Democracy in Myanmar: Who care?<\/p>\n
Amitav Acharya, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Singapore<\/p>\n
A July 2005 agreement among the members of the Association of
\nSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that Myanmar would relinquish its
\nturn at the chairmanship has averted a major diplomatic crisis
\nfor the organization. Western nations, including the United
\nStates and the European Union, who attend the annual ASEAN
\nmeetings as \"dialog partners,\" had threatened to boycott the 2006
\nmeeting if Myanmar was in the chair.<\/p>\n
Founded in 1967, ASEAN now includes 10 countries of Southeast
\nAsia. Under its rotational leadership, Myanmar, which joined the
\ngroup in 1997, was due to assume the chairmanship of its Standing
\nCommittee in 2006.<\/p>\n
The Western dialog partners of ASEAN are protesting against
\ncontinued political repression and human rights abuses by the
\nMyanmarese regime, which has ruled the country since 1962. The
\nregime has refused to accept the result of the 1990 national
\nelection, which was won by the opposition National League for
\nDemocracy (NLD). The party leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has since
\nspent most of her time under detention.<\/p>\n
By giving up its claim to lead ASEAN in 2006, the junta
\nmanaged to take the heat off the question of domestic reform. And
\nASEAN avoided a Western boycott of its 2006 meeting. But without
\nmore focused action by ASEAN and the international community to
\nmove Myanmar towards democracy, the move will be little more than
\nASEAN's traditional practice of sweeping problems under the
\ncarpet.<\/p>\n
The discussion in Laos was not about how to improve the
\npolitical situation in the country. The issue was Myanmar's
\nleadership, rather than membership in ASEAN. ASEAN has not made
\nMyanmar's continued membership of the association subject to
\npolitical reform.<\/p>\n
ASEAN has been reluctant to push Myanmar towards political
\nreform out of deference to its doctrine of non-interference. The
\nMyanmarese junta has started drafting a new constitution, due to
\nbe completed in 2007, which it says would lead to political
\nliberalization. Presumably, this would make Myanmar eligible to
\nassume the leadership in ASEAN.<\/p>\n
ASEAN members agree and hope that this will be the case. But
\nits Western partners dismiss the constitution-drafting process.
\nSuu Kyi and her party have boycotted the National Convention
\ndrafting the constitution, whose delegates were hand-picked and
\ntightly controlled by the junta. The Bush administration in May
\n2004 stated that because \"Yangoon's constitutional convention has
\nnot allowed for substantive dialog and the full participation of
\nall political groups, including the NLD, it lacks legitimacy.\" If
\napproved by a popular majority in the electorate in a free and
\nfair referendum -- which is by no means guaranteed -- the
\nconstitution would still accord the military a privileged
\nposition in the political system, including sole claim to the
\npresidency.<\/p>\n
ASEAN's role in Myanmar has been very different from its role
\nin the Cambodia conflict during the 1980s, when it led efforts to
\nfind a peaceful settlement to the dispute, which resulted in the
\nParis Peace Agreement in 1991. That conflict was originally a
\ncivil war, although it had been internationalized by Vietnamese
\nintervention and occupation of Cambodia. There has been no
\noutside intervention in Myanmar, which is one justification for
\nASEAN's hands-off policy. But Myanmar has proven to be a major
\nembarrassment for ASEAN.<\/p>\n
ASEAN's diplomatic options in dealing with Myanmar are limited
\nby intra-mural differences within the grouping over how to deal
\nwith the junta. Some members -- Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
\nand Singapore -- are increasingly concerned about the group's
\nrelationship with Western nations, if not its international
\npublic reputation per se. Thus, these ASEAN countries want to see
\nthe association play a role in nudging the junta to reform.
\nOthers, like Vietnam, stick to the principle of non-interference,
\nand are worried about setting a precedent of allowing regionalist
\npressure for domestic political reform -- a precedent that would
\nlikely come back to haunt them.<\/p>\n
ASEAN's capacity for inducing political reform in Myanmar is
\nalso constrained by the fact that the junta has secured backing
\nfrom both China and India, its two most powerful neighbors,
\nplaying them against one other. Hence, the junta can ignore any
\ndemand for political change that ASEAN may bring to bear on it.<\/p>\n
China and India are critical to any intervention by the
\ninternational community in Myanmar. But is the West really
\ninterested in advancing political change in Myanmar? There is no
\nserious diplomatic effort ongoing today -- of the kind one finds
\nin Sri Lanka or Aceh -- that might help bring about political
\nreconciliation in Myanmar. The Bush administration snubbed ASEAN
\nby canceling Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's attendance at
\nthe Vientiane meeting. But this posturing was almost entirely
\ncost-free, thanks to good bilateral relations with key Asian
\nnations, as indicated by a separate Rice stopover in Bangkok
\nbefore the Vientiane meeting. Diplomatic snubs and economic
\nsanctions are no substitute for a policy of seeking a solution to
\nMyanmar's political woes.<\/p>\n
Myanmar's strategic location or economic potential may be
\napparent to India and China, but not to the US. Myanmar is not
\nregarded by the Bush administration as a terrorist haven,
\nalthough it claims to side with the US on the war on terror,
\nsupposedly against extremist elements among its Rohingya Muslim
\nminority. When asked by the author as to why the US is not
\nactively seeking a role in the Myanmar problem, a senior official
\nin the first Bush administration replied that because there is no
\nsignificant domestic interest or constituency in the United
\nStates pushing for such a role. The administration's democracy-
\npromotion agenda does not extend to Myanmar, despite the fact
\nthat Secretary Rice named Myanmar as one of six \"outposts of
\ntyranny\" during her Senate confirmation hearing in January.<\/p>\n
Yet, a diplomatic effort backed by the US and involving
\nMyanmar's giant Asian neighbors would be necessary and timely.
\nDenying Myanmar the chairmanship of ASEAN is good posturing, but
\nit does not advance the cause of democratic transformation in the
\ncountry. If the US could engage in six-party negotiations
\ninvolving China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea to deal with the
\nNorth Korea problem, why should it not encourage a similar move
\ninvolving China, India, and ASEAN to deal with the Myanmar issue?<\/p>\n
The international community needs to prove that while taking a
\nmoral high ground on Myanmar's crisis; it must also offer
\nconcrete ideas and approaches to advance the democratization and
\nnational reconciliation process beyond the current policy of
\nsanctions and boycott. A necessary step in that direction would
\nbe a new diplomatic initiative to persuade the Yangoon regime to
\nbroaden the constitution-drafting process -- with the
\nparticipation of freed opposition leaders and a firm time-table
\nfor internationally-supervised elections. Such an initiative
\ncould be spearheaded jointly by ASEAN, China and India, with the
\nbacking of the US and the EU and other members of the
\ninternational community.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, ASEAN must come out of its non-interference closet
\nand address the issue head-on. Otherwise, its hands-off approach
\nwill continue to cloud its legitimacy and credibility as a
\nregional organization with a mandate for seeking \"regional
\nsolutions to regional problems.\"<\/p>\n
Amitav Acharya is Deputy Director and Head of Research at the
\nInstitute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological
\nUniversity.<\/p>",
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