Diplomacy can help calm troubled sea<\/p>\n
Graham Gerard Ong, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore<\/p>\n
The dispatch of three Indonesian warships to the Sulawesi Sea
\nlast week, in protest against Malaysia's decision to award a
\ncontract to an Anglo-Dutch firm to explore and mine the Ambalat
\nand East Ambalat oil and gas blocks, may appear to be a
\nstraightforward case of \"gunboat diplomacy\".<\/p>\n
Until a few days ago, the issue had remained largely dormant
\nbecause Malaysia appeared to be resolved to tackle it through
\ndiplomatic rather than military means.<\/p>\n
Now, the latest reports indicate a significant escalation in
\ntensions between the two countries after a confrontation between
\na Malaysian and an Indonesian warship on Saturday.<\/p>\n
The patrolling Malaysian warship seemed to have informed its
\nIndonesian counterpart that it had encroached into Malaysian
\nwaters near Sebatik island in the Sulawesi Sea. In the row that
\nfollowed, the Malaysian vessel apparently decided to withdraw
\nwhen the Indonesian vessel gave pursuit.<\/p>\n
The significance of Sebatik island, which is approximately 215
\nnautical miles (398km) north-east of the Ambalat blocks, was
\nunderlined on Monday when Indonesian President Susilo Bambang
\nYudhoyono visited the southern part of the island. The area has
\nalso become a temporary shelter for Indonesians fleeing a
\nMalaysian crackdown against illegal workers.<\/p>\n
This confirms that the disputes over the Ambalat blocks and
\nMalaysia's repatriation of illegal Indonesian immigrants are
\nintertwined and have to be dealt with simultaneously.<\/p>\n
However, any broader analysis of this crisis cannot avoid the
\nrecognition that it was Indonesia which initiated it by sending a
\nnaval presence to the area.<\/p>\n
An explanation for its actions may be found in the works of
\nthe famous 19th-century naval historian and strategist Alfred
\nThayer Mahan. In his classic The Influence Of Sea Power Upon
\nHistory, he argued that naval power is the key to success in
\ninternational politics.<\/p>\n
The navy's importance rests on two key pillars: Its ability to
\naffect events on land, and its ability to control the use of the
\nsea (or \"command of the sea\" as Mahan called it). The latter
\npertains to the ability to protect one's maritime assets and to
\nproject military power ashore while denying the opposition the
\nmeans of counteraction.<\/p>\n
Unlike the littoral states of Singapore and Malaysia, the
\nIndonesian navy played a vital role in the formation of the
\ncountry's national consciousness after the end of World War II --
\na consciousness not unrelated to Indonesia once being the locus
\nof the Sriwijaya and Majapahit maritime empires between the 7th
\nand 16th centuries.<\/p>\n
Despite possessing only wooden ships, a few landing craft and
\nweapons left over by imperial Japan, Indonesia, soon after the
\nproclamation of its independence from the Dutch, created the
\nAgency of the People's Security Sea Service, the progenitor of
\nthe Republic of Indonesia Navy (renamed in 1970 as the Navy of
\nthe Indonesian Armed Forces).<\/p>\n
Its role was then further embellished through its contribution
\nin the independence war against the Dutch between 1945 and 1949.<\/p>\n
Though the Indonesian military's traditional role of dwifungsi
\nhas been officially dismantled in the post-Soeharto era, the
\ndispatch of the three warships was a knee-jerk response to
\nPresident Susilo's statement about what his government believes
\nto be its rights in the Sulawesi Sea.<\/p>\n
Just as the East Timor incident created a negative impression
\nworldwide of former president Megawati Soekarnoputri's
\nadministration, the recent show of force in Sulawesi may come at
\na high cost to President Susilo's political credibility, and may
\ntarnish his country's reputation.<\/p>\n
For one thing, the Indonesian move negates the credibility it
\naccrued when it proposed the creation of an ASEAN Security
\nCommunity by 2020 during its 2003-2004 chairmanship of the ASEAN
\nStanding Committee.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's actions go against the grain of the grouping's
\nfundamental principles.<\/p>\n
ASEAN states are to settle their disagreements without
\nconsidering the use of force as an option. Preparations for the
\nuse of force are no longer acceptable and neither must they be
\nfactored into a country's contingency planning.<\/p>\n
Also, the relative frailty of Indonesia's navy is an open
\nsecret among the region's defense community. Though it is the
\nbiggest naval force in Southeast Asia, its neglect over the 1990s
\nhas led to an unserviceable fleet.<\/p>\n
Even Indonesia's navy chief of staff, Admiral Bernard Sondakh,
\nhad admitted as much. A 2002 The Jakarta Post editorial quoted
\nhim saying, \"Only a handful of our warships are operational\".
\nEven then, since \"none are equipped to engage in combat\", they
\nwere only \"good for fishing expeditions\", he said.<\/p>\n
Malaysia's decision to avoid a naval response until the
\nSebatik island standoff showed an accurate assessment of the
\nscope of Indonesia's naval capacity.<\/p>\n
Its sensible decision to withdraw its warship from the Sebatik
\nisland standoff also suggests that it has decided to avoid the
\noutbreak of unnecessary conflict.<\/p>\n
Malaysia would do well not to engage in any sabre-rattling,
\nfor its prudence can generate positive political capital for the
\ncountry should it submit its case on the dispute to the
\nInternational Court of Justice once again.<\/p>\n
The news of its initial deployment of three warships, reported
\nin the press a day after the opening of the three-day ASEAN
\nRegional Forum on Regional Cooperation on Maritime Security held
\nin Singapore, also places added strain on the already fragile but
\npressing agenda of regional maritime security cooperation.<\/p>\n
Lastly, the Sulawesi incident raises questions about the state
\nof affairs within President Susilo's government.<\/p>\n
When six Indonesian warships appeared off East Timor's coast
\nin 2002, security analysts interpreted it as a sign that the
\nIndonesian military was reasserting its power under then-
\npresident Megawati's weak leadership.<\/p>\n
Similarly, the warships in Sulawesi may indicate a similar bid
\nfor power by the military, against what it perceives as President
\nSusilo's softness in negotiating with Malaysia on both the
\nillegal workers' issue as well as the oil and gas blocks dispute.<\/p>\n
It may also indicate a struggle for power within the military,
\namong its various services. Significantly, just days before the
\nIndonesia-Malaysia summit last month, the Indonesian navy
\nannounced a massive fleet expansion plan over the next decade.<\/p>\n
Its plans to add at least 302 warships to its inventory may
\nalso indicate a desire to tip the regional naval balance of power
\nin Indonesia's favor.<\/p>\n
In what could be a bid for \"overseas presence\", the Indonesian
\nnavy made its maiden journey across the Pacific maritime theater
\nin the middle of last year, sailing to Shanghai for training
\nexercises with the People's Liberation Army navy.<\/p>\n
However, if the dispatch of the warships shortly after
\nPresident Susilo's meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah
\nBadawi was indeed done at the Indonesian leader's bidding, the
\ninternational community may need to revise its perceptions of his
\ndiplomatic persona.<\/p>\n
The writer is a research associate at the Institute of South-
\neast Asian Studies. The views expressed here are his own.
\n-----<\/p>",
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