Danger of cracking down on Islamist groups<\/p>\n
John Sidel, Guardian News Service, London<\/p>\n
In the wake of the bomb attack in Bali, media and government
\nsources have begun to point fingers at a shadowy group called
\nJemaah Islamiyah, said to be al-Qaeda's local franchise outlet in
\nSoutheast Asia. The emerging picture is of an Indonesian-based
\nIslamist terrorist group and of insurgent militant Islam in the
\ncountry, if not the whole region.<\/p>\n
In all likelihood, the Indonesian security forces will soon
\nyield to Australian, American, and British pressure and "round up
\nthe usual suspects" associated with this group. However, it is
\nimportant to reconsider the assumptions behind this impending
\ncrackdown on "Islam" in Indonesia, and to assess the likely
\npolitical consequences.<\/p>\n
The arrests of suspected members of Jemaah Islamiyah in the
\nPhilippines, Singapore and Indonesia over the past year have yet
\nto generate evidence of this group's terrorist activities, or
\neven of its existence. The security forces in these countries are
\neager to impress America with their commitment to the war on
\nterrorism and have few scruples in their treatment of suspects.
\nOver the years, groups like Jemaah Islamiyah have also enjoyed
\nclandestine ties with elements of the Philippine and Indonesian
\nmilitary and intelligence services, who have used them for
\nfinancial and political gain.<\/p>\n
Even if Jemaah Islamiyah does not really exist in a formal
\nsense, there certainly are networks of Islamist scholars,
\nstudents and activists in Indonesia who are eager to inculcate a
\nstronger sense of Islamic identity throughout the region. For
\nexample, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the Muslim cleric accused of leading
\nJemaah Islamiyah, has been a vocal critic of secular nationalism
\nand was elected to head the Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly in
\n2000.<\/p>\n
But Ba'asyir and his students represent a small minority in
\nthe context of Indonesian Islam, which is notable for its
\nsyncretism, pluralism and fragmented political representation.
\nUnder Dutch colonial rule, indigenous aristocrats were retooled
\nas bureaucrats in western-style secular schools, just as
\ngraduates of Christian missionary schools occupied a privileged
\nposition in the civil service, colonial army and professional
\nclasses.<\/p>\n
Thus Christians and secularized Muslims came to occupy a
\ndominant position in the Indonesian political elite after
\nindependence. And in the first years of the military regime of
\nSoeharto, the organizations which claimed to represent devout
\nMuslims in Indonesia were marginalised.<\/p>\n
By the 1980s and early 1990s, economic growth, urbanization
\nand the expansion of the university system brought Indonesians
\nschooled in a self-consciously Islamic tradition into the urban
\nmiddle classes in record numbers, and allowed for their
\nascendancy within the political elite.<\/p>\n
By the late 1990s, such Muslims were well represented in
\nparliament, the Cabinet and military. The resignation of Soeharto
\nin 1998, and the presidency of a self-styled champion of Islam,
\nBJ Habibie, represented the peak of this Islamic ascendancy.<\/p>\n
But this trend was soon to be reversed. Muslim parties did
\nbadly in the 1999 elections. Politicians representing Christian,
\nsecular, and accommodationist Muslims assumed power, culminating
\nin the rise of Megawati Soekarnoputri to the presidency in 2001
\nand her party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI
\nPerjuangan). More than a third of the PDI Perjuangan's MPs are
\nnon-Muslim (mostly Protestants), and virtually none has any
\nhistory of Islamic association. In areas plagued by inter-
\nreligious violence, like Maluku and Central Sulawesi, the PDI
\nPerjuangan is the party of Protestants. Secular nationalism is
\nentrenched in power in Indonesia today as a partisan political
\nforce.<\/p>\n
It is against this Indonesian backdrop that the emergence of
\narmed Islamist groups like Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah must
\nbe understood. After all, alongside the Muslim professionals who
\nemerged in the 1990s, there were many "professional Muslims" who
\nenjoyed the boom years for political Islam under Soeharto and
\nHabibie. Among them were Muslims -- like Abu Bakar Ba'asyir --
\nwho were schooled in a tradition rooted in Indonesia's small
\nHadrami Arab immigrant community and closely connected to centers
\nof Islamic education in the Middle East. Such Indonesian Muslims
\nnurture an understanding of Islam that stresses its most orthodox
\nprinciples, its appeal as a foundation for supra-national
\nspiritual unity, and its potential as a basis for the exercise of
\npower. They have been concerned to "purify" the faith of the
\naccretions of local customs in Indonesia -- promoted by the Dutch
\ncolonial regime and its successors.<\/p>\n
For Indonesian Muslims of this ilk, the past few years have
\nbeen deeply embittering. Indonesia is now again run by
\npoliticians favoring secular nationalism, with Christians
\nregaining influence. Outraged by the pro-Christian bias of the
\nMegawati government in areas of inter-religious conflict, some of
\nthese Muslims are deeply disillusioned with Indonesian democracy
\nand attracted to the promise of violent action. Small wonder that
\nan armed group called Laskar Jihad emerged, with the connivance
\nof elements of the military, to defend Muslims -- and attack
\nChristians -- in Maluku and Central Sulawesi.<\/p>\n
Against this backdrop the past few months have seen the
\nescalation of pressures on the Indonesian government to crack
\ndown on Islamist networks in the country. It is in this context
\nthat western tourists on Bali (a Hindu island and a PDI
\nPerjuangan stronghold) have become targets of a terrorist attack,
\nalong with a US consulate on the island and a Philippine
\nconsulate in the predominantly Christian province of North
\nSulawesi.<\/p>\n
The danger of the impending crackdown is not simply that
\ntrends towards the reduction of military influence in Indonesia
\nwill be reversed in the name of the war against terrorism. In
\n2004, Indonesia may see its first direct presidential elections,
\nwith Megawati facing off against a Muslim candidate. If
\nmishandled, the impending crackdown and consequent polarization
\ncould inadvertently help rather than hinder the formation of a
\nJemaah Islamiyah -- an Islamic community -- in Indonesia.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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