Devolution a must to fight poverty<\/p>\n
By S. Abdurrahman<\/p>\n
CANBERRA (JP): Various development programs, from the
\n\"vindicative\" perspective of the Indonesian government, have been
\nable to significantly ease out rural poverty for the past two
\ndecades.<\/p>\n
The development programs introduced by the government include
\npresidential assistance programs, a presidential instruction
\nprogram for the least developed villages, a savings scheme and a
\ncredit scheme.<\/p>\n
However, are these poverty alleviation programs sincerely
\ndevolved at the village level in a wide-range scope and to a far-
\nreaching extent to ensure their effectiveness and efficiency? And
\nmore importantly, do they include the participation of the poor?
\nHow do the determinants of implementing devolution at the village
\nlevel interplay for the goal of poverty alleviation?<\/p>\n
Devolution, in its fullest local sense, is a precursor to
\nalleviating poverty at the village level. By common definition,
\nit is the transfer of administrative and political power from the
\nupper echelon of the government to lower levels. Many
\ncommentators have claimed that it is the strongest form of
\ndecentralization with multidimensional and propoor objectives. As
\nusually assumed and professed, one of the objectives of
\ndevolution is the alleviation of poverty on the basis of a
\n\"participatory and emancipatory approach\".<\/p>\n
What is devolution in Indonesia? Policy statements on rural
\ndevelopment during the New Order government era devote
\nconsiderable attention to engaging the participation of the poor,
\nrural population.<\/p>\n
The policy stipulated in the Broad Outlines of State Policies
\nstates that the greatest attention must be given to furthering
\nrural development by increasing participation, preparedness and
\nself-reliance of village society. It has been proclaimed by the
\nMinistry of Home Affairs that villages, the smallest autonomous
\nterritorial communities, are the \"pillars of public participation
\nin all facets of government, development and society\".<\/p>\n
In addition, Law No. 5\/1974 recognizes the right of villages
\nto manage their own internal affairs. A village is headed by an
\nofficial elected periodically, who is responsible to a district
\nhead. The other village functionaries are nominated or appointed
\ndirectly by the village head. Administrative structures of the
\nvillage are determined by the Village Government Law of 1979,
\nstipulating the need for increasing public participation in
\ndevelopment and the effectiveness of village administration.<\/p>\n
But the principle of wider representation of the public in
\nvillage administration has been treated with lip service. The
\n1979 village law actually formalizes the centralization of
\nauthority in the hands of the village head and supravillage head
\nofficials from the district and upper levels. The village
\nfunction is limited to the administration of centrally-planned
\npolicies of the national government and upper-level regional
\nadministrations.<\/p>\n
To support the finances of the village, the government
\nauthorizes it to use part of the locally collected tax on land
\nand buildings. On the other hand, over time, villages lose their
\nsources of income when their control and rights over many
\nresources cease.<\/p>\n
Likewise, the administration deconcentration does not extent
\nto the political sphere. Political responsibilities are expressed
\nand shouldered by second-level local administrations (regencies
\nand mayoralties) as stipulated in Government Regulation No.
\n45\/1992. Under this ruling, governmental matters other than
\nsecurity and defense, judiciary, foreign affairs, currency,
\nmonetary and other functions not affecting national interests are
\nwithin the scope of accountability of second-level local
\nadministration.<\/p>\n
Notably, the three Indonesian political parties, the dominant
\nGolkar, United Development Party and Indonesian Democratic Party,
\nare not rooted in villages and districts. As such, they do not
\nhave strong representation and clout at local levels. People at
\nvillage and district levels are collectively a \"floating mass\"
\nand they are not directly involved in political activities.<\/p>\n
The strongest rationale for this is the claim by the
\ngovernment that people at these levels have no interest in
\ndemocratic processes and they have limited capacities to deal
\nwith modern political and social changes. The rural populace's
\nimmature understanding in political affairs and limited
\norganizational skills are suspected of being responsible for this
\nproblem. It is assumed that their involvement in political
\nparties will do more \"harm\" than \"good\" for their own lives and
\nfor the unity of the country. But this is an exquisite example of
\npolitical \"window dressing\" to cover up the vested interest of
\nthe government.<\/p>\n
The hidden agenda of separating rural people from the
\npolitical parties is to maintain the status quo of the present
\ngovernment under Golkar. A greater bulk of the 200 million
\npopulation in Indonesian, most of whom live in rural areas,
\nconstitute the biggest and strongest partisan groups for Golkar.<\/p>\n
Unlike the two other political parties, Golkar has official
\nchannels at the village and district levels through functionaries
\nat those levels. Such official functionaries have no choice other
\nthan supporting the ruling party and influencing the whole
\nsociety to support Golkar in order to win the general election,
\nheld once every five years.<\/p>\n
Of course, there is a win-win condition offered by Golkar to
\nthe village and district officials -- if Golkar stays as the
\nruling faction, they will also stay in their positions or might
\nbe promoted to more desirable positions.<\/p>\n
Another striking fact is that most of the government-sponsored
\ndevelopment schemes for alleviating poverty at village levels are
\nnot uncommonly named as Golkar's social development programs,
\nsuch as rural banking, presidential assistance, a presidential
\ninstruction program for the least developed villages, family
\nplanning, savings scheme, credit scheme and other forms of
\npoverty-alleviation programs. People at the village levels are
\nrequired to make a vow as partisans of Golkar in order to have
\naccess to these development-assistance packages.<\/p>\n
The rhetoric of participation is obviously shown by the
\nwidening discrepancy between what should be and what is in the
\ndelivery of the development programs. It is also explained by the
\ningrained assumptions regarding the limited capacities of a
\ntraditionally oriented rural populace to deal with modern social
\nchange. And by the higher priority given to insuring perpetuation
\nof the central government hegemony in all aspects of the
\npolitical process. These centrally planned priorities and
\npaternalistic tendencies are reflected in central government
\npolicies reinforcing the bureaucratic rigidity of village-level
\nadministrations throughout Indonesia.<\/p>\n
So, is devolution a successful strategy for helping the poor
\nin Indonesian villages out of their plight? No. Are the poverty
\nalleviation programs, which are masqueraded as \"propoor\", really
\ndevolved down to the village levels? No. What is wrong with the
\ndeterminants of implementing devolution at the village level in
\nIndonesia?<\/p>\n
Primarily, there is inadequacy of financial support for the
\nimplementation, monitoring and evaluation of \"supposedly\"
\ndevolved poverty-alleviation programs. Because of this, the
\nmobility of rural poverty workers in villages can hardly gain
\nimpetus and are definitely not sustained. The financial
\nconstraint in providing incentives and rewards explains the lack
\nof proper orientation and training for them. This breeds
\n\"halfhearted\" commitment and incompetence of field motivators and
\npoverty technicians in actual village propoor development works.<\/p>\n
There is an obvious lack of community organization and
\nparticipation of the poor in decision-making and implementation
\nof programs and projects for alleviating their poverty. This is
\npartly explained by the highly elitist structure in the
\ninegalitarian local societies.<\/p>\n
The present community structure is executive-centered.
\nDecisions emanate from the so-called \"executives\", and poor
\npeople are only consulted, if ever informed, or not at all. The
\npersonality and orientation of the leaders strongly influence the
\nprocess of decision-making. This constraint on structure affects
\nthe various inputs to the system, which has also subsequent
\ninfluence on the benefits or outputs of programs and projects as
\nwell as their impact in the long run. This strengthens the
\npeople's dependency attitude, which kills their initiative for
\nparticipation and develops low self-esteem.<\/p>\n
The incidence of \"politicizing\" of poverty-alleviation
\nprograms is highly notable. This is in light of the culture of
\ngraft and corruption by officials who define their involvement
\nwith the handling of resources within the stream of aggrandizing
\nparochial interests. Out of the practice of political
\nmanipulations, \"small empires\" are established on the turf of
\nlocal leaders in some villages that are controlled by political
\ndynasties.<\/p>\n
In other words, there is a replication of the top-heavy and
\nrather \"blurred\" or \"shady\" social structure of the central
\ngovernment at the village levels. This could be an aftermath of
\nthe faulty selection of formal community leaders. What is crucial
\nin this scenario is that the people do not necessarily share the
\nthinking of village leaders, which render attempts of devolution
\nas exercises in futility.<\/p>\n
Given these realities, how then should devolution be
\nimplemented relevantly, responsively and proactively to the goal
\nof poverty alleviation, particularly at the village level?<\/p>\n
The writer is a non-governmental organization activist now
\npursuing postgraduate studies in development administration at
\nthe Australian National University, Australia.<\/p>\n
Window: The hidden agenda of separating rural people from the
\npolitical parties is to maintain the status quo of the present
\ngovernment under Golkar.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/devolution-a-must-to-fight-poverty-1447893297",
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