Consolidation of democracy: Anticipating 2004<\/p>\n
Smita Notosusanto
\nCetro<\/p>\n
Next year, is the fifth anniversary of the end of the Soeharto
\nregime which marked Indonesia's transition from authoritarianism
\nto democracy. Indonesia was hailed as the newest addition to the
\nlong-list of \"third wave\" democracies already in progress since
\n1974. Many of these nascent democracies are now showing signs of
\nreverting to authoritarianism.<\/p>\n
These reversals are in part caused by the continuing economic
\ncrisis that had triggered the political transition in the first
\nplace and the inability of the new democratic government to
\ndeliver both the economic and political goods anticipated by
\ntheir citizens.<\/p>\n
The most important reason underlying the reversal is the
\nfailure of states in transition to firmly establish the
\ndemocratic rules of the game in the form of constitutional
\nmeasures and other institutional provisions to uphold the new
\ndemocratic state. As a result in many of these countries a
\ntug-of-war between pro-democracy forces and the remaining status
\nquo forces or authoritarian incumbent continues.<\/p>\n
Like other third wave democracies, Indonesia is especially
\nvulnerable to reversal because the events of 1998 did not provide
\nan opening for pro-democracy forces to dictate and dominate the
\ndemocratic agenda.<\/p>\n
Despite his resignation from power, Soeharto's legacy of
\nauthoritarian structures or enclaves remains. The failure of pro-
\ndemocracy forces to design democratic rules of the game in a new
\nconstitution resulted in a prolonged and destabilizing power
\nstruggle at the highest levels of government which had the ripple
\neffect all the way down to the regions. In many countries
\nundergoing severe political transitions, drafting a new
\ndemocratic constitution becomes a priority even before an
\nelection takes place.<\/p>\n
The new constitution has to delineate the salient features of
\nthe new democratic state, making democracy the only game in town;
\nhighlighting protection of civil and political rights, rule of
\nthe law, supremacy of civilian government over military forces
\nand accountability of state institutions and officials. In the
\nabsence of clear and accepted democratic rules of the game,
\ncompeting political forces will play their own game, establish
\nrules or interpret existing regulations according to their own
\nfactional interests.<\/p>\n
Transitional governments, usually face the multiple battles of
\npreventing authoritarian incursions, running an effective
\ngovernment while struggling to provide economic goods. This was
\nthe predicament surrounding the government of President
\nAbdurrahman Wahid and is now faced by the government of
\nPresident Megawati Soekarnoputri.<\/p>\n
Indicators of a systematic reversal toward authoritarianism
\nare already apparent in the emphasis on security and the heavy-
\nhanded approach in handling conflicts in the regions. Also in the
\ncontinued tolerance toward impunity for perpetrators of past
\nhuman rights abuses as well as corruptors within the highest
\nlevels of state institutions. Increasing trends toward
\nmilitarism, illustrated in the rise of civilian militia groups
\neven within political parties, add a violent character to the
\nalready chaotic political process. There is also a faint but
\nsignificant trend toward clamping down on dissent as demonstrated
\nin the trial of youths accused of destroying the pictures of the
\nPresident during a pro-democracy rally. The recent cancellation
\nby stated-owned television TVRI of the broadcasting of the play
\nAlia -- about the plight of a young Acehnese girl at the height
\nof the military operations zone in Aceh reportedly at the behest
\nof the armed forces is another measure that can only be
\nassociated with the New Order regime.<\/p>\n
Despite the fact that the 1999 election was hailed as the
\nfreest elections since 1955, the public is now disillusioned with
\nthe result.<\/p>\n
Elected legislators tend to have very low public
\naccountability and lack commitment to public interests.<\/p>\n
Corruption and money politics are rampant in almost all
\nlegislatures at all levels, especially in relation to elections
\nof local public officials.<\/p>\n
Finally, the productivity of the legislature is very low,
\nillustrated by the backlog of bills and failure of the
\nlegislature to propose bills, therefore allowing a more dominant
\nrole for the executive branch to dictate the agenda in proposing
\nmost bills. Even when legislations were passed, many of these
\nlegislations did not go through a rigorous public consultation
\nprocess, and worse, legislations were often passed when most of
\nthe legislators were absent.<\/p>\n
Fortunately, there were significant victories in the battle to
\nkeep the democratization process on track. Most important is the
\nfreedom of the press that has provided an important support to
\nour nascent democracy.<\/p>\n
Another achievement is the constitutional amendment to allow
\ndirect presidential elections and creation of a second house in
\nthe legislature to represent provincial representatives
\nconsisting of non-party members.<\/p>\n
It was also a momentous victory when the People's Consultative
\nAssembly (MPR) decided to abolish the reserved seats for military
\nrepresentatives -- eliminating one of the last remnants of
\nauthoritarian enclave in the Assembly.<\/p>\n
Indeed, these attainments can be regarded as important
\ndemocratic enclaves that will serve as important foundations for
\nthe consolidation of democracy.<\/p>\n
To further ensure consolidation, it is important for pro-
\ndemocracy forces to carefully safeguard the preparations for the
\n2004 elections. In newly established democracies, the second
\nelection usually becomes the \"make it or break it\" indicator of
\nthe democratization process.<\/p>\n
This means that the legal underpinnings of the 2004 elections
\nneed to be scrutinized in order to prevent reversals and to
\nstrengthen consolidation of democracy. The most important agenda
\nin a country undergoing a difficult transition such as Indonesia
\nis to prevent the status quo or authoritarian incumbent from
\ndominating the elections.<\/p>\n
The law has to establish a level playing field for all
\nparticipants, allowing more political space to alternative voices
\nor those marginalized groups previously spurned by the
\nauthoritarian regime. Therefore, provisions in the political
\nparty and electoral laws have to ensure this level playing field
\nfor all participants. Consequently, choosing an election system,
\nbecomes a crucial point. While the proportional system (PR) has
\nits weaknesses, it is still the only system that would allow non-
\nstatus quo or alternative voices to participate in the political
\nprocess. A first-past-the-post, single member district, better
\nknown as the district system, would only allow two or at the most
\nthree of the biggest and most established political parties to
\ndominate the legislature. While this is perhaps a normal
\nphenomenon in more established democracies, it is more
\nthreatening to fragile democracies especially those with existing
\nauthoritarian structures and players.<\/p>\n
Apprehension about the number of participating political
\nparties should not be a justification to adopt provisions that
\nwould limit participation of alternative, new, and less-
\nestablished parties. The problem facing Indonesia is less the
\nquantity of political parties than the quality and accountability
\nof political parties. This can be addressed by promoting stricter
\nconditions for internal party democracy, financial accountability
\nand provisions to allow the creation of local political parties
\nthat will only be allowed to contest elections at the provincial
\nor district legislature level. The 1999 general elections also
\ndemonstrated that the numbers of parties did not really affect
\nthe ability of voters to choose the political party of their
\nchoice.<\/p>\n
Second, to strengthen public accountability of elected
\nlegislators, the electoral system should also allow voters to
\ncast their votes for candidates instead of political parties. The
\nopen-list proportional system (PR) allows this.<\/p>\n
As opposed to the current closed PR system which only allows
\nparty symbols to appear on the ballot paper, the open-list PR
\nwill have both the symbols of participating political parties,
\nand the names of candidates nominated by each participating
\npolitical party. Thus voters can cast their votes for individual
\ncandidates as well as the party of their choice.<\/p>\n
The open-PR system will also reduce the dominance of a central
\nparty committee in determining the candidates or switching
\ncandidates across districts as frequently happened in 1999.<\/p>\n
A vital point is also the issue of the independence of the
\nelectoral commission. The government proposed that the electoral
\ncommission be put under the authority of the home ministry, which
\nwill seriously weaken its independence. If this happens, then,
\nwe can expect more intervention by the government in elections
\nthrough election officials which will reduce the integrity of the
\nelections. An independent and non-partisan Elections Commission
\nhas to be maintained so that the level playing field among
\nparticipants of the elections can be established.<\/p>\n
Fourth, the new electoral law will have to adopt the creation
\nof an effective enforcement of electoral regulations to ensure
\nthat violators of both the political party and electoral laws
\nwill be brought to justice. This is certainly one of the weakest
\npoints of the 1999 general elections since not a single violator
\nof the electoral laws during the 1999 general elections, notably
\nin the use of campaign financing, have been brought to justice.
\nThe creation of an ad-hoc elections court would provide an
\nefficient and speedy processing of election violations. Closely
\nrelated to this is the fifth agenda of delineating detailed and
\nstrict campaign finance regulations to encourage political
\nparties to be more accountable about their campaign fund-raising
\nand spending. Strict campaign finance regulations are also needed
\nto prevent parties from misusing public funds or public
\nfacilities to benefit their party or their candidates. Campaign
\nfinance regulations are also needed, again to ensure a level-
\nplaying field between established parties and new, smaller
\nparties.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the course of deliberations within the
\nlegislature on the above agenda is discouraging. The Indonesian
\nDemocratic Party of Struggle (PDI-Perjuangan) has thrown its
\nsupport behind maintaining a closed-PR system, therefore ensuring
\ndominance of a central party committee and denying voters the
\nability to cast their votes for individual candidates instead of
\nparties. Also, both PDI-Perjuangan and Golkar are conspiring to
\nlimit the participation of medium and smaller parties to
\nparticipate in the Presidential elections by maintaining a
\ncondition that only the first three winners of the legislative
\nelections can contest, therefore ensuring only the three biggest
\nparties to join the presidential elections. Political factions in
\nthe legislature have spoken out against rigid campaign financing
\nregulations, even objecting to the proposal to impose a ceiling
\nfor campaign contributions.<\/p>\n
More worrying is the fact that in the already passed Political
\nParty Law, the government is granted the authority to control
\npolitical parties, to ensure that political parties do not
\nviolate provisions prohibiting activities against the
\nConstitution, against the integrity and unity of the Republic of
\nIndonesia, and against governmental policies in the establishment
\nof diplomatic relations and initiatives with friendly nations.<\/p>\n
This would put a limit on the freedom of political parties to
\nbe critical or oppose the government, or the ruling political
\nparty in government. Again, this provision may strengthen the
\ntrend toward authoritarianism.<\/p>\n
Against this background, as we end the tumultuous year of
\n2002, it is imperative that all pro-democracy forces pay close
\nattention to the current deliberation of the electoral law and
\nthe accompanying presidential electoral law which will continue
\nto take place in early 2003. After that, the whole country will
\nhave to go through a hectic schedule of preparations for both the
\nlegislative and presidential elections in 2004. It is therefore,
\nup to all of us to ensure that the elections in 2004 provide a
\nstrong foundation for consolidation of democracy in Indonesia.<\/p>",
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