Democracy vs efficiency at WTO<\/p>\n
By Djauhari Oratmangun<\/p>\n
GENEVA (JP): More than two months have elapsed since the World
\nTrade Organization's Singapore Ministerial Conference (SMC)
\nended.<\/p>\n
Yet the accusations of \"nontransparency and an undemocratic
\nway of doing business\", in particular in the decision-making
\nprocess of the World Trade Organization (WTO), continue to be a
\ncontroversial topic in Geneva with most of the developing
\ncountries.<\/p>\n
The closing remarks made on Dec. 13, 1996, by Yeo Chew Tong,
\nSingapore's minister for trade and industry, acknowledged the
\nlack of transparency when he said that the conference had been an
\noutstanding event in all respects despite the fact that, \"due to
\nlack of time\", he \"regretted not having been able to consult each
\nof the ministers at every stage\", are still fresh in our minds.<\/p>\n
Minister Yeo's apologetic statement was prompted by the fact
\nthat on the eve of Dec. 12, 1996, when the draft Ministerial
\nDeclaration -- which emerged by consensus from a small group of
\nministers at the closed-doors meeting -- was brought up at the
\ninformal heads of delegations meeting. Some ministers from
\ndeveloping countries strongly expressed their dissatisfaction at
\nthe undemocratic process and nontransparency which had
\ncharacterized the Singapore meetings.<\/p>\n
However, after taking into account the explanation supplied by
\nthe chairman, they were willing to agree on the Singapore
\nDeclaration as presented by Minister Yeo. In return, both
\nMinister Yeo and the WTO director general, Renato Ruggiero,
\nagreed that this matter would be closely examined in Geneva with
\na view to agreeing on a procedure that would, as much as
\npossible, ensure greater transparency and a wider participation
\nof decision-making in the WTO and at future ministerial
\nconferences.<\/p>\n
The question is, why did the allegation of undemocratic ways
\nand nontransparency occur in the first place in an important
\nmultilateral negotiation such as the SMC? And does it reflect the
\nbusiness which is being conducted in the multilateral trading
\nsystem -- the WTO -- the majority of whose members have placed
\ntheir trust in the organization to secure a fair, equitable and
\nmore open rule-based international trading system?<\/p>\n
We have to be candid in analyzing this issue since, in
\nmultilateral diplomacy, one of the most difficult dilemmas that
\nconference organizers of the host country face is the trade-off
\nbetween greater democracy and greater efficiency.<\/p>\n
Greater democracy generally implies extensive participation by
\nas many negotiating parties as possible. It means that small
\nstates should be able to participate -- at least in theory -- on
\nan equal footing with larger, more powerful states. On the other
\nhand, greater efficiency is about rendering the process more
\nbusinesslike, so that stable and optional agreements are achieved
\nin a timely manner.<\/p>\n
Usually, in order to overcome this dilemma in multilateral
\nnegotiations, some sort of group system is established. It is
\ncommon that within the United Nations negotiation process, the
\nGroup of 77, the Non-Aligned Movement, or regional groupings
\n(Asia, Africa, the Western countries, Latin America and the
\nCaribbean), have been successfully used to ensure greater
\ndemocracy and greater transparency in a negotiation. The Group of
\n77 and the Non-Aligned Movement have contributed positively
\ntowards ensuring democracy and transparency in the North-South
\nnegotiations in the 1970s and 1980s.<\/p>\n
However, within the WTO system, where every country has its
\nown specific trade interests, it is sometimes difficult for
\ndeveloping countries to form into a group which truly represents
\na common position in pursuing their trade interests.<\/p>\n
For example, the so-called investment group, which was led by
\nIndonesia during the SMC preparations in Geneva with the aim of
\nrejecting the inclusion of investment issues in the WTO agenda,
\nfailed to maintain its position in Singapore due to the
\ndifferences of trade interests among the group's members when
\nthey came under pressure at the negotiation table in Singapore.<\/p>\n
In this respect, WTO groupings are better represented by
\nInformal Committees Groups which are more likely to reflect
\ncommon trade interests and which often comprise developing as
\nwell as developed countries. Two examples are: the Cairns Group,
\nwhich deals with agricultural issues and includes Canada,
\nAustralia, Indonesia and Fiji; and the antidumping group, which
\nconsists of countries which are under dumping investigation.<\/p>\n
Therefore, it is difficult to form a solid developing group in
\norder to take into account new issues on the international
\nagenda, particularly in the area of trade within the context of
\nthe WTO, which has a contractual concept and binding commitments.<\/p>\n
A case in point was the attempt by the chairman and the
\ndeveloping group, in Singapore, to set up a group to represent an
\nequitable geographical distribution. They ended up forming a
\ngroup which represented key players in the international trading
\nsystem, among which Indonesia was included.<\/p>\n
Therefore, it was obvious that the criteria for selection was
\nprobably to get some of the key countries with some trade and
\neconomic weight, without whose support no accord could be
\nreached.<\/p>\n
After the conference, the WTO spokesman said that the chairman
\nand the developing group had tried to set up a group according to
\ngeographical distribution, however, they acknowledged that it is
\ndifficult to strike a balance.<\/p>\n
Even the chairman and developing group in their postconference
\nreview admitted that \"no process is perfect, especially in view
\nof the fact that we have very limited time and a large
\nmembership. We achieved that process well, considering that we
\nhad a consensus when we presented the final draft.\"<\/p>\n
After taking in all changes and to make the first ministerial
\nconference a successful one, the host country and in particular
\nMinister Yeo, in close consultation with the developing group and
\nwith the \"blessing\" of the major trading nations, decided to go
\nfor greater efficiency. In other words, a more businesslike
\napproach, with a view to producing a Singapore Ministerial
\nDeclaration on Dec. 13, 1996.<\/p>\n
However, in taking this approach, the chairman had to use a
\nhigh degree of diplomacy to convince the countries that were not
\nincluded in the small group that their interests were well
\nrepresented and included in the declaration. This is a very
\ndelicate issue, since it is closely related to the sovereignty of
\none country, which is able to participate in the decision-making
\nprocess.<\/p>\n
Minister Yeo's concluding remarks, which were carefully
\ndrafted in such a way as to reflect the interest of all
\ncountries, while at the same time expressing an apology, could
\nalso be seen as a remarkable diplomatic achievement.<\/p>\n
The apologetic statement was presented without his losing
\ncredibility as a chairman by assuring all the delegates that the
\nprocedures to ensure transparency and wider participation needed
\nto be improved for the next conference. And everybody's
\ninterests, in particular on the new issues such as core labor
\nstandards, investment, competition policy and government
\nprocurement, had been well protected.<\/p>\n
In this regard, Minister Yeo made a success of choosing the
\ngreater efficiency approach at the Singapore Ministerial
\nConference.<\/p>\n
The writer is an Indonesian diplomat based in Geneva, the
\nviews expressed are strictly personal.<\/p>",
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