntheir own rights and duties, independent of (but in cooperation
\nwith) the central government. Each new state would need to
\nconvene a constituent assembly to decide whether or not it would
\njoin the federation and under what conditions. This could be done
\nwithout dissolving the Republic of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Simultaneously, the relationship between the central (or
\nfederal) government in Jakarta and the states would need to be
\nworked out in the form of a treaty. Legally, this could be done
\nthrough an amendment to the 1945 Constitution. There would need
\nto be negotiations between the states and the federal government
\nconcerning the division of powers, defining the limits of
\nregional autonomy and the powers of the federal government.<\/p>\n
In the Indonesian case, there would be a number of thorny
\nissues, such as the need to divide Java into several states (no
\nother federation, to my knowledge, has 65 percent of its
\npopulation in one state), the geographical imbalance of
\nresources, and the lack of a coherent identity within larger
\nunits outside of Java (for instance, how many Sikka people in
\nFlores actually feel themselves to be \"Nusatenggarese\" or
\n\"Eastern Indonesians\"?).<\/p>\n
But let us imagine for a moment that these issues were solved
\nand that the Republic of Indonesia became a federation of states.
\nWould this mean that the nation would overnight become more
\ndemocratic or more decentralized?<\/p>\n
No, not necessarily. The second frequent misconception about
\nfederalism, this time heard from its champions, is that it would
\ncure most if not all of Indonesia's social, economic and
\npolitical ills. Such is not the case. We need here to make
\ncareful distinctions along three dimensions: federal vs. unitary;
\ndecentralized vs. centralized; and democratic vs. authoritarian.<\/p>\n
A federal state is not always more decentralized and
\ndemocratic than a unitary state. Sweden, for example, is a
\nunitary monarchy -- but with a very high degree of
\ndecentralization and local democracy. Several of the former
\ncommunist states in Eastern Europe (including Yugoslavia and the
\nSoviet Union) were (and remain) authoritarian and centralized
\nfederations. Federations can be more or less decentralized and
\ndemocratic; so can unitary states. It depends on politics, and
\nhow words are used to denote various political ideas.<\/p>\n
What most commentators mean when they talk about federalism in
\nIndonesia is, in fact, regional autonomy and local democracy.
\nThese could both be achieved without turning the unitary state
\ninto a federation. Both regional autonomy and democracy could be
\naccommodated within a unitary state. The newly approved Law on
\nLocal Governments provides the legal framework for far-reaching
\nautonomy for districts and municipalities.<\/p>\n
In fact, together with the Law on the People's Consultative
\nAssembly (MPR), House of Representatives (DPR) and Provincial
\nHouse of Representatives (DPRD), it provides the foundation for a
\ntotal renegotiation of the balance of power between the center
\nand the regions. With empowered local legislatures and regional
\nautonomy, a unitary Indonesia could open up for a more
\nparticipatory democracy. But this cannot be done without vigilant
\npublic opinion demanding that the local regional government is
\naccountable, and builds on a widespread conviction that DPRD
\nmembers are representatives of the people, not of the state.<\/p>\n
Democratization can be obtained both within a federation and a
\nunitary state. It is here that people's energies and enthusiasm
\nare needed. A federation is thus not an end in itself. It is a
\nmeans that could be used to achieve certain ends, such as a
\nfairer division of revenue or increased political participation
\non the local level, but it could also be used for less laudable
\ngoals, such as to allow resource-rich localities to keep their
\nriches to themselves.<\/p>\n
The transformation process could also stir up emotions
\npreventing an orderly result. It is an intriguing fact that out
\nof the world's 10 largest democracies, nine are federations (the
\nexception is Japan). There might thus be something inherent to
\nfederal systems that allows for more democratic participation,
\nand thus would be worthwhile for Indonesia to consider. On the
\nother hand, there are risks such as strengthening undemocratic
\nlocal power-holders through access to more revenue with less
\ncentral supervision.<\/p>\n
The current public debate on the future form of the
\nIndonesian nation must be continued. Whatever form the nation-
\nstate takes, the important issues to be looked at are people's
\nparticipation, good governance and local autonomy.<\/p>\n
Just as in 1945, Indonesia today has a rare and historic
\nopportunity to transform the government to meet the challenges of
\nthe future. This is a country of potentially enormous social
\nchange and entrepreneurship. We are witnessing a flowering of new
\nideas and social actors, as Indonesia seeks to become a
\ndemocratic nation with a more just division of powers and
\nresources between center and regions, and between state and
\ncitizens.<\/p>\n
The writer is a program officer at the Ford Foundation in
\nJakarta, and is responsible for a program on participatory local
\ngovernance.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/disentangling-confusions-about-federalism-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}