Democracy seeds will grow and strengthen<\/p>\n
By M. C. Ricklefs<\/p>\n
MELBOURNE (JP): Will the Republic of Indonesia survive the
\ncrisis which it has been suffering for the last two or three
\nyears? The answer is obvious: yes and no.<\/p>\n
Whatever the outcome of the crisis and the attempts to
\novercome it, the Republic of Indonesia in, say, 2005 will not be
\nthe same as it is now. So present structures, attitudes,
\nexpectations and styles will not all survive in their present
\nform. But I believe that there will still be a Republic of
\nIndonesia for many years to come.<\/p>\n
The challenges facing the nation are truly immense. They are
\nin large measure the fruit of the failure of successive
\ngenerations of leadership and the political-social-economic
\nsystems which they introduced.<\/p>\n
To gain a perspective on the present crisis, we can usefully
\nturn to the 1950s in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
After the Revolution of 1945-1949, Indonesia failed to
\nestablish a viable system of government which was responsive to
\nthe will of the people.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian national leadership was at that time largely
\nDutch-educated, with very little experience in matters of
\ngovernment. This was hardly surprising, given the fact that they
\nhad grown up in a colonial environment which had, since the mid-
\n1920s, turned more conservative and opposed to the Indonesian
\nindependence movement.<\/p>\n
The foremost civilian leaders, people like Sukarno, Hatta and
\nSjahrir, had been imprisoned by the Dutch. The Japanese had been
\nprepared to employ some of these leaders to their own ends during
\nWorld War II.<\/p>\n
Towards the end of the war, as it became obvious to the
\nJapanese that they were going to be defeated, they encouraged
\nIndonesians to move towards independence as a way of frustrating
\nany attempt by the European colonizers to reestablish themselves
\nin Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
But nowhere in all of this experience did that first
\ngeneration of civilian Indonesian leaders have an opportunity to
\ndevelop practical measures for governing this vast archipelago.
\nNor were the military leaders who emerged during the Revolution
\nany better equipped to create a modern state.<\/p>\n
They were mostly at least ten years younger than the civilians
\nand most of them had limited education, which had been severely
\ndisrupted by the Japanese occupation and the Revolution which
\nfollowed.<\/p>\n
Their training had been as military men: accustomed to giving
\nand accepting orders, not to listening to and responding to the
\nwill of the people. To be sure, their experience as guerrilla
\nfighters gave them valuable links to the masses, but the military
\nmind is rarely gifted with the view of leadership which sees it
\nas something which involves responsibility to the people. Among
\nthese military men, but not the most prominent among them, was
\nSoeharto.<\/p>\n
Nor were the Indonesian masses, in most areas, in a position
\nto demand responsive government from their new leaders.
\nEverywhere the only government people had experienced was an
\nauthoritarian one: colonial occupation or Japanese military
\ngovernment, with local employees and allies to enforce them.<\/p>\n
There was no tradition of what we would recognize as a modern
\ndemocratic style of government. Given low levels of literacy,
\nlimited communications and very uneven social, political and
\neconomic development, it is not surprising that there did not
\nemerge any widespread popular movement for democratic and
\nresponsive government.<\/p>\n
The governing elite of the new nation, both the national-level
\nleaders and those at provincial, kabupaten and lower levels, were
\nprone to regarding ordinary Indonesians with a degree of
\ncondescension and even contempt. The rakyat (people) were bodoh
\n(stupid) in the eyes of many elite Indonesians.<\/p>\n
So in the 1950s Jakarta politics became a game of elites and
\ntheir clients. Winning government was only partly about policies:
\nit was also, in fact perhaps more, about money and patronage.<\/p>\n
Compared to what was to follow, corruption was still at a low
\nlevel. Kami masih belajar (we were still learning) a good friend
\nonce said to me about corruption in that period. So there was
\nless money around, and less going into the pockets of politicians
\nand their mates. But it was enough to contribute to a failure by
\npolitical leaders to recognize their responsibility to listen and
\nrespond to the wishes of the rakyat.<\/p>\n
The ostensibly democratic system of the 1950s foundered on its
\nfailure to create democratic, responsive, responsible networks
\nwhich reached from the capital city to the towns, villages and
\nhamlets across the nation.<\/p>\n
In most democratic systems, it is political parties which
\nperform this role of two-way bridge between the leadership and
\nthe masses. But of all the Indonesian political parties of the
\nperiod 1950-1957, only the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party)
\nsuccessfully built such bridges.<\/p>\n
That was one of the reasons why it did unexpectedly well in
\nthe national election of 1955 and the regional elections of 1957.
\nBut this was not taken as a lesson by other political parties to
\ntry to outdo the Communists in this respect.<\/p>\n
Rather, it contributed to the view of other political leaders
\nthat, if electoral politics was likely to deliver power to the
\nCommunists, then it would probably be better to abandon electoral
\npolitics.<\/p>\n
Regional dissatisfaction with Jakarta meanwhile grew. There
\nwere lots of reasons for this: the overvalued Rupiah which
\ndiscriminated against outer island exporters, religiously
\ninspired dislike of the more cosmopolitan lifestyles of Jakarta
\npoliticos, inadequate attention to infrastructure in the islands
\noutside of Java and others.<\/p>\n
Even before the Dutch conceded independence to Indonesia in
\n1949, the Darul Islam rebellion had broken out in West Java. The
\nRepublik Maluku Selatan (South Moluccan Republic) rebellion
\nfollowed shortly after the end of the revolution.<\/p>\n
The most serious challenge came from the resistance to Jakarta
\nin both Sulawesi and Sumatra which culminated in the Permesta and
\nPRRI rebellions of the late 1950s.<\/p>\n
These were about how the whole nation should be governed. They
\nrepresented opposition to the authoritarian military-Sukarno
\nalliance which was by then emerging as the new shape of Jakarta
\ngovernment, replacing the failed structures of liberal democracy.
\nThese rebellions had covert outside support from several sources,
\nincluding some of Indonesia's close neighbors and the United
\nStates of America.<\/p>\n
It is worth recalling, thus, that in the 1950s Indonesia was
\nfacing circumstances which were similar to those of today: an
\nattempt to create electoral democracy, economic difficulties,
\nregional dissent, failing political leadership, and outside
\ninterference.<\/p>\n
The differences, however, are also very important. Remember
\nthat in the late 1950s communications were still limited,
\nnewspapers and radio reached only a minority of Indonesians,
\nliteracy was still low and there was no popular expectation that
\ngovernment would act in the popular interest or knowledge of how
\nit might be required to do so.<\/p>\n
And the idea of 'Indonesia' as a nation-state was still quite
\na new one: the first generation to be born in the independent
\nstate of Indonesia was just reaching voting age as electoral
\ndemocracy was collapsing in the late 1950s.<\/p>\n
In fact, Indonesia was in greater danger of falling apart
\nterritorially in the 1950s than it is today. And there were those
\nboth within the country and outside it who would have welcomed
\nsuch a disintegration, for it would have undermined the
\nincreasingly radical thrust of the Sukarno government.<\/p>\n
In contemporary terminology, the structures of 'civil society'
\nwere still very weak in the 1950s. And the international
\nenvironment was relatively hostile to a radicalizing Indonesia
\nunder the leadership of Sukarno and the army.<\/p>\n
But Indonesia did not fall apart. Instead, under Sukarno's
\nGuided Democracy (1959-1965) and then under Soeharto's New Order
\n(1966-1988) the nation entered a period when its infant democracy
\nwas overthrown for totalitarian government -- moderated
\nprincipally by administrative incompetence and inefficiency which
\npreserved space for individual freedom to a greater degree than
\nmight otherwise have been expected.<\/p>\n
So where does Indonesia stand today? Regional dissatisfaction
\nis rampant. Accepting that East Timor was a special case doesn't
\nreally help all that much to reassure many observers. After all,
\nPapua and Aceh are special, too, but in different ways. Papua was
\nnot a part of Indonesia at the point of independence and only
\ncame under Indonesian rule in the early 1960s. Historical and
\ncultural experiences there differ from those of the mainstream in
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
And what of Aceh? There we see a bulwark of the Republic
\nduring the Revolution. For forty years after the 1870s, Acehnese
\nhad resisted colonial conquest -- the longest war of resistance
\nin colonial history anywhere in the world. Before the Japanese
\ncould get there at the start of World War II, the Acehnese had
\nthrown the Dutch out themselves. Aceh was so committed to the
\nstruggle for independence and had a history of resistance so
\nfierce that, once the Dutch had evacuated surrendered Japanese
\ntroops from there at the end of the war, they did not even try to
\nreenter Aceh for the rest of the Revolution.<\/p>\n
So is Acehnese secession from Indonesia really conceivable?
\nIt is well to remember that when the Acehnese resisted outside
\nrulers (i.e. the colonial state) a hundred years ago, the
\nsoldiers whom they fought were mostly other Indonesians:
\nJavanese, Ambonese, Bugis and so on.<\/p>\n
Only a minority of the colonial forces were actually
\nEuropeans. When the Acehnese resisted Jakarta in the 1950s, they
\nshowed that their commitment was not unconditional; it was to a
\nparticular vision of Indonesia, one which did not include the
\nstyle of government they perceived in Jakarta at that time. And
\nclearly the DOM (military operations area) policy of the New
\nOrder for a decade from the late 1980s has deeply embittered
\nAcehnese.<\/p>\n
By unleashing such military repression, Soeharto probably
\nsucceeded in persuading many Acehnese that a deal with Jakarta,
\nsuch as that encapsulated in the Daerah Istimewa (Special
\nDistrict) settlement of 1959, cannot be relied upon if there is a
\nchange of government policy in Jakarta.<\/p>\n
So the answer is: yes, Acehnese secession is conceivable, and
\nbecause of the history of Aceh it would have incalculable impacts
\nacross the country. Unlike East Timor, and perhaps unlike Papua,
\nthe loss of Aceh would call into question the very concept of
\nIndonesia. For that reason alone, it is unlikely that Jakarta
\nwould accept such an outcome.<\/p>\n
So the future for Aceh seems to be either (1) a political
\nsettlement which allows Aceh the degree of autonomy which
\nAcehnese feel is necessary to allow them to preserve the values
\nthey are prepared to fight and die for, or (2) chronic, draining,
\nlong-term, bloody conflict.<\/p>\n
Much depends upon leadership, but where is that to come from
\nin today's Indonesia?<\/p>\n
Since the late 1950s Indonesians have been accustomed to a
\npresidency which determines the shape, style and even details of
\nnational policy. No one can reasonably expect that today.<\/p>\n
Although Abdurrahman's presidency has achieved some things, in
\nthe light of Indonesia's vast problems, it has to be regarded on
\nbalance as unsuccessful. Abdurrahman has, however, preserved one
\nparticularly precious gift of reformasi: he has preserved
\nopenness.<\/p>\n
Under Sukarno or Soeharto one could be denounced, arrested or
\nworse for insulting the head of state. Now, Gus Dur makes it
\nclear that anyone can say what they like, even if he doesn't like
\nwhat they say. This is a precious right, not to be undervalued or
\nabused.<\/p>\n
It is clear that Indonesia now lacks most of the structures of
\nauthority which the nation has been accustomed to. It has a
\nfailing presidency at its center. Its military and police are
\nunable to defend law and order; it is as well that an outside
\nattack on the nation is inconceivable, for it is equally
\ninconceivable that the military could even defend the nation.<\/p>\n
Wiping out corruption from the judiciary has a very long way
\nto go. The bureaucracy functions only in part. And the nation is
\nabout to enter the age of regional autonomy, with authority
\ndevolving to levels of government which are only partly equipped
\nto manage it.<\/p>\n
This means that what is called 'civil society' needs to
\nrespond to the challenges facing the nation. This is both
\npromising and threatening. Civil society -- resting on
\ninstitutions and networks which mediate between government and
\nthe people -- consists of dedicated people committed to the NGOs
\nand other voluntary groupings which are addressing many of the
\nnation's social issues. Here we see some wonderfully devoted,
\nprincipled people.<\/p>\n
The development of literacy since the 1950s and the spread of
\nmodern means of communication support the functioning of
\nvoluntary networks and organizations. Horizontal communication is
\ngreatly facilitated by the internet and handphone. It is now
\nvirtually impossible for any government to control fully the
\ninformation received by its citizens, or their ability to
\ncommunicate with others.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has been particularly fortunate to have an inspired,
\neducated student movement to lead the way at crucial junctures by
\nmaking effective use of these horizontal means of communication.
\nSo what if they foul up the traffic on Jakarta's streets now and
\nthen?<\/p>\n
But there are other kinds of institutions and networks which
\nalso mediate between government and the people, and which are
\nencouraged by present circumstances in Indonesia. These include
\npolitically organized thugs, thieves, terrorists, extremists,
\nmurderers, corruptors, frauds, drug-dealers, people-smugglers and
\nall the odious characters associated with organized crime.<\/p>\n
We may be confident that, just as has proved true in the
\nformer Soviet Union, so in Indonesia criminals, terrorists and
\nextremists will make good use of the opportunities offered by the
\nbreakdown of law and order and the greater ease of horizontal
\ncommunications.<\/p>\n
Soeharto's New Order kept criminals under control basically by
\ntwo policies. One was to employ, franchise and license them,
\nusing them to the benefit of the regime. The other was to use
\nextrajudicial violence to eliminate them when they got out of
\nhand. Political or other extremists were jailed or murdered. With
\nthe fall of the New Order fell also the centralized control of
\nviolence which underlay such approaches.<\/p>\n
Today's international environment is much more supportive of
\nIndonesia than it was in the 1950s. Despite suspicions of the
\nUnited States, Australia and the United Nations, in fact no
\nnation stands to benefit from a territorial break-up of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
And no nation would benefit from a failure of democracy in
\nIndonesia. The only conceivable source of support for
\ndisintegration would be criminal networks, who will always profit
\nfrom loosening structures of authority.<\/p>\n
The nation's greatest strength remains its nationalism. At
\nleast three generations have grown up believing that Indonesia is
\na nation which has the right to exist, and which has a rightful
\nclaim upon their loyalty.<\/p>\n
Soeharto's manipulation of nationalism to serve his, his
\nfamily's and his cronies' interests undoubtedly created cynicism
\nabout Indonesian nationalism in many minds. Yet the concept still
\nclaims the loyalty of many and inspires them to act in the
\ninterest of the nation and its people.<\/p>\n
When the nation comes through this time of troubles -- which
\nwill be neither easy nor soon -- I believe it will be because of
\nthe resilience of its society and the strength of its
\nnationalism.<\/p>\n
In my view, there is a very strong prospect that the seeds of
\ndemocracy which have been planted so recently in Indonesia will
\ngrow and strengthen. Widespread popular disappointment and
\ndespair at the Abdurrahman presidency is not without its
\nbenefits.<\/p>\n
In a democratic country it is possible for dedicated citizens
\nto get on with the task of creating a better future without
\npresidential leadership. That is a valuable lesson, one which it
\nseems the President has been anxious for Indonesians to learn.<\/p>\n
Professor M. C. Ricklefs is director of the Melbourne
\nInstitute of Asian Languages and Societies, at the University of
\nMelbourne.<\/p>",
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