Dialog the key to building regional trust<\/p>\n
By Rizal Sukma<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Last month's joint military exercises conducted
\nby the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) -- comprising
\nBritain, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia -- mean
\nthat military alliances are still crucial.<\/p>\n
But military alliances in Southeast Asia have rarely been
\nraised in talks on regional security since the Cold War.
\nPolitical logic now tends to assume that military alliances as
\nmechanisms for guaranteeing security are obsolete. And the spirit
\nof multilateralism, which is based on institutionalized talks,
\nhas been around for years.<\/p>\n
But why do FPDA members now want to revitalize the function
\nand role of the alliance? In a press conference on the joint
\nmilitary exercises, the defense ministers of member countries
\nreaffirmed the alliance's relevance.<\/p>\n
Singapore's Defense Minister Tony Tan, for example, cited
\nthree reasons why the military alliance was still necessary: it
\nis considered vital for regional security and stability; it is an
\nimportant vehicle through which member countries can conduct
\nregular exercises and consult in times of crisis; and it is a
\nforum for bilateral and multilateral exercises.<\/p>\n
But why does the FPDA now renew and reaffirm its relevance
\nafter two decades of being \"low profile?\" And how do FPDA and
\nother military alliances fit into the increasing multilateral
\ndiscussions to secure peace and guarantee stability in the
\nregion?<\/p>\n
The FPDA was established in 1971 after \"chaotic\" order in
\nSoutheast Asia, partly caused by Indonesia's adventurous policy
\nof konfrontasi (confrontation). Its establishment has been
\njustified in terms of defending Malaysia and Singapore from an
\narmed attack. Even though the potential attacker has never been
\nclearly defined, many Indonesians know that the FPDA was
\nestablished in case Indonesia reintroduced aggressive foreign
\npolicy (Mochtar Kusuma-atmadja, Contemporary Southeast Asia,
\nDecember 1990, p. 169).<\/p>\n
But for its members, the FPDA provides psychological
\nreassurance and reflects pragmatic strategic thinking in an
\nuncertain world. In this regard, history cannot be ignored in
\ndefense planning.<\/p>\n
Since its establishment, the FPDA has not shown any real
\ninclination to provide a security guarantee or umbrella for its
\ncore members such as Malaysia and Singapore. In fact, the
\ndifferences between Singapore's and Malaysia's strategic
\nperceptions on the use of a military alliance involving extra-
\nregional powers have long been noted. Malaysia is known to have
\nentertained the view that military involvement by extra-regional
\npowers would only be temporary. On the other hand, Singapore has
\nsupported the view that such involvement by foreign powers,
\nespecially Western, is essential for maintaining a regional
\nbalance of power. In this context, the decline of Britain's role
\nand security commitment in the region has made Australia's role
\nin the defense arrangements more instrumental.<\/p>\n
The arrangements have not been seen as actively pursuing its
\nmilitary function. Its first major maritime exercise, for
\nexample, did not happen until June 1981. Even so, Malaysia and
\nSingapore viewed the smaller-than-expected exercise as
\ninadequate. The dissatisfaction over the FPDA at that time was
\nclearly expressed by Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister
\nRajaratnam. He called for a new collective arrangement and
\nquestioned the credibility of the FPDA against a Soviet threat.
\nAn Australian analyst once noted that \"during the 1970s and early
\n1980s, the FPDA experienced periods of stagnation and
\nrejuvenation, pointed questions as to their relevance and
\ndiffering interpretations among its members as to their purpose\"
\n(Philip Methven, The Five Power Defense Arrangements and Military
\nCooperation Among the ASEAN States, Canberra, 1992, p.9).<\/p>\n
Doubts over the FPDA's future increased when Paul Dibb's
\nreport to the Australian government on national defense was
\npublished in March 1986. Professor Dibb's report says the
\n\"continued existence of the FPDA is a political rather than a
\nmilitary consideration\". To alleviate mounting criticism from
\nMalaysia, Singapore and domestic sources, the Australian
\ngovernment made major revisions to the relevance of the FPDA in
\nthe Defense White Paper which drew its content primarily from
\nDibb's report, stressing its continued commitment to the
\narrangements.<\/p>\n
Following the outcry over Dibb's report, a major air and
\nmaritime exercise, code named Lima Bersatu, was held in the South
\nChina Sea in September 1988. This was followed by joint air and
\nnaval exercises. In short, the end of the 1980s witnessed a
\nlimited rejuvenation in the activities and functions of the
\ndefense arrangements; developments which were welcomed by
\nMalaysia and Singapore albeit in varying degrees.<\/p>\n
In this context, the member countries' latest attempt to
\nrejuvenate FPDA's role and relevance can be interpreted as the
\ncontinuation of existing trends. But given the location and
\ntiming of the latest exercise, it is tempting to speculate on
\nother possible reasons for it. Was the exercise prompted by
\ngrowing regional concerns over China's military activities in the
\ndisputed South China Sea? Or, does it reflect the return of
\nbaseless concerns over the possibility of Indonesia becoming an
\naggressive regional power?<\/p>\n
The first possibility has been denied by Malaysian Defense
\nMinister Syed Hamid Albar (Straits Times, April 16, 1997). China,
\nhe maintained, would not use force to settle territorial disputes
\ndespite modernizing its air and naval forces. But speculation on
\nfuture Indonesian aggression is even less convincing, especially
\nin light of the Indonesia-Australia Agreement on Maintaining
\nSecurity signed in December 1995. Since Jakarta has maintained
\ngood security relations with Canberra through the agreement,
\nthere is no good reason to suspect Indonesia's intentions in the
\nregion. Therefore, one does not yet have the confidence to
\nspeculate on the objectives of the FPDA military exercises.<\/p>\n
Regardless of the reasons behind the exercise, it is likely
\nthat the joint exercise will be received with a degree of
\nskepticism, if not cynicism, in some quarters in Indonesia. In
\nthis regard, to what extent will military alliances such as the
\nFPDA complement the evolving principles of multilateralism as
\nunderstood in the context of the post Cold War Asia-Pacific.<\/p>\n
It is not an exaggeration to say that the establishment of a
\nmilitary alliance, which is usually based on the existence of
\nstrategic views of a common threat, reflects the lack, if not the
\nabsence, of trust among states in the region. Meanwhile,
\nmultilateral security talks reflect an awareness and willingness
\nto build trust among nations. For trust to grow, the role of the
\nASEAN Regional Forum must be encouraged by its members. More
\nimportantly, the degree that military alliances compliment
\nmultilateralism will in the end depend on talks.<\/p>\n
For its part, Indonesia believes that stability and security
\nin the region will be best preserved by neighboring countries
\nbecoming more confident in the growing importance of existing
\nmultilateral forums. Most Indonesians believe that multilateral
\ntalks, no matter how slow they evolve, are still the best option
\nfor alleviating any suspicions in the region. Otherwise, what is
\nthe ARF's future if it cannot win its members' confidence?<\/p>\n
The writer is a Ph D. graduate and a researcher at the Centre
\nfor Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta. The views
\nexpressed here are the author's alone.<\/p>",
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