{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1132243,
        "msgid": "democracy-defense-and-development-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-06-11 00:00:00",
        "title": "Democracy, defense and development",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Democracy, defense and development JP\/7\/JUWONO Part 1 of 2 Democracy, defense and development Juwono Sudarsono Jakarta From a centralized government backed by the military for more than 32 years under President Soeharto, Indonesia today remains the focus of attention of many policymakers and academicians.",
        "content": "<p>Democracy, defense and development<br>\nJP\/7\/JUWONO<\/p>\n<p>Part 1 of 2<\/p>\n<p>Democracy, defense and development<\/p>\n<p>Juwono Sudarsono<br>\nJakarta<\/p>\n<p>From a centralized government backed by the military for more <br>\nthan 32 years under President Soeharto, Indonesia today remains <br>\nthe focus of attention of many policymakers and academicians. The <br>\nquestions posed were: Can civilian-dominated politics take root <br>\nin Indonesia and become the vanguard of democratic government in <br>\na country that has the largest Muslim population in the world? <br>\nCan a democratic government, facing multiple economic and <br>\nfinancial crises, recover sufficiently in the short run to <br>\nrelease itself from the vicious circle of political instability, <br>\neconomic stagnation and social conflict?<\/p>\n<p>What is the role of the military in the new political <br>\nenvironment? Will the military's repositioning in the new <br>\npolitical system enhance both democracy and development? Finally, <br>\nhow efficiently will Indonesians utilize, to the maximum, their <br>\nendowed natural resources for equitable and sustainable <br>\ndevelopment in an increasingly competitive regional and global <br>\nenvironment?<\/p>\n<p>Let us first take up some general points about the first \"D\": <br>\nDemocratic government. Most social and political scientists would <br>\nagree that a functioning democracy would require the following <br>\nunderpinnings:<\/p>\n<p>An agreement on fundamentals about state identity (what is it <br>\nto be Indonesian?) to galvanize and underpin the diversity of 300 <br>\nethnic groups across 17,000 islands, unevenly distributed in the <br>\ndensely populated island of Java (65 percent of the population <br>\nwith 15 percent of the land area).<\/p>\n<p>The outer islands where resource-rich provinces (Aceh, Riau, <br>\nEast Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua) are largely underpopulated <br>\nand have less political leverage at the central government level. <br>\nOur first president, Sukarno, provided the basis for state <br>\nidentity, Pancasila, by which all Indonesians are theoretically <br>\nbound to believe in, because of the resonance and resilience of <br>\nthese precepts in the body and soul of all Indonesians from Aceh <br>\nto Papua.<\/p>\n<p>An important aspect of Pancasila is that although Indonesia is <br>\nthe largest Muslim country, it is not an Islamic state. In fact, <br>\nIslam and democracy are compatible in Indonesia precisely because <br>\nour version of Islam is enriched through healthy interaction with <br>\nother faiths.<\/p>\n<p>Our challenge, of course, is to continuously replenish the <br>\nvitality of that state identity and the notion of \"Indonesian-<br>\nness\" through broader social, economic, judicial and political <br>\nparticipation. As the world's fourth most populous country and <br>\nthird largest democracy, we must rise to the challenge that the <br>\ndemocracy we have committed ourselves to will be able to deliver <br>\nthe goods to the deprived, the desperate and the despondent.<\/p>\n<p>A \"critical mass\" is needed from the locally defined middle <br>\nclass, ideally comprising at least 30 to 40 percent of the <br>\npopulation, who will define civic government and become the <br>\n\"transmitters\" between the very rich and the very poor. While <br>\ncomparisons can be misleading, democracies generally function <br>\nwith agreement on fundamentals only if a committed middle and <br>\nlower class enjoy access to basic human needs (food, shelter, <br>\nclothing) and public goods: electricity, roads, harbors, public <br>\neducation, primary health care.<\/p>\n<p>The GDP per capita ideally should be at least $3000-$4000 with <br>\nmonthly household spending ranging between $500 and $1500 a <br>\nmonth. They constitute the concerned citizens who fight for <br>\ngrowth and equity, for a fairer political and legal system and <br>\nwho vigorously contest unwarranted gains from the economic pie.<\/p>\n<p>Unfortunately, GDP per capita of $1300 and 15-20 percent <br>\nmiddle class show that our path towards a functioning democracy <br>\nremain marked by glitches, the crashing of social and cultural <br>\ngears across ethnic, provincial and religious lines before it <br>\ngets better in 10-15 years. Kalimantan, Aceh, Poso, Ambon and <br>\nPapua in recent years have shown the seriousness of our <br>\nleadership challenges.<\/p>\n<p>A competent and professional bureaucracy enables government to <br>\nfunction properly and truly be a provider of public goods in <br>\nterms of the delivery of services through taxation and fiscal <br>\nmeasures in order to provide utilities(road, harbors, <br>\nelectricity, telecommunications, potable water ) to the larger <br>\npopulation.<\/p>\n<p>In this respect, Indonesia's four million-strong bureaucracy <br>\nstill leaves much to be desired. The bulk of our civil service is <br>\nlargely undertrained and lack the capacity to run a functioning <br>\nadministration, which should be able to effectively allocate <br>\ncritical social services.<\/p>\n<p>For a nation of 215 million there are just 5,000 Ph.Ds in all <br>\nfields ranging from bio-technology to the arts.<\/p>\n<p>The second \"D\" has to do with the role of the Indonesian <br>\nMilitary (TNI). For more than 30 years (1966-1998) it defined the <br>\nparameters of governance at all levels: national, provincial, <br>\ndistrict and local. Because the system lacks the fundamentals of <br>\ndemocratic government (organized political parties, civic groups, <br>\na politically neutral civil service) the TNI became all-pervasive <br>\nin defining domestic security and external defense.<\/p>\n<p>Its all encompassing national security doctrine sanctified <br>\nactive and retired officers to gain prominent roles in the ruling <br>\npolitical party, the bureaucracy, in the legislature, the <br>\njudiciary, the prosecutors office and the court system. Up until <br>\n1999-2000, the police were under the authority of the TNI <br>\nheadquarters. Each service had independent sources of extra-<br>\nbudgetary funding through clusters of foundations, enterprises <br>\nand cooperatives.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is the Minister of Defense.<br>\nThis is an excerpt of his speech, presented recently at the 13th <br>\nSenior Course (KSA-XIII) at the National Resilience Institute <br>\n(Lemhannas).<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/democracy-defense-and-development-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}