Dig for clues behind E. Sumba poverty<\/p>\n
Friedhelm Betke, Advisor, Central Statistics Agency, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The district government of East Sumba, on Sumba island in East
\nNusa Tenggara province, invited the Central Statistics Agency
\n(BPS) to take a fresh look at the poverty figures calculated for
\nthat district. According to the BPS, some 27 percent of
\nhouseholds in East Sumba were living in poverty in 1999, two
\nyears after the onslaught of the Asian economic crisis.<\/p>\n
Though almost 5 percent higher than the average figure for the
\nwhole of Indonesia in the same year, this estimate was still far
\nbelow the corresponding number provided by the National Family
\nPlanning Board (BKKBN). The latter classified more than 84
\npercent of families in East Sumba as "poor". The local government
\nwas confused.<\/p>\n
Which of these figures was correct? Could both the BPS and the
\nBKKBN be mistaken? Were the national agencies, as some local
\nofficials felt, perhaps neglecting aspects of poverty linked to
\nthe particular social and economic conditions of the island?<\/p>\n
Without going further into the complicated technicalities, it
\nshould be noted that the BKKBN and the BPS approaches in
\nmeasuring poverty -- at the family or household level -- were
\ndeveloped for different purposes and cannot easily be compared.
\nHowever, both approaches were conceived at the national level and
\nthus apply uniform sets of indicators all over the archipelago.<\/p>\n
From a macro-perspective, this has indeed one very significant
\nadvantage: comparability. Districts and provinces can be ranked
\nand subsequent poverty reduction efforts can focus on those most
\nin need of assistance. Or so it seems. What if the underlying
\nassumptions of current top-down and uniform poverty measurement
\ndo not apply in certain areas of Indonesia?<\/p>\n
BPS, supported by UNICEF and the German Agency for Technical
\nCooperation (GTZ), is currently pursuing this question and
\nattempts to identify options for more local-specific poverty
\nmonitoring in collaboration with the government of East Sumba.<\/p>\n
First results from this endeavor indicate that poverty and
\ninequality in East Sumba seem to be "hidden" within the
\nhousehold, which is generally a more complicated unit than that
\nof the nuclear family. Statistics generated from household
\nfigures, as defined by national standards, cannot reveal the
\namazing survival strategies developed by the Sumbanese over time,
\nwho migrated to this dry and barren island many generations ago.<\/p>\n
To survive under such harsh conditions migrants were required
\nto adapt, inducing the development of social mechanisms apt to
\nensure sustained livelihood for the entire populace. To date,
\nSumbanese social life -- particularly among the majority of rural
\ninhabitants -- is organized in such a way that risks of crop
\nfailure, shortages of food, and other social and economic
\nmisfortunes are shared across larger social units, thus,
\nlessening the hardships of individuals.<\/p>\n
Rules and norms governing everyday life in rural Sumba still
\nseem to enforce mutual help among relatives and neighbors, in
\nsharing staple food and exchanging unpaid agricultural labor.
\nThese indigenous "social security nets" cover large sections of
\nthe populace, which is spread out thinly over many individual and
\noften fairly remote dwellings.<\/p>\n
Apparently the units of survival and prosperity in East Sumba
\nextend far beyond the household level. Networks of solidarity
\nthat are organized in large corporate groups -- defining their
\nmembership through recognition of kinship relations derived from
\ncommon male ancestors (patrilineages) -- evolved over time.<\/p>\n
Based on their forefathers' claims over land where they first
\nsettled in ancient times, these groups (clans, locally referred
\nto as kabihu) continue to control tana (large terrains) normally
\nexceeding the average size of the modern Indonesian desa
\n(administrative village), introduced to Sumba only in the last
\ncentury.<\/p>\n
Relationships between these groups have since evolved,
\nfurther complicating the picture. Being principally autonomous
\nand economically competitive, each kabihu has sought to further
\nextend and secure its resource base -- either through marriage
\nalliances with other kabihu or war with those not affiliated.<\/p>\n
Over time, control over the networks' reproductive and labor
\npotential was seized by an emerging nobility -- the maramba --
\nwho had acquired a sizable number of slaves during times of war.
\nThey also controlled large herds of livestock, which were
\nvaluable in the course of marriage negotiations. Certain maramba
\nfamilies and associated kabihu networks accumulated wealth and
\ndistanced themselves economically from commoners and less
\nprivileged kabihu groups.<\/p>\n
Even in contemporary Indonesia this rigid social structure
\nappears to persist in East Sumba. The population is still divided
\ninto common kabihu members and slave descendants, while both are
\nsubdued to the influence of the ever-powerful elite. The numbers
\nand proportions, however, of these different categories of
\ninhabitants are not known, as national surveys and censuses are
\noblivious of such local specificities.<\/p>\n
The same is true for information on relationships between
\ndifferent kabihu networks and their potential wealth
\ndifferential. However, would such information not be vital in the
\ndevelopment of a poverty alleviation policy? Without
\nunderstanding the information "hidden" in the system of
\nrelationships among families, comprising of traditional social
\nstrata and kabihu membership, it would seem impossible to judge
\nwho controls whose resources, who can or cannot borrow from whom
\nand to whom a credit would eventually go, when given to a
\nseemingly "poor family".<\/p>\n
The seemingly "exotic" example of East Sumba shows that
\nuniform approaches to poverty measurement may miss important
\naspects of poverty in areas affected by remnants of traditions
\nthat interfere with market economic rules. In view of increasing
\ndemands for information truly serving local autonomy in policy
\ndevelopment, the time has come for a change in paradigm featuring
\na greater sensitivity toward local social conditions.<\/p>\n
This would not mean, however, that each district would
\neventually approach the local-specific aspects of poverty in a
\nunique and completely incomparable fashion. On the contrary,
\ninnovative efforts at all levels should lead to new standards for
\nidentification of core variables, allowing for more meaningful
\ncomparisons across areas inhabited by socially and culturally
\ndifferent communities.<\/p>\n
Such an endeavor, however, would exceed present institutional
\ncapacities by far. A reformed social-information policy would
\nneed to question current assumptions on macroeconomic poverty
\ncritically and encourage sociological and anthropological views.
\nThis would contribute toward a better understand of the diversity
\nof poverty in Indonesia which -- as the example of Sumba shows --
\nis still poorly understood.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/dig-for-clues-behind-e-sumba-poverty-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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