Demography speaks of conflict<\/p>\n
By Sri Pamoedjo Rahardjo<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The social tensions which ushered in the end of
\nthe New Order has reached the crossroads of either retaining
\nPancasila democracy or adopting a Western-style democracy, and
\nthe common people are caught in the cross fire of the current
\nfriction. Finding faults and public protests are now daily
\nevents. The economy remains stagnant. Plus, the current friction
\nis fraught with political overtones. However, such conflicts can
\nbe avoided if both sides understand the demography of conflict.<\/p>\n
Conflict in a family or in a society is a daily event. The
\ncurrent conflicts in Indonesia, however, are often analyzed using
\neconomic and political variables. Another way of viewing the
\ncurrent societal conflict in Indonesia is as intergenerational
\nfriction. The entire Indonesian population can be observed as a
\nhuman development cycle, that is, from birth to infancy,
\nchildhood, adolescence, adulthood, aging and eventually death.
\nGrowth itself is accompanied by changes in attitude, perception
\nand behavior. Having reached a population of 200 million in 1997,
\nthe momentum of change and intergenerational differences are
\naffecting a large number of people. It is imperative that we
\nunderstand the dynamics operating between these population
\ngroups.<\/p>\n
The present population structure of Indonesia is a result of
\nthe demographic behaviors of previous generations. The layered
\nmosaic of Indonesia's population suggests differences in the
\nneeds and demands of each generation. Failure to recognize these
\ndifferences may result in an oversimplification of the current
\nconflict as merely politically and economically motivated. An
\nanalysis of the upcoming and future population mosaic can help
\nanticipate and identify differences in intergenerational values
\nthat in turn dictate the needs and demands of each group.
\nIgnoring these differences will create unresolved conflicts that
\nmay not be easily detected, but can be manipulated and taken
\nadvantage of by special interest groups.<\/p>\n
In the past, the New Order government has proudly claimed the
\nsuccesses of population and family planning programs. The
\nindicator of the programs successes was the reported decline of
\nthe population growth and the total fertility rate. Population
\ngrowth is the difference between the birthrate and death rate,
\nwhile the total fertility rate is the average number of children
\nper woman of reproductive age. If the average number of children
\nwas 3.3 in 1990, this meant that a woman of reproductive age had
\nan average of 3.3 children who were born in 1990 or earlier.<\/p>\n
The below table shows the population structure of Indonesia by
\ntotal fertility rates from 1920 to 1998, together with other
\ndescriptive variables. Before independence, the country
\nexperienced high birth rates and high death rates. The main
\ncauses in the decline in the average number of children were poor
\neconomic conditions, frequent epidemics and generally poor
\nenvironmental health. Many demographers believe that in the
\n1940s, birth rates were even lower than death rates.<\/p>\n
As the social and political situation improved, the
\ndemographic indicators tended to increase. The arrival of the
\nbaby boomers compelled the government to introduce family
\nplanning programs in the late 1960s. Only then did demographic
\nindicators begin to decline. With the current shift in the
\nprograms focus, e.g., from family planning to family welfare,
\nattention to management of the size of families seems to have
\nbeen affected. Combined with the increasing cost of
\ncontraceptives, the specter of a rapid increase in the number of
\nbirths is again not far off.<\/p>\n
Population humps exert pressures on available resources and
\ncontinuously create another cycle of peaks in the population
\nstructure. All other factors constant, these peaks will disappear
\nfrom the population structure only after all generations affected
\nby the humps have gone through their life cycle. When the
\nstructure is carefully observed, the population humps in the past
\nhave created overlapping masses in the population mosaic.<\/p>\n
This overlap suggest conflicting priorities in meeting
\ndemands, which must be done in order to minimize friction within
\nsociety. Unless we become aware of these different priorities, an
\nappropriate public response cannot be designed effectively and in
\na timely manner. Similarly, unless the political leaders
\nunderstand the differing views, needs and demands of
\nintergenerational groups, they will not be able to talk about
\nacceptable solutions which are in line with public feelings. What
\ndo the figures suggest?<\/p>\n
First, the structure of generations suggests attitudinal
\nchanges. The cycle of human behavior starts from infancy. With
\nparental nurturing, the infant's personality is formed. As the
\ninfant grows to childhood, the child begins to associate and
\nrelate with people outside the family.<\/p>\n
As the child grows to adolescence, the young person becomes
\nsensitive to the needs of the family, relatives, peers and others
\nin his or her social circle. Generally, as the person grows into
\nadulthood, socialization with other subcultures will accumulate
\ninto wisdom and biases in his or her personality. As the person
\nages, the personality development could regress to lower self-
\nesteem, loss of power and declining income, even though the
\nperson is perhaps richer in wisdom.<\/p>\n
Secondly, physiological changes with their accompanying
\npsychological changes could create intergenerational friction in
\nsociety. Generational subgroups obviously differ in their way of
\nthinking and acting in a way that is almost akin to parent-youth
\nconflicts. Unless these differences are well understood, the
\nintergenerational conflicts can be manipulated as political
\nissues by some groups.<\/p>\n
In other words, the natural phenomenon of parent-youth
\nconflict can become mass hysteria if leaders do not have the
\nwisdom to manage this apparently predictable cycle of conflict.
\nMass hysteria can become out of control if the leadership is not
\nequipped with an understanding of the human development cycle.<\/p>\n
What lessons can be derived from the human growth cycle? The
\nfigures above reveal overlapping generations with contrasting
\nfunctions, needs and demands in society. The generation born
\nbefore the 1990s overlaps with the generation born before the
\n1940s, the generation born before the 1980s overlaps with the
\ngeneration born before the 1950s, etc.<\/p>\n
Members of the 1920 and 1930 generations have a longer
\nlifespan due to improved economic status and health technologies.
\nTheir existence in society generally demands geriatric services
\nand facilities. A critical mass of the aged in our society
\ncomprise the current elite who survived the depression in the
\n1930s and World War II.<\/p>\n
Their backgrounds taught them to be tough in meeting
\nchallenges and prudent in their spending. They have also
\ndeveloped strong family bonds. As youths, they helped to lay down
\nthe foundations of the nation. In return, they expect the ensuing
\ngenerations to emulate them, to be tough, loyal, prudent and to
\nmaintain their extended kinships. Rejection of the older views is
\nseen as the rejection and refusal of the younger generation to
\npreserve moral values.<\/p>\n
The adult members of society (the 1940 and 1950 generations)
\nreveal a different demand function. Their childhood was marked by
\nan extensive period of poverty and difficulty. This exposure bred
\na more acquisitive but relatively prudent generation. Almost
\nsimilar to the previous generation, they are frugal and
\nhardworking.<\/p>\n
The elite of this generation, however, have varied views on
\nthe increased social mobility which opens opportunities to all
\npeople of various family and ethnic backgrounds. The hard lives
\nof their youths make them long for stability in society.
\nConsequently, they now demand a strong government to maintain
\nstability. As they are preparing to enter old age, security is a
\npriority. The majority of them wish to maintain the status quo
\nand preserve the prosperity enjoyed in the last decade.<\/p>\n
The young adult members of society (the 1960 and 1970
\ngenerations) grew up in better living conditions, as the country
\nexperienced an economic boom in the 1980s and early 1990s. This
\nhas caused this generation to become less sensitive to the
\nenvironment at large.<\/p>\n
Speaking generally, they think of themselves as the center of
\nachievement. They are less open to extended kinship. They are
\nambitious and focused on their own career development. They are
\nalso not willing to lose what they possess. They want to maintain
\nthe comforts they enjoyed when they were growing up. Success in
\ntheir careers and increasing incomes have caused this generation
\nto become more cosmopolitan.<\/p>\n
The elite of this generation have developed their own
\nsubculture of yuppies and big spenders. The current prolonged
\ncrisis could develop a bitterness toward this subculture.
\nDemographically, their number is large and they are capable of
\nforming a critical mass that would have to be reckoned with.
\nFailure to recognize their needs can imperil future leaders.<\/p>\n
The young members of society (the 1980 generation) were
\nnurtured during the peak of economic prosperity. The exposure of
\ntheir parents to a highly competitive job market compels a demand
\nfor better schools, higher education, global exposure and better
\njob opportunities within and outside the country.<\/p>\n
As youths, they are full of idealism, highly active and
\nmotivated, but easily influenced by their peers. Prolonged
\nexposure to the current difficulties can steer them back to
\nultraconservatism when they become adults. In contrast, the
\nyoungest members of society (the 1990 generation) are still
\nlimited to demands for health and nutrition, as well as basic
\neducation and recreation.<\/p>\n
However, the current decline in their parents' income, crude
\npublic debates, untoward public behavior and shortages in basic
\ncommodities expose them to bad adult role model examples in
\npublic and private life, and could make them less respectful
\ntoward authority figures. The current difficulties can also cause
\nthem to be more prudent and conservative. In extreme cases,
\nmembers of this generation have been forced into the streets in
\norder to survive.<\/p>\n
In conclusion, the current conflict can be seen as the
\nphenomenon of the human personality development cycle. What
\nshould be understood by all concerned generations, is that
\nintergenerational conflict can happen because a variety of
\nhistorical, social, economic and political backgrounds form
\nbehavioral differences.<\/p>\n
Conflict can be minimized if these generations are aware that
\nthe young will become old, and the old were once young. If they
\nunderstand the cycle, friction can be prevented from turning
\ninto a full-blown conflict that could result in the breaking of
\nfamily ties and national unity. Are we all willing to pay such a
\nhigh price in the name of change?<\/p>\n
The writer is a social and economic observer and a former
\nregional development bank officer.<\/p>",
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