Decentralization alternatives vital<\/p>\n
By Santo Koesoebjono<\/p>\n
THE HAGUE, Netherlands (JP): "We are doing well during this
\nperiod of economic crisis. In fact we hope that this situation
\nwill last longer," a government official in Bali said recently.<\/p>\n
A senior research fellow of the island's state University
\nUdayana expressed a similar opinion about the economic progress
\nof this island. His wife's family, merchants of gold and silver
\nwares, is doing good business now because the economic
\nuncertainty usually drives people to invest in precious metals or
\nproperty.<\/p>\n
The ugly corner has been turned and the economy of the island
\nis booming, supported by the favorable exchange rate between the
\nU.S. dollar and the rupiah.<\/p>\n
Motorcycles and popular four-wheel-drive Kijangs and Panthers
\nare purchased and driven, contributing to overcrowding on the
\nsmall roads unprepared for huge flows of transportation.<\/p>\n
Similar economic growth is also noted on other islands, such
\nas Sumatra and Sulawesi. The economic crisis had a differential
\nimpact on the economies of different regions, said an economist
\nfrom LIPI, the national research institute of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Java may be the hardest hit. The situation on Java dominates
\nthe focus of the economic crisis because of its high percentage
\nof the population (59 percent of the total population of 202
\nmillion), high concentration of manufacturing industries and
\nservices, and because the central government is located there.<\/p>\n
This differential welfare gap between the regions may
\nstimulate the desire for more autonomy and the decentralization
\nof activities. Political parties should be prepared to meet and
\naccommodate these demands, otherwise unrest and regional
\nsecession movements will continue to mount. By ignoring the wind
\nof and need for change, reforms will get out of step with popular
\ndemand.<\/p>\n
The political turmoil in May 1998 led to the fall of former
\npresident Soeharto. The harassment of the Chinese ethnic minority
\ncaused an exodus of these non-pribumis (non-indigenous) abroad
\nand to the more peaceful and safer island of Bali. Estimations
\nrun to around 60,000 to 70,000 pendatang (newcomers) from Jakarta
\nto Bali since May 1998, although such figures should be
\ninterpreted with care.<\/p>\n
This mass influx of members of the middle and well-to-do
\nclasses has had a big impact on the economy of Bali, although in
\nterms of numbers they represent only a tiny percentage of the
\nisland population of three million people. Prices of properties
\nin the capital city Denpasar and in the popular resorts of Sanur
\nand Kuta have skyrocketed. This has influenced the prices of
\nspecific consumer goods and life-styles. Although the situation
\nin Jakarta has somewhat calmed down, life in this city is still
\nunsafe.<\/p>\n
Newspapers, radio and TV continuously give reports which
\nconfirm this. It has become a topic of discussion among relatives
\nand friends, noted in warnings to foreign tourists, which makes
\nforeigners hesitant to visit and invest in Indonesia. Although
\nmany non-pribumis have returned to Jakarta to resume their
\nbusinesses, their family members remain abroad or in Bali. This
\nsudden influx and settlement of the Jakarta elite in Bali, with
\ntheir different life-styles, stimulated a demographer at Udayana
\nUniversity to question the impact on the social, religious and
\ntraditional life on Bali.<\/p>\n
A more pungent question is whether the differential effect of
\nthe economic crisis will lead to a growing gap in welfare
\nbetween the peoples of the different islands. Moreover, what will
\nbe the consequences on the government and its administrative
\nstructure?<\/p>\n
The fall of the autocratic and centralist regime has allowed
\nthe blooming of different types of activities. Diverse business
\nactivities are mushrooming, bypassing government controls.
\nBusinessmen are moving their activities to different regions,
\nsuch as Sumatra and Sulawesi, to develop trade directly with
\ntheir immediate clients abroad. Palm oil, rubber, cocoa beans,
\ncoffee and copra are some of the commodities finding direct
\noutlets abroad. This trade results in an inflow of cash for local
\nproducers and businessmen, and rising welfare and consumerism in
\nthe regions. The local populations are doing well during this
\nperiod of national economic malaise.<\/p>\n
The economic development of different regions may further
\nincrease the sense of economic independence from the central
\ngovernment, although one wonders whether the present reformasi
\nclique condones this development. This progress is instrumental
\nto avoid social and economic unrest in the regions, and it is
\nalso keeping resources flowing in to the advantage of the clique
\nin power.<\/p>\n
However, as politics and economics are good bedfellows, the
\nrising welfare stimulates the demand for more autonomy for the
\nregions. Regions will be more assertive, as former minister
\nSarwono Kusumaatmadja said recently in an interview with a Dutch
\nnational newspaper.<\/p>\n
Decentralization is preferable to an outright split of the
\nregions. However, we should not fear that these regions will ask
\nfor independence, because it is very unwise to demand
\nindependence knowing the fate of the newly created independent
\nstates after the fall of the Soviet Empire in 1989. Moreover, if
\na region really wanted its independence it could have raised the
\nissue during the period of instability around May 1998. However,
\nthere were no serious indications that this was an issue.<\/p>\n
The situation becomes more complicated when the regions ask
\nfor more political, economic, financial and administrative
\nautonomy from the central government. The demand for more
\nautonomy is spreading through the country and not limited only to
\nindependence-minded provinces. Regions will ask for a stronger
\nsay in the development of their region, contrary to the
\ndecentralization policy rhetoric of the Soeharto regime which was
\nmerely cosmetic. The regions will also demand equitable
\ndevelopment and a bigger share of the profits generated by local
\nresources.<\/p>\n
Redressing the bitter legacy of 32 years of the Soeharto
\nregime is a main task of reformasi for the regions. If this
\nfails, frustrations will increase and social unrest may explode.
\nConfronted with the demand for decentralization, are political
\nparties ready to meet this request when they are in power? What
\nagenda do they have for a diversified economy in a united
\nIndonesia?<\/p>\n
Once this voice for more decentralization becomes stronger it
\nis infeasible to suppress such a demand. Political turmoil might
\ncreate opportunities for basic institutional changes and the
\nreshuffling of personnel.<\/p>\n
The other side of the decentralization coin is whether the
\nregions are ready to plan, implement, direct and administer
\nregional development. Do they have the required human resources
\nand skills to do this?<\/p>\n
Decades of being obedient and loyal to the central government,
\nnot allowed to take initiatives and make decisions on their own,
\nmay hinder the achievement of local personnel. These issues were
\nput forward by local government officials from various provinces
\nof Indonesia who were attending a training session on
\ndecentralization in the Netherlands one year ago.<\/p>\n
Examples can be observed in former communist countries. At
\npresent, most managers and personnel in those countries, although
\nhighly educated, are lacking in managerial skills and
\nexperience, a sense of initiative and the imagination to create
\nand shape development. Will regions in Indonesia be able to
\ncounter these deficiencies within a short time?<\/p>\n
It is therefore pressing to formulate alternatives to the
\ndecentralization of regions which will shape the future of the
\ncountry. Scenarios should be developed showing the consequences
\nof these alternatives in all aspects. They should not remain
\nmerely general plans, but must go into more detailed plans of
\naction, such as the relation between the central and regional
\ngovernments, responsibilities and obligations for national safety
\nand international relationships, the development of the
\ninfrastructure, human resources and skills and the allocation of
\nfunds.<\/p>\n
One also ought to explore the potential competitive advantage
\nof regions given the differences between the natural resources
\nand skills of the regions.<\/p>\n
In The Jakarta Post, author-philosopher Mangunwijaya once
\nalluded to the United States of Indonesia in the 21st century. Of
\ncourse, this is just one alternative for a more equitable
\ndistribution of wealth. However, let us shift some of the
\nemphasis from "Tunggal Ika" (one unity) to "Bhinneka"
\n(plurality).<\/p>\n
The writer is an economist-demographer based in the
\nNetherlands.<\/p>\n
Window A: The fall of the autocratic and centralist regime has
\nallowed the blooming of different types of activities. Diverse
\nbusiness activities are mushrooming, bypassing government
\ncontrols.<\/p>\n
Window B: Regions will ask for a stronger say in the
\ndevelopment of their region, contrary to the decentralization
\npolicy rhetoric of the Soeharto regime which was merely
\ncosmetic.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/decentralization-alternatives-vital-1447893297",
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