Corruption, a cultural indicator<\/p>\n
This is the first of two articles on corruption by Ignas
\nKleden, a sociologist and the director of the Go-East Institute
\nin Jakarta, which focuses on East Indonesian affairs. He is also
\na consultant with the Indonesian Anti-Corruption Watch.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia is one of the most corrupt countries
\nin the world. On the Transparency International Corruption
\nPerception Index, Indonesia ranks the 96th least transparent out
\nof 98 countries. Local newspapers and magazines report about
\ncorruption cases that caused state losses in billions and
\ntrillions of rupiah; smaller amounts of money are no longer
\nnewsworthy. Besides, only a few people in the cases are sent to
\njail anyway.<\/p>\n
The country's first vice president, the late Mohammad Hatta,
\namong the country's most respected statesman, coined the local
\nterm for the culture of corruption: budaya korupsi.<\/p>\n
Taken seriously, the term includes corrupted social behavior
\nand corrupted cultural norms that have become the general
\nguideline for public behavior. This is maybe why some people have
\nsuggested that corruption be legalized since it seemed very
\nunlikely to be eliminated.<\/p>\n
By making it legal, so the argument goes, we could manage it
\npublicly and openly. As an illegal action, corruption will remain
\nunderground so that only those familiar with the underworld will
\nbecome its beneficiaries. Making it legal and public would
\nprovide the opportunity to organize a more equal distribution of
\ncorruption.<\/p>\n
If this were the case, Indonesia would be the first country in
\nwhich people could live legally from theft. There would be no
\nproperty rights, no public property and the rule of law would
\nvery soon be replaced by the rule of the jungle.<\/p>\n
Then only the strong could eat their fill, while the weak
\nwould only be able to satisfy their hunger with the table scraps.<\/p>\n
Academic anthropology has a similar concept -- the culture of
\npoverty. This notion refers to a situation where the habits of
\nthe very poor remain in place even when these people have become
\nmuch better off. Their observance of time, for example, which
\ntraditionally was very loose and undisciplined, will not be
\ntransformed into strict punctuality even if they are now working
\nin big offices. Also, they will remain as unorganized as they
\nwere before, even if they have risen to a position of power over
\nother people.<\/p>\n
In the same vein, Indonesians initially became involved in the
\npractice of corruption because their income was still not
\nsufficient to cover their everyday expenses. However, this habit
\nseems to remain even after one is earning much more money as the
\nmiddle-manager of a private company or a high-ranking government
\nofficial.<\/p>\n
At that stage corruption is not only something to meet basic
\nneeds, but becomes a mental thing in that it plays into the
\nvalue-orientation and system of belief of a group of people.<\/p>\n
Perhaps it is an exaggeration to speak of the culture of
\ncorruption in Indonesia. It sounds too pessimistic and offers no
\nhope of overcoming it. However, there is no doubt that its long-
\nestablished and ever widening practices hint at some cultural
\nattitudes, indeed, some basic underlying assumptions which make
\npeople inclined to think, not in the right way, but rather in a
\ndistorted way.<\/p>\n
First, corruption seems to be tolerable because people are
\nmore interested in what one has achieved materially than in
\nquestioning the process which led to that condition.<\/p>\n
That somebody now has two luxury cars and two big houses in
\nvery expensive locations in Jakarta is what matters for most
\npeople. Only few would question as to how a government employee
\nofficially earning less than Rp 3 million per month could afford
\nto have two houses worth Rp 2 billion and two luxury cars worth
\nat least Rp 1 billion.<\/p>\n
With regard to government officials, corruption becomes all
\nthe less questionable because in feudalistic thinking, still
\nprevalent in the minds of many, the social status of the powers-
\nthat-be is expected to bring about material wealth as a natural
\nconcomitant.<\/p>\n
Material wealth is not something one achieves through economic
\nstruggle, but is rather supposed to result from social status.<\/p>\n
This belief often reaches the extent that those within the
\nbureaucracy trying to live honestly within their means have been
\nseen as unsuccessful or even foolish.<\/p>\n
This cultural attitude is still more discernible in the
\ncomparison between economic and political crime. Politicians and
\nthe powers-that-be here are more sensitive to political
\ncorrectness than to economic accountability.<\/p>\n
Someone who supposedly insults the president or a high-ranking
\ngovernment official is easily brought to court, and is very
\nlikely to arouse violent reactions from the followers of the one
\ninsulted.<\/p>\n
In contrast, those who do injustice to the people and inflict
\nsevere financial losses to the state are easily protected by the
\n\"presumption of innocence\". People who take public funds either
\nby means of bribery or by means of political compulsion are not
\nsubject to any political or legal deterrence.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency has become a symbol
\nof the softness of the Indonesian state as Gunnar Myrdal, in his
\nAsian Drama, would have it.<\/p>\n
One of the main features which distinguishes a \"soft state\"
\nfrom a \"hard state\" in Myrdal's terms is the level of
\ndetermination to remain disciplined and follow the rules of the
\ngame, as earlier agreed upon, and the persistence to strive for
\neconomic goals by means of getting involved in economic
\ncompetition.<\/p>\n
Economy as such is seen as an important pillar of social
\ndevelopment and political sustainability, so much so that
\ntransgressions against the workings of economic policy and its
\nimplementation will be treated as serious offenses which deserve
\nserious punishment.<\/p>\n
Corruption would be treated as criminal offense, or as
\ndangerous as subversion. In a sense this is true, since such
\ncorrupt practices as bribery, mark-ups, non-performing loans and
\nviolations of a bank's legal lending limit undermine the workings
\nof the nation's economy.<\/p>\n
The results of this economic subversion are discernible in a
\nhigh-cost economy, the nonsolvency of banks, the increasing price
\nof goods and import failures, which finally result in increasing
\nunemployment and widening impoverishment.<\/p>\n
In a \"soft state\", political power and social status seem to
\nbe more important than the economy, and there is no
\ncorrespondence between national ideals and the reality of
\ndevelopment.<\/p>",
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