Contemplating a military coup<\/p>\n
Kusnanto Anggoro
\nSenior Researcher
\nCentre for Strategic and
\nInternational Studies (CSIS)
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
Historian Andrew Janos wrote in 1964 that a military coup in
\nthe United States "would be too fantastic to contemplate, not
\nonly because few would actually entertain the idea, but also
\nbecause the bulk of the people are strongly attached to the
\nprevailing (democratic) political system" (The Seizure of Power:
\nA Study of Force and Popular Consent, Research Monograph No. 16,
\nCenter for International Studies, Princeton University, 1964, p.
\n39).<\/p>\n
According to Janos, a coup against an elected democratic
\ngovernment could only occur if political apathy prevailed as the
\ndominant feature in society.<\/p>\n
Three decades later, Charles J. Dunlap Jr., then a lieutenant
\ncolonel and Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Central Command, at
\nMacDill AFB, Florida, envisaged an American military coup in
\n2012. (The Origins of the American Military Coup 2012, Parameter,
\nWinter 1992-1993: pp. 2-20). The main ingredient behind the
\ncoup, according to Dunlap, was widespread exasperation with
\ndemocracy.<\/p>\n
Such contrasting views deserve special attention. Janos was a
\ncivilian, who believed in participatory politics. On the other
\nhand, Dunlap was a military officer concerned more with effective
\ngovernment. To him, a military coup was possible if people became
\ndisillusioned at the apparent inability of elected government to
\nsolve the nation's dilemmas.<\/p>\n
Arguably, the post-2004 election will lead to such an
\nenvironment. Indonesia's societal malaise was readily apparent in
\n2003.<\/p>\n
According to a poll earlier this year, 78 percent of
\nIndonesians believed the country was on the "wrong track." One
\nresearcher declared that social indicators were at their lowest
\nlevel in 20 years. The country suffered from a "deep pessimism
\nabout politicians and government after years of broken promises."<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, TNI's political faction in the People's
\nConsultative Assembly (MPR) abstained from two votes leading up
\nto the special legislative session in 2001. Generals refused to
\nuphold President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid's emergency decree,
\ndesigned to keep him in power. Still, in Maluku and Aceh military
\noperations succeeded in reducing the brutality that often
\ncharacterizes territorial military action.<\/p>\n
With such "political neutrality and professional" conduct,
\nJanos' and Dunlap's theses appeared to be mutually reinforcing.<\/p>\n
People began to dream of a return of the Soeharto legacy. As
\npeople are looking for someone or something that could produce
\nworkable answers to the nation's crises, the military appears to
\nhave been successful in restoring a considerable degree of public
\nconfidence. Of course, political oxygen as such may be
\ninsufficient for a military coup.<\/p>\n
Nonetheless, another oxygen prevails, i.e. a praetorian guard
\nmentality in the military. Both the ouster of Gus Dur (2001) and
\ndiscussion on Article 19 of the draft of the Armed Forces bill
\n(2003) indicate some important points. Disobeying Gus Dur,
\nconstitutionally the supreme commander of the military, was not,
\naccording to the military, an act of insubordination. With a
\nstrong belief that "loyalty to the government must be in line
\nwith that to the people," the move against him was justified
\nbecause the president was engaging in a political struggle with
\nhis legislature, also political institutions.<\/p>\n
While the fall of Gus Dur showed that the military can
\ncontinue to influence events, debate on Article 19 of the draft
\nof the Armed Forces bill may illuminate another military
\nfixation.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the article, under which the Armed Forces chief is
\nrequired only to inform the president 24 hours after deploying
\ntroops when he determines the well-being of the state is at risk,
\nwas not an indication that army conservatives were preparing a
\ncontingency measure in anticipation of anything going wrong in
\nthe 2004 election.<\/p>\n
In fact, argument used in the discussions related to more
\npractical issues, for instance intercepting intruding foreign
\naircraft into Indonesian's territory or uncontrollable communal
\nconflict in remote areas. Changes of personnel in the drafting
\ncommittee of the bill were not necessarily predestined to the
\nreturn of Army conservatives, though some of them brought
\northodoxies.<\/p>\n
Nonetheless, the article did not fall from the sky. The whole
\ndiscussion about the military has regressed to the patterns that
\nexisted before Soeharto's fall from power. Since mid-2001 senior
\nofficers have been genuinely concerned about the civilian
\npolitical leadership, about the involvement of party leaders in
\nmoney politics and especially, about their perception that
\npoliticians show more concern for rebel casualties in places like
\nAceh than the casualties of their own army.<\/p>\n
Military coups have been seen somewhat less frequently since
\nthe mid-1980s. The failure of military regimes in Latin America
\nto resolve the economic and political problems appeared to have
\nmade the military much more reluctant to intervene in politics.
\nIn contrast to past crises, the armed forces sat on the sidelines
\nthrough economic crises such as the Asian crisis in Thailand in
\n1998 or the Argentinean crisis of 2002.<\/p>\n
Failed transition to democracy, either in the form of
\nineffective government, the shortsighted interest of civilian
\nelites or mounting corruption, could invite military
\nintervention, although this should not necessarily end up with a
\nmilitary regime.<\/p>\n
In Pakistan (1999), Pervez Musharraf moved in with the promise
\nof fighting corruption. In Cote d'Ivoire and the Central American
\nRepublic (2002) the military serves as an arbiter between
\ncivilian leaders.<\/p>\n
Democracy is a fragile institution that must be continuously
\nnurtured and scrupulously protected. The old credo that the
\nmilitary is the guardian of the state is taking on special
\nmeaning for the Indonesian Armed Forces, amidst a prevailing
\nstrong ideological fixation and an ingrained, self-defined,
\nquasi-religious mission of protecting the state.<\/p>\n
At present, few generals envisage such a coup. The political
\nrole of the military will not end in 2004. I was somewhat nervous
\nwhen an active general told me, "despite being no longer in the
\nlegislature, the military will use the authority with which it is
\nvested to take part in safeguarding and controlling the reform
\nmovement."<\/p>\n
By definition, a military coup is simply the use of the threat
\nof military force to remove a particularly unpopular leader; the
\nmilitary may not directly assume power. This occurred twice in
\nthe Philippines in 2003. Let us hope that the 2004 elections do
\nnot fail to establish an effective government, and thereby
\nfurther deepen political apathy.<\/p>\n
Kusnanto Anggoro is a lecturer, postgraduate studies program
\nUniversity of Indonesia, Jakarta.<\/p>",
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