{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 2032929,
        "msgid": "defence-satellite-programme-and-future-requirements-1791773475",
        "date": "2026-10-12 08:53:48",
        "title": "Defence Satellite Programme and Future Requirements",
        "author": "",
        "source": "CNBC",
        "tags": "",
        "topic": "Politics",
        "summary": "The article argues that Indonesia needs a realistic, long-term plan for military satellites as space-based communications, surveillance and command systems become increasingly vulnerable in conflict. It reviews the country\u2019s dependence on foreign suppliers, the planned four-satellite Earth-observation constellation, and the need to fund further satellites while building domestic industry capabilities through achievable steps.",
        "content": "<p>In this year\u2019s war between the United States and Israel against Iran,\nIran reportedly attacked the US Naval Support Activity in Bahrain, which\nhosts various facilities, including an AN\/GSC-52B military satellite\ncommunications terminal.<\/p>\n<p>The attack on the military satellite communications terminal\nillustrates Iran\u2019s efforts to disable US military communications in the\nPersian Gulf, where satellites are now indispensable to C5ISR\nsystems.<\/p>\n<p>With human-made vehicles orbiting above the Earth, a party can\nestablish a command-and-control network and monitor events on the\nEarth\u2019s surface in real time. This allows tactical and strategic\ndecisions to be made quickly on the basis of relatively up-to-date and\ncomprehensive information. It is therefore unsurprising that the United\nStates established a new service branch, the US Space Force, several\nyears ago, while each service branch apart from the US Air Force also\nhas a Space Command organisation.<\/p>\n<p>For countries with military satellite constellations in space, one of\nthe main concerns, now and in the future, is that an adversary could\ndisable those satellites during a war by various means.<\/p>\n<p>The loss of a satellite constellation \u2014 whether communications,\nearly-warning, reconnaissance or navigation satellites \u2014 would cause\nC5ISR systems to fail entirely. Units on land, at sea and in the air,\nseparated by distance, could no longer be managed within a single chain\nof command and control.<\/p>\n<p>US Secretary of the Air Force Troy Menk\u2019s statement in September 2026\nthat the United States had deployed weapons in orbit is evidence of how\nseriously the country views the threat of Russia and China disabling its\nmilitary satellite constellation in space.<\/p>\n<p>Although the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing weapons of\nmass destruction in space, major powers are seeking to exploit\ncapabilities that are not covered by the agreement.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia has used satellites for defence purposes since the Hughes\nAircraft Company-built Palapa A1 was launched into space on 8 July 1976.\nTo date, the country\u2019s use of these human-made vehicles for defence has\nmainly served communications needs, rather than observation, navigation\nor early warning.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, Indonesia\u2019s command of rocket technology \u2014 one of the\nfoundations for sovereign use of space \u2014 remains little changed from the\n1960s. In short, the country remains highly dependent on other nations\nto manufacture satellites and satellite launch vehicles.<\/p>\n<p>Under the Ministry of Defence\u2019s 2020\u20132024 Minimum Essential Force\n(MEF), it awarded Thales Alenia Space a \u20ac273.3 million contract to\nacquire reconnaissance satellites, in collaboration with PT LEN\nIndustri. The French-Italian firm is required to build four\nEarth-observation satellites for Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>The four satellites will form an initial reconnaissance\nconstellation. The final configuration is intended to comprise seven\nsatellites, provided Indonesia awards Thales Alenia Space a similar\ncontract under the 2025\u20132029 Optimum Essential Force (OEF).<\/p>\n<p>The joint venture between Thales and Leonardo cannot be expected to\nwork with brokers if the Ministry of Defence wants to complete the\nseven-satellite configuration before the end of this decade. A\nseven-satellite Earth-observation constellation is a requirement\nIndonesia must meet if it wants comprehensive reconnaissance\ncapabilities from orbit.<\/p>\n<p>Under the current agreement, Thales Alenia Space is building four\nreconnaissance satellites for Indonesia: two optical satellites and two\nSynthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellites. All will be placed in low\nEarth orbit (LEO), with two using polar orbits and the other two\nequatorial orbits.<\/p>\n<p>To the author\u2019s knowledge, however, it remains unclear which orbital\npositions the four European satellites will occupy, as Indonesia has not\nyet registered them with the International Telecommunication Union\n(ITU). Their launch schedule is also unknown, given that PT LEN Industri\nhas not signed a contract with any launch-services provider.<\/p>\n<p>Will the Ministry of Defence award Thales Alenia Space a further\ncontract for the remaining three satellites under the OEF 2025\u20132029, in\norder to complete the seven-satellite constellation? And what are the\nplans for procuring defence communications satellites before the end of\nthis decade, to make up for the shortfall under the 2015\u20132019 MEF?<\/p>\n<p>Defence communications satellites are needed so that the Ministry of\nDefence and the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) no longer depend\non satellites owned by state-owned or private companies, even when\ntransponder capacity is provided free of charge. Such satellites would\nsupport not only voice, video and data communications, but also the\ncontrol of unmanned aircraft, particularly Medium Altitude Long Range\n(MALE) types, which currently depend on Chinese satellites.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia is now seeking to meet its defence satellite needs,\nparticularly for Earth-observation and communications satellites.\nNavigation and early-warning satellites will be difficult to acquire\nunless the country can manufacture satellites domestically and develop\nits own satellite launch vehicles.<\/p>\n<p>Given these requirements, it would be prudent for the Ministry of\nDefence to draw up a defence satellite plan covering the next 25 years,\nto guide all parties involved.<\/p>\n<p>The plan must be realistic and grounded in actual conditions, rather\nthan in aspirations detached from reality. It should include how the\ngovernment will prepare funding to support the defence satellite\nprogramme, covering both the space and ground segments.<\/p>\n<p>The plan should also realistically assess the capabilities of the\ndomestic satellite industry, given that satellite manufacturing is not\nonly an advanced but also a complex industry. In other words, ambitions\nfor domestic companies to produce communications and reconnaissance\nsatellites on an unrealistic timeline should be avoided.<\/p>\n<p>No Indonesian company currently has the capacity to manufacture\nsatellites; efforts to develop that capability were interrupted in 1997\nwhen the Asian financial crisis struck. It would be wiser and more\nrealistic for the government to steer national industry towards joining\nthe global supply chains of satellite firms such as Thales Alenia Space\nor Airbus Defence and Space.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/defence-satellite-programme-and-future-requirements-1791773475",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}