Counter path to Aceh peace<\/p>\n
Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Sociologist, Civil Society Alliance
\nfor Democracy (Yappika), Jakarta<\/p>\n
In terms of length, the present armed conflict in Aceh which
\nstarted in 1976, is second only to the war the Acehnese waged
\nagainst the Dutch colonial rule (1873-1942). The armed conflict
\nin Aceh may also be considered as the Acehnese War Part II and
\nthe enemy is Indonesia.<\/p>\n
This armed conflict in Aceh has affected many parties, such as
\nforeign investors like ExxonMobil and other foreign companies
\nowning the shares of capital-intensive projects in Aceh or
\nstrategic industries.<\/p>\n
Peace-making has involved foreign non-governmental
\norganizations (NGOs) such as the Henry Dunant Center, which
\nincludes representatives of the United States, Britain,
\nYugoslavia and Thailand as its \"wise men\", and some other
\ninternational NGOs dealing with human rights and humanitarian
\naffairs.<\/p>\n
The reason for the involvement of so many parties is that the
\nprotracted armed conflict in Aceh has generated an adverse impact
\non both sides, as well as on neighboring countries (in the case
\nof internally displaced persons) and other countries which have
\ninvestment in the country.<\/p>\n
This armed conflict is an act not only to destroy those
\nparties relying on the strength of their weaponry, but also
\ncivilians and the markets, central to Aceh's economy. These last
\ntwo have often been made objects of structural and cultural
\nviolence of the warring parties and have even been made objects
\nof frustration when one party loses a battle.<\/p>\n
A war involving armed political entities should not involve
\nthe market and the civilians although it is the principle of a
\nwar to distinguish only friends or foes.<\/p>\n
Those involved in a war often encourage the market and
\ncivilians to form part of or to be opposed to the parties on the
\ngrounds of sacred integration and nationalism. Therefore, the
\ninvolvement and the destruction of a market and civilians in a
\nwar violates not only classical war ethics and religious values,
\nbut also the values of modern life which apply universally --
\nhuman rights.<\/p>\n
We can calculate roughly how much Indonesia has spent on
\nAceh's armed conflict, especially given that mobilization of
\ntroops in Aceh today is by far the number of soldiers ever
\ndeployed in Aceh's history of war. As many as 40,000 troops have
\nbeen mobilized from outside Aceh and if each needs Rp 17,500 for
\ntheir daily meal allowances, the Indonesian government must spend
\nup to Rp 700 million a day only for their meals. Certainly, more
\nmoney will be needed for the war zone of Papua and the other
\nconflict-ridden areas such as Maluku, Poso and Kalimantan.<\/p>\n
Some of the Indonesian soldiers reportedly receive funds from
\nExxonMobil channeled to them through the state oil company
\nPertamina. There are up to 150 military posts with at least 25
\nsoldiers stationed at each post. Roughly, therefore, there are at
\nleast 3,000 soldiers, whose lunch fees must be borne by the
\nforeign investors. The money spent on the side dishes totals Rp
\n52.5 million\/day or some Rp 19 billion a year. Then there are
\nsecurity charges that must be borne by major foreign industries
\nand estate companies, most of which are relatively found in
\nhinter Aceh.<\/p>\n
To buy bullets, Indonesia must fork out Rp 25 billion a day,
\nor Rp 8.5 trillion a year. Of course, this budget does not
\ninclude ammunition for heavy-duty guns such as armored vehicles,
\ntanks, bazookas, bombs, grenades and fire bullets that can
\nannihilate entire villages. This cost precludes armory,
\ntransportation means, communications, the construction of defense
\nfacilities, international campaigns and so forth.<\/p>\n
For the armed conflict in Aceh, the cost has exceeded the
\nstate's budget for the military of Rp 32 trillion. The problem is
\nwhere Indonesia can obtain legal funds to finance its war in
\nAceh.<\/p>\n
This amount of money is of course spent neither on development
\nnor on attempts to take Indonesia out of the acute economic
\ncrisis, nor efforts to improve and develop the market and the
\nliving quality of Indonesians. Instead, it has been spent on
\ncounterproductive destruction.<\/p>\n
Other costs arising from the armed conflict in Aceh can be
\ncalculated on the extent of the destruction sustained by the
\nmarket and the political and cultural systems. The destruction of
\nthe market includes the destruction of a production system,
\nmarketing network market facilities and the flight of investments
\nfrom Aceh and Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Therefore, an illegal economic system has found fertile ground
\nand has become uncontrollable. People's capital has also been
\ndamaged owing to massive stealing, extortion, robbery and looting
\n-- all developing fast in line with the war escalation and
\nintelligence operations conducted by the parties.<\/p>\n
As a result, the surviving political system is likewise devoid
\nof morality. Corruption in the form of bureaucratic rents, the
\nabuse of funds and the manipulation of funds through fictitious
\nprojects is a product of political collusion involving
\nbureaucrats, businessmen, legislators and the military.<\/p>\n
This collusion has gained intensity and frequency following
\nthe closure of the public space, where civilians or civilian
\ncommunity organizations can exercise control over their right of
\nsovereignty as citizens of a republic. War kills a system or the
\npotential and the chance to develop a system of democratic
\nstatehood. War will instead reinforce the establishment of a
\nmilitaristic, authoritarian and centralized political system.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/counter-path-to-aceh-peace-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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