{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1633531,
        "msgid": "danantara-as-a-solution-1774414279",
        "date": "2026-03-25 11:32:00",
        "title": "Danantara as a Solution",
        "author": "",
        "source": "CNBC",
        "tags": "",
        "topic": "Economy",
        "summary": "One year after its establishment on 24 February 2025, the Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara (BPI Danantara) is under scrutiny from rating agencies like Moody's and Fitch, who view it as a potential risk to Indonesia's sovereign rating due to its management of state-owned enterprise (SOE) dividends and assets. Drawing inspiration from China's SASAC model, Danantara aims to serve as a super holding company for Indonesian SOEs, reinvesting profits to fuel economic growth and investment, rather than contributing to the national budget. This opinion piece argues that Danantara must quickly mature to meet public expectations and support President Prabowo Subianto's vision for accelerating Indonesia's economic progress through effective SOE transformation.",
        "content": "<p>Danantara as a Solution<\/p>\n<p>Note: This article is the personal opinion of the author and does not\nreflect the views of the CNBCIndonesia.com editorial team.<\/p>\n<p>It has been a year since the Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata\nNusantara (BPI Danantara) was established. Since its formation on 24\nFebruary 2025, the public has been awaiting its role as a state\ninstrument in realising Indonesia\u2019s economic progress, particularly in\nthe field of investment.<\/p>\n<p>Moreover, through government policy and approval from the Dewan\nPerwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives), Danantara has been granted\nprivileges to: (i) manage 100% of SOE dividends that are the right of\nthe government; (ii) optimise SOE assets to be leveraged in order to\nobtain funding for Danantara\u2019s investment activities or related\nSOEs.<\/p>\n<p>The existence of Danantara has become a focal point of attention for\nrating agencies such as Moody\u2019s and Fitch in the last two months.\nUnfortunately, this focus from the rating agencies has not yet reflected\noptimism regarding its existence in strengthening creditors\u2019 confidence\nin Indonesia\u2019s sovereign rating position.<\/p>\n<p>The rating agencies have instead placed Danantara in their rating\nnotes as a factor that could potentially lower Indonesia\u2019s debt rating\nin the future. Moody\u2019s and Fitch have issued official statements\nregarding Indonesia\u2019s sovereign rating with a relatively similar stance\non Danantara.<\/p>\n<p>Danantara is indeed a new institution. However, with its vast\nresources, strong government and political support, and such significant\nprivileges, it is entirely reasonable for the public (society,\ninvestors, and creditors) to hope that Danantara will mature quickly and\ndeliver concrete results.<\/p>\n<p>Danantara is not an ordinary sovereign wealth fund (SWF)\norganisation. Therefore, its existence must soon become a solution\nrather than a source of pessimism and concern amid such high public\nexpectations and the reality of the needs demanded by the state,\nparticularly in realising government targets as often stated by\nPresident Prabowo Subianto.<\/p>\n<p>The idea of establishing Danantara is purely the vision of President\nPrabowo. The author believes that the concept of forming Danantara is\nnot merely to make it an SWF like Singapore\u2019s Temasek and GIC, which\npurely function as investment companies.<\/p>\n<p>In addition to being an investment company, Danantara also serves as\na holding company, even a super holding company, for all existing SOEs.\nThis differs from Temasek or GIC, where they became super holding\ncompanies for the companies they own through a natural process via their\ninvestment activities.<\/p>\n<p>SASAC as a Role Model<\/p>\n<p>The author views that the concept of forming Danantara refers to\nSASAC (The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission)\nin China. SASAC was established on 24 March 2003, exactly 23 years ago,\noverseeing tens of thousands of existing SOEs operating from the local\nto national levels.<\/p>\n<p>SASAC is a \u201cgovernment body\u201d tasked with managing SOEs and is\naccountable to the State Council, subject to Company Law and other\nadministrative regulations. Almost similar to Danantara, SASAC is also\ngiven the authority to fully manage SOE dividends that are the\ngovernment\u2019s right for development in various investment activities.<\/p>\n<p>The SOE transformation process carried out through SASAC can be said\nto have successfully accelerated the business development of SOEs in\nChina. Based on the global magazine Fortune 500 publication released in\nMarch 2026, 128 companies, or 25% of them, originate from China.<\/p>\n<p>The majority of these Chinese companies in the Fortune 500 are SOEs.\nMeanwhile, Indonesia is only represented by Pertamina, which does not\nenter the Top 100, precisely at rank 165, a significant drop from its\nfirst entry into the Fortune 500 at rank 122 in 2012.<\/p>\n<p>The Chinese government\u2019s policy of focusing SOE management under one\nbody, namely SASAC, has not only managed to position them as the largest\ncompanies globally but also as the main contributors to high economic\ngrowth and job creation.<\/p>\n<p>It should be noted that SOE reform in China began in 1984, marked by\na fundamental change in the relationship between SOEs as corporations\nand SOEs as fiscal instruments (national budget). Before 1984, SOE\ndividends were the largest contributor to China\u2019s state revenue\n(national budget) at around 50%; since 1984, the national budget no\nlonger receives dividends from SOEs as a revenue source.<\/p>\n<p>Since then, the Chinese government has implemented a dividend payout\nratio (DPOR) of 0% (zero DPOR), meaning all profits generated by Chinese\nSOEs are returned to the SOEs as retained earnings to strengthen capital\nfor expansion and SOE investments. This policy applied until 2003, known\nas the first generation of SOE reform.<\/p>\n<p>In its development, the Chinese government opened up to foreign\ninvestors entering state-owned companies. Since 2003, China has\nconducted extensive privatisation of SOEs through initial public\nofferings (IPOs) on the capital markets.<\/p>\n<p>The privatisation process was carried out by SASAC. The concept of\nSOE privatisation implemented is \u201czhua da fang xiao\u201d or \u201cgrasp the large\nand let go of the small\u201d\u2014retain the large ones and release the small\nones.<\/p>\n<p>In 2007, a dividend policy (DPOR) was enforced to provide certainty\nof return on investment (ROI) for non-government shareholders.\nInitially, DPOR was 5-10%, then increased to 30% in 2020. This period of\nSOE reform is known as the second generation of SOE reform.<\/p>\n<p>Although the DPOR policy was applied, the government\u2019s share of\ndividends was still treated the same, i.e., not entering the national\nbudget. The government\u2019s share of SOE dividends was deposited into the\nState Capital<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/danantara-as-a-solution-1774414279",
        "image": ""
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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