Corruption has become a cultural indicator<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles on corruption by Ignas
\nKleden, a sociologist and director of The Go-East Institute
\nfocusing on East Indonesian affairs in Jakarta. He is also a
\nconsultant with the Indonesian Anti-Corruption Consultancy here.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): During Soeharto's administration critics were
\npunished if they offended social etiquette or national ideals.
\nTypical expressions usually hinted at their lack of knowledge of
\nlofty eastern values of politesse and finesse.<\/p>\n
Soeharto himself used to characterize his critics as those
\nconvinced of their abilities without being able to empathize with
\nothers. Anyone lacking these political aesthetics was liable to
\nbe accused of being subversive.<\/p>\n
This is easy to understand if one keeps in mind that in a
\nfeudalistic society only the nobility rules while the commoners
\nor the peasant-tenants work and produce.<\/p>\n
There was a relation between power and culture controlled by
\nthe nobility with the economy. Economy was identical with rural
\nagriculture, which became the peasants' responsibility. Trade was
\nsomething alien, unknown and unrecognized.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian word for trader is pedagang which originates
\nfrom the word dagang. In old Malay the word dagang means
\ntraveler, wanderer, foreigner, stranger or vagabond. This was the
\ncase because in a patron-client relationship, a typical feature
\nof feudalistic agricultural communities, there was no place for
\ntraders.<\/p>\n
The social status of traders was something alien inserted from
\noutside; it assumed only an interstitial nature in the
\nfeudalistic social structure. It was not celebrated or controlled
\nby local rituals. Market exchange in trading might have been
\nimportant but it was not in everyday consciousness as something
\nto be attended to or to be taken care of.<\/p>\n
In traditional communities what mattered was power from above
\nand submission from below. Economy was something taken for
\ngranted. The nobility took it for granted that they should have
\nmore than enough to eat, live in big houses and be served by
\ndozens of servants and maids.<\/p>\n
The commoners also took it for granted that they had to supply
\na part of their agricultural produce to their masters, to gain
\npolitical protection and cultural education in return. The market
\nwas very small and limited, engaged in by only people of unclear
\nsocial status. The nobility looked down upon trading as dirty
\nwork while peasants looked at this as something unfamiliar which
\nthey just had to tolerate.<\/p>\n
This agricultural-feudalistic legacy seems to be deeply
\nembedded in the consciousness and even subconsciousness of
\nIndonesians today, though they might have very little or nothing
\nto do with agricultural life.<\/p>\n
The status system still has its workings in that those who go
\nup the mobility ladder, feel and are treated as the new nobility
\nby having the old privileges.<\/p>\n
They do not feel subject to public control just as the
\nlandlords in the past did not feel accountable to their peasant-
\ntenants. In a feudalistic society, control, along with power and
\nculture, can only come from above and never from below.<\/p>\n
However, in the old times every member of the nobility had
\ntheir own commoners who were dependent upon them and to whom they
\nwere responsible. Needless to say, this responsibility was
\nentirely different from the modern notion of accountability.<\/p>\n
In those days \"responsibility\" implied only the attention
\nwhich should be given by a master to those who worked for him.
\nThis was done not on the basis of rights and obligations which
\nhad been agreed upon beforehand, but rather on the basis of whim
\nand favor on the one hand, as well as a sense of propriety on the
\nother.<\/p>\n
It was not a matter of justice but merely a matter of
\ngenerosity.<\/p>\n
There was also corruption because there was very little
\nawareness concerning the categorical difference between the
\npublic and the private. For centuries people used to
\ndifferentiate between one's own belonging and that of others, or
\nbetween the people's belonging and that of a king or the
\nnobility. Public awareness of public belongings was still limited
\nto natural assets such as land, forest, water and sea. The use of
\ncommunal land, for instance, is organized through a kinship
\nmechanism according to local traditional customs.<\/p>\n
However, there is a very weak and vague awareness of public
\nutilities among Indonesians. By definition all public utilities
\nbelong to the civil society as a mode of grouping, based not on
\nterritory and citizenship nor on membership in a traditional
\ncommunity -- but on civic rights and equal entitlement to legal
\nprotection.<\/p>\n
Whereas communal life within communities is organized
\naccording to cultural values and norms, life within the state is
\norganized according to power relations, and life within civil
\nsociety is organized according to the rule of law.<\/p>\n
The double role of the law is clear in that it is supposed to
\nbe able to translate various cultural value systems which are
\nparticular in nature into legal regulations which hold true for
\neverybody from all cultural groupings.<\/p>\n
The law is also expected to translate the ruling power of the
\nstate into the rule of law.<\/p>\n
In that case public utilities and public belongings are not
\nonly familiar to people used to cultural control and control by
\npower. Nobody in the traditional villages would dare cultivate a
\npiece of land without cultural approval of the communities. In
\nthe same vein, nobody in the cities would dare take water or
\nbricks from the residence of a mayor or local military commander.
\nHowever almost everybody will borrow a book from the village
\nlibrary without feeling obliged to return it on time. Also, no
\none will pay attention to a damaged public phone.<\/p>\n
As a test case for Jakarta: No press marketing management in
\nJakarta will dare sell newspapers in boxes on the streets or at
\nmarket places, believing that those who take the newspapers will
\nnot place their money in the box.<\/p>\n
This is so because the sale of newspapers is not seen as an
\naction subject to either cultural control or power, or political
\ncontrol. It is subject to social control or public control which
\nis unknown in most of traditional communities.<\/p>\n
Libraries and newspapers are only two examples of public
\nutilities. The most striking example is, of course, banking.
\nBanks are institutions which are not arranged according to
\ncultural norms and values, neither according to power nor
\npolitical relations.<\/p>\n
Those who take credit from a bank face no political or
\ncultural risks. They would only face legal risks, which becomes
\nthe sole control within civil society. However, as described
\nabove, the civil society and the public are unfamiliar to most of
\nthese risks.<\/p>\n
Accordingly, public utilities are equally alien because though
\nprivate banks have their owners, banks as such exemplify public
\nutilities which according to popular perception belongs to nobody
\nand can therefore be taken away by anybody.<\/p>\n
IBRA stands for a very obvious lack of responsibility of
\npeople who have taken credits from banks in Indonesia. It hints
\nat the fact that public funds represented by banks never arouses
\nthe feeling of obligation among those who take the loans to
\nreturn the money before their deadlines.<\/p>\n
In more general terms, legal control until now is less
\neffective than both political control by power and cultural
\ncontrol by norms and values.<\/p>\n
Corruption is a transgression of the law, not of power or
\nculture. In that sense, the struggle against corruption -- from a
\nlong-term perspective -- can only be effective if the awareness
\nof the existence and the significance of civil society is
\nstrengthened at the same time.<\/p>\n
If people are not aware of the existence of civil society as
\nmuch as they are aware of both communal communities and the
\nstate, then it is really difficult to push for law enforcement.<\/p>\n
Consequently, corruption as a legal matter will unwittingly be
\nentitled to a sort of impunity, because unlike cultural and
\npolitical consciousness, legal awareness is still lacking.
\nTransgressions of the law becomes unimportant or even
\nnonexistent.<\/p>\n
This does not mean that serious action cannot be taken to end
\ncorruption until the awareness of the civil society becomes
\nsufficiently developed.<\/p>\n
One can confidently say in a dialectical way that taking
\nserious action against corruption by making it a subject of
\npunishment (according to the due process of law) will help
\nstrengthen the awareness of both civil society as a public domain
\nand the law as its most important representation.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/corruption-has-become-a-cultural-indicator-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}