Last week, a meeting of Commission VIII of the House of\nRepresentatives (DPR) with the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah (Kemenhaj) and\nthe Hajj Financial Management Agency (BPKH) was temporarily suspended.\nNot because of policy substance, but because the financial\naccountability report for the 1447 H\/2026 M hajj was only received by\ncouncil members while the meeting was underway, and upon reading it,\ndiscrepancies were found in the number of pilgrims and the value of\nbenefits between the records of Kemenhaj and BPKH.<\/p>\n
The question that emerged was simple but pointed: if two state\ninstitutions that both \u2018manage hajj\u2019 cannot agree on the figures, who\nactually has authority over that data? This incident is not an ordinary\nadministrative failure. It is a symptom of a legal design that has not\nyet fully answered a fundamental question since the hajj institutional\nreform was rolled out, namely where the boundary of authority lies\nbetween the technical organiser and the financial manager.<\/p>\n
Law Number 14 of 2025 concerning the Third Amendment to Law Number 8\nof 2019 on the Organisation of the Hajj and Umrah Pilgrimage established\nKemenhaj, which took over the duties of the Directorate General of Hajj\nand Umrah Organisation at the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The aim was\nclear: to unify services, including health, accommodation, and transport\nfor pilgrims under one roof, avoiding the overlapping authority that had\nlong been complained about.<\/p>\n
At the same time, Article 46 Paragraph 4 of the law also strengthened\nthe role of BPKH, rather than merging it into Kemenhaj. The article\ngrants this institution the authority to jointly determine the Hajj\nPilgrimage Cost (BPIH) together with the Minister of Hajj and Umrah and\nthe DPR.<\/p>\n
This is a significant shift from BPKH\u2019s previous status, which was\noften referred to merely as a \u2018paymaster\u2019 under Law Number 34 of 2014 on\nHajj Financial Management. This change is normatively sensible, as BPKH,\nwhich manages hundreds of trillions of rupiah belonging to pilgrims,\nreasonably deserves a voice in determining how much of those funds are\nused.<\/p>\n
But the problem lies not in the intention, but in the coordination\narchitecture that accompanies it. Law 14\/2025 and Presidential\nRegulation Number 92 of 2025 on the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah regulate\nthe position and main duties of Kemenhaj in detail, but have not yet\nexplicitly formulated a standard mechanism for how these two\ninstitutions, with different databases and recording systems, unify\ntheir figures before reporting to the public and the President.<\/p>\n
Lawrence Friedman, in his legal system framework, distinguishes three\nelements: substance (the rules themselves), structure (the institutions\nthat implement them), and legal culture (the behaviour and habits of\nactors within them). The pattern visible in Law 14\/2025 shows a symptom\ncommon in institutional reform in Indonesia: legal substance moves\nquickly, while coordination structure lags behind.<\/p>\n
The law has been enacted, the Presidential Regulation has been\nissued, and even BPKH Regulation Number 1 of 2026 already regulates the\ntechnicalities of pilgrims\u2019 virtual accounts. However, the speed of\nregulation has not been matched by the maturity of coordination\nstructures between two institutions that have both only recently been\nrestructured, and it is this gap that allows pilgrim data and benefit\nvalues to still be recorded differently at the two institutions.<\/p>\n
The post-reform challenge is no longer about the availability of\nregulation, but rather the ability to translate legal design into real\ncollaborative governance on the ground. The unsynchronised data between\nKemenhaj and BPKH is not merely a human error in recording.<\/p>\n
It is evidence that the law in the books, namely the shared authority\nin determining BPIH, has not yet been translated into law in action in\nthe form of an integrated reporting system that compels both\ninstitutions to work from the same database from the outset.<\/p>\n
The debate over the BPIH 2027 financing scheme clarifies the stakes.\nBPKH itself, in its presentation to Commission VIII of the DPR, warned\nof a potential negative difference of Rp6.87 trillion in the 60:40\ndistribution scheme between benefit value and costs paid directly by\npilgrims. On that occasion, BPKH also referred to the prohibition on\nusing investment returns from one prospective pilgrim\u2019s deposit to\nfinance the departure of another pilgrim, in accordance with the Ijtima\u2019\nUlama Decision of the MUI Fatwa Commission.<\/p>\n
This shows that BPKH does not merely execute decisions, but actively\ncorrects Kemenhaj\u2019s proposals based on sharia considerations and\nfinancial prudence, precisely the function intended by Article 46\nParagraph 4. The question is: if this checks and balances function works\nwell in the policy realm, why does it fail precisely in the realm of\nbasic data reporting?<\/p>\n
Gustav Radbruch taught that good law must balance three values:\ncertainty (Rechtssicherheit), justice (Gerechtigkeit), and utility\n(Zweckm\u00e4ssigkeit). Textually, Law 14\/2025 promises structural certainty:\none ministry, one service roof, one door of responsibility.<\/p>\n
Yet behind that structural simplification, the law actually\nmaintains, even strengthens, the independence of BPKH\u2019s financial\nauthority separately. This is not an inconsistency, but a conscious\nchoice: the state chooses to protect the independence of managing the\npeople\u2019s funds from unilateral intervention by technical authorities,\nwith the consequence that must be paid in the form of higher\ncoordination complexity between two institutions that are no longer in a\nsingle chain of command.<\/p>\n
The separation of the two institutions from a single chain of command\ndoes not mean the design is flawed. Previous academic studies on the\nposition of BPKH and comparative studies with Malaysia\u2019s Hajj Pilgrims\nFund Board (Lembaga Tabung Haji) actually show that the independence of\nthe hajj financial manager from the technical organiser is a common,\neven recommended, practice to protect pilgrims\u2019 interests from\nshort-term political intervention.<\/p>\n
In other words, the problem is not in the separation itself.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/data-discrepancy-hajj-at-an-unfinished-crossroads-of-authority-1788000660", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }