Cooperation needed to overcome disasters<\/p>\n
Bantarto Bandoro, Jakarta<\/p>\n
o one wishes for a disaster. But when disaster strikes,
\nattempts should be made to extract as many positives as possible
\nfrom the event. The global response to the Indian Ocean tsunami,
\nfor example, prompted the region and the world to consider its
\nimplications for regional and global relations. The idea that
\nASEAN should have its own regional center for humanitarian
\nassistance (The Jakarta Post, Oct. 27) should be seen against
\nsuch a background. It is a clear reflection of the need for a
\nmuch more permanent and effective mechanism to manage disasters.<\/p>\n
The center would hopefully not only improve the capacity of
\nASEAN members countries to provide quick-response humanitarian
\nassistance in case of natural disaster, but also change their
\nmind-set as to how they should manage their relations,
\nparticularly when faced with disaster.<\/p>\n
Natural disasters present an unusual laboratory for the study
\nof change and the process of change, particularly in state
\nrelations.<\/p>\n
The world has seen several countries hit by natural disasters
\nover the last several years: the Gujarat earthquake (2001), the
\nearthquake in the southern Iranian city of Bam (2003), the Indian
\nOcean tsunami (2004) and the recent devastating earthquake in
\nSouth Asia. The disasters injured and killed people and damaged
\nproperty. But the disasters also created opportunities to
\nfacilitate better cooperation and relations, particularly among
\nstates in conflict, by fostering linkages that otherwise might
\nnot have existed.<\/p>\n
The cooperative spirit generated from the common effort to
\ndeal with disasters possibly overrides preexisting prejudices,
\nbreaking down barriers that otherwise might never have been
\nbroken down. Pakistan and India can be seen in such a situation.
\nThe 7.6-magnitude quake that devastated Pakistani-controlled
\nKashmir led India to offer food and medical supplies. India and
\nPakistan later reportedly signed an agreement to open their
\nborder to allow relief to pass through unimpeded (The Jakarta
\nPost, Oct. 31).<\/p>\n
The devastating human impact of the tsunami is assumed to have
\ntransformed quite significantly the relationship between the Free
\nAceh Movement (GAM) and the central government of Indonesia. The
\nsigning of an agreement between GAM and the government might have
\nbeen dictated by the fact that both parties wished to lessen, if
\nnot eliminate, the burden on the Acehnese particularly after they
\nwere hit by the tsunami. GAM and the government both made the
\nsafety of the people, as well as the stability of Aceh itself,
\ntheir core values.<\/p>\n
Regarding Pakistan and India, we see that changes at the
\nhighest level of bilateral or regional relations were caused by a
\ndevastating earthquake. The disaster has, at least and for the
\ntime being, changed the public perception that India and Pakistan
\nare enemies. As a result of this process and for the longer term,
\nthe conflict between India and Pakistan will gradually,
\nhopefully, be superseded by cooperative structures and
\nmechanisms. Concerns over the human impact of the disaster was
\nthe prime motive for this change.<\/p>\n
The earthquake served as a catalyst for bringing the two
\nneighbors closer. One would then believe the earthquake was a
\ncatalyst, not a creator, of diplomacy. Meaning that it could
\nyield a significant transformation in the relations between India
\nand Pakistan<\/p>\n
The complex relationship between political and natural
\nprocesses is actually linked to South Asian political and
\nregional stability. The whole idea is that earthquake diplomacy
\ncould open up a new era in India-Pakistan relations, one that
\nwill lead to the elimination of sources of vulnerability. But
\nthis new era could come to an end if the feeling grows on the
\nside of India, for example, that whatever it does Pakistan does
\nnot respond by taking some form of action but instead demands
\nmore. Such scenarios would lead to a false assumption that
\ndiplomatic efforts should be casually linked with the occurrence
\nof disasters.<\/p>\n
The point here is that there is a high degrees of complexity
\nin an actual disaster, as is the case of South Asia, which is
\noften presented as only a process of transition that changes
\nrelations among states. This does not guarantee disaster will
\nopen an opportunity to increase cooperation among rival states,
\nlet alone perpetuate this cooperation. Instead, disaster may have
\na multiplying and legitimizing effect in diplomatic
\nrapprochement.<\/p>\n
On the ASEAN regional disaster center issue, one would think
\nthat it would be the best way to achieve the goals of ASEAN
\ncooperation in the event of disaster, provided that ASEAN
\ninvolves other non-formal institutions in such a project and
\nimplements the plans effectively. So this will be a joint
\nundertaking between the members states of ASEAN and their
\npeoples. Cooperation between different types of institutions
\nwithin ASEAN members countries is healthy in general and can have
\nparticular benefits for regional disaster preparedness.<\/p>\n
Cooperation based on geographic proximity is probably the most
\ncommon form of cooperation. This is why the idea for a disaster
\ncenter came up, one that reflects a systematic attempt by ASEAN
\nto face future natural disasters. This in turn would result in
\nmore intensive diplomatic activities among the members of ASEAN
\nin the field of disaster management.<\/p>\n
But ASEAN must remember that cooperation can be very time-
\nconsuming, given the fact that ASEAN does not have extensive
\nexperience in disaster management. It is important therefore that
\ncooperation not be attempted when the difficulties outweigh the
\nbenefits. ASEAN must also keep in mind that it is more important
\nto have a simple plan in place, at least at the outset, than to
\nhave the perfect plan ready. If necessary, implement a simple
\nplan while working on a more elaborate one.<\/p>\n
So, what has changed as a result of disaster, is ASEAN's view
\nof the complexity of disaster itself as well as its response to
\nthe impacts of a disaster on ASEAN communities. The realization
\nof a regional disaster center would mean a significant change at
\nthe level of scientific understanding of shared risk by ASEAN.<\/p>\n
Thus, shared risk leads to shared responsibility among all
\nmembers of ASEAN exposed to the threat of disaster. An ASEAN
\ndisaster center is not a bad idea at all. Disasters provide
\nconditions and processes that promote constructive change in
\nrelations among nations during and after the events.<\/p>\n
The writer is director of Scientific Infrastructure and
\nPublication; chief editor of The Indonesian Quarterly, Centre for
\nStrategic and International Studies, Jakarta, and a lecturer in
\nthe International Relations Postgraduate Studies Program at the
\nSchool of Social and Political Sciences, the University of
\nIndonesia. He can be reached at bandoro@csis.or.id.<\/p>",
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