Consequences of East Timor ballot<\/p>\n
After East Timorese overwhelmingly voted against integration
\nwith Indonesia, Tjipta Lesmana, a social studies and politics
\nlecturer at the University of Indonesia, examines the
\nconsequences of their choice. This article was prepared before
\nthe introduction of martial law in East Timor beginning early
\nTuesday.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): A new full-scale civil war in East Timor is
\napparently imminent if the Indonesian Military (TNI) fails to
\nstem violence launched by pro-integration militias, following the
\nannouncement of the Aug. 30 ballot results.<\/p>\n
The vote was, as expected, strongly won by proindependence
\nsupporters (78.5 percent, versus 21.5 percent in favor of
\nautonomy). Violence erupted the day after the referendum.
\nProintegration militias blocked the airport and detained for
\nseveral hours scores of United Nations Mission in East Timor
\n(UNAMET) personnel en route to Dili.<\/p>\n
On Sept. 1, they rampaged through a neighborhood around UNAMET
\nheadquarters, shooting, burning houses and sending hundreds of
\npanicked residents into the UN complex. Ian Martin, the UNAMET
\nchief, failed to conceal his deep resentment of Indonesian
\npolice, so his calls for assistance were not answered promptly.
\nThe latest unpredicted development has led the UN Security
\nCouncil to hold an urgent meeting.<\/p>\n
The Habibie administration has be trapped into worldwide
\ncondemnation. Australia, New Zealand and Canada called on the
\nSecurity Council to immediately send peacekeeping forces to East
\nTimor.<\/p>\n
The scenes of violence, as a matter of fact, indicated that
\nthe prointegration groups thought they would lose the ballot.
\nEveryone seems to be reminded of a slogan vigorously launched by
\nantiindependence leaders during the referendum campaign,
\n\"Integration or War!\". Tito Baptista, chairman of the United
\nFront for East Timor Autonomy, warned, \"If we lose with 40
\npercent, it is enough to fight 100 years more.\" The warning was
\nthe clearest indication of imminent bloodshed if East Timor lost
\nits autonomy status within Indonesia's jurisdiction.<\/p>\n
The likelihood of a renewal of civil war was, indeed, echoed
\nby Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in February. Citing definite
\nconsequences of bloodshed, at the time the Habibie administration
\ncategorically rejected the idea of holding a referendum in East
\nTimor. But Alatas failed to convince the UN Secretary-General
\nKofi Annan of his theory. And in New York, Annan preferred
\nPortugal's argument that a referendum was the best and fairest
\nalternative to solve East Timor's problem. One man, one vote, a
\nUS$53 million project funded and organized by the UN, finally
\nturned into a fact.<\/p>\n
Now that the result of the ballot has been unveiled, the
\nHabibie administration, not the least TNI, should have been ready
\nto accept a bitter situation in East Timor. East Timor is bound
\nto be scrapped from the Indonesian map. Wasn't it Habibie himself
\nwho arrogantly proclaimed to the world that \"If East Timorese
\nwant to depart, go ahead\"? Habibie even set a deadline of Jan. 1,
\n2000 for its separation. Describing the land as consisting of
\nnothing but rocks, he described the Indonesian government's
\ndecision in 1976 to accept East Timor's integration as being on
\nhumanitarian grounds.<\/p>\n
The land was so poor, Habibie further said, 93 percent of
\nTimor's development budget was funded by the central government.
\nEast Timor brings only a heavy burden to all Indonesians, instead
\nof gold.<\/p>\n
This is only one side of the Habibie administration's stance
\non East Timor hailed by the world community. But the other side,
\nrepresented by TNI, is a bleak one. TNI is indeed very upset with
\nHabibie's unpredicted policy on East Timor.<\/p>\n
Officially, TNI Commander Gen. Wiranto has to support the
\ngovernment policy. Covertly, however, the military sabotages it
\nby training pro-Indonesia militias and supplying them with
\nmilitary equipment.<\/p>\n
Under any circumstances, they would resist the land being
\nfreed. Violence has intensified since the government announced
\nthe choice between wide-ranging autonomy and independence to
\nTimorese. An estimated 500 people have died during the past five
\nmonths alone. Prointegration militiamen would not fight so
\npassionately without getting strong backing from the Indonesian
\nmilitary. This is understandable if one realizes that tens of
\nthousands of TNI soldiers died since Indonesia took over East
\nTimor.<\/p>\n
Using violence and intimidation to undermine the independence-
\nminded population, they hoped the poll would have a low response,
\nand then would challenge its legitimacy.<\/p>\n
But the tactics were a total failure. The poll turnover was
\nsurprisingly high: 98.5 percent of registered voters cast their
\nballots. Now that the referendum has been conducted successfully,
\nthe military had no other way except to launch violence anew,
\ncontrary to their previous pledge to accept whatever the poll
\nresult is.<\/p>\n
President Habibie has pledged his administration's commitment
\nto cooperate with Portugal in implementing the second phase of
\nthe referendum, i.e., toward the setting up of a transitional
\ngovernment in East Timor.<\/p>\n
In his national speech shortly after the announcement of the
\npoll results, Habibie also instructed TNI and the National Police
\nto secure peace and order, taking stern action with all parties
\nintending to obstruct the further reconciliation process.<\/p>\n
As stipulated in the May 5 New York agreement, the Indonesian
\nsecurity apparatus has the responsibility to safeguard voting
\nprocedures up to the establishment of the transitional
\nadministration in East Timor. Failure to adhere to this
\ncommitment is tantamount to international intervention. And the
\npossibility of military intervention from the world community has
\nbeen echoed by several UN members.<\/p>\n
There is a strong possibility that East Timor will turn into
\n\"Southeast Asia's Kosovo\" if the UN agrees to dispatch
\npeacekeeping forces. One of the arguments used by the North
\nAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to send troops to Kosovo was
\nto protect ethnic Albanian lives from systematic evacuation by
\nSerbs. The same argument could probably be used in the case of
\nEast Timor: International troops are needed to protect
\nproindependence people and UN personnel from attacks, because the
\nIndonesian police have failed to exercise their duty.<\/p>\n
The loss of East Timor and the presence of multinational
\ntroops there would put Habibie in an awkward position in the
\ncoming General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly
\n(MPR). Outcries of nationalistic sentiment would overrun the
\nwhole Assembly.<\/p>\n
Believe it or not, he has absolutely no chance whatsoever to
\nbe elected as the country's president. His failures to bring
\nformer president Soeharto to court and to uncover the Bank Bali
\nscandal, indeed, have inflicted a very high cost on his political
\nfuture.<\/p>\n
All of this messy drama could be attributed to Habibie's
\nimpulsive leadership style. It began with his blundering
\nstatement on Jan. 26 that East Timorese could have their
\nindependence if the option of wide-ranging autonomy offered by
\nthe government was rejected. A blunder because the MPR, the
\nhighest state body in the country, was made to accept a fait-
\naccompli. Habibie was apparently not aware of MPR Act No.
\nVI\/MPR\/1978, which named East Timor as an integral part of the
\nRepublic of Indonesia. He made the announcement to the world
\ncommunity without prior consent from the MPR.<\/p>\n
\"If autonomy was rejected,\" said Foreign Minister Ali Alatas
\nin February, \"we will hand in the East Timor problem to the MPR.\"<\/p>\n
Alatas might have mistakenly thought that the MPR was
\nsubordinate to the President, not the other way around. Yes, both
\nthe President and the foreign minister forced the MPR to accept a
\nfait accompli.<\/p>\n
Now the crucial question is: What happens if the MPR refuses
\nto revoke MPR Act No. VI\/MPR\/1978? Could Habibie just tell Koffi
\nAnnan that East Timor is not eligible to follow its path of
\nindependence?<\/p>\n
Yes, Habibie has really put the MPR in a difficult position,
\nwithout any option except to allow East Timor to go.<\/p>\n
In summary, there is a possibility that a new full-scale civil
\nwar will erupt following the prointegration faction's loss in the
\nballot.<\/p>\n
But that will not take long, since international peacekeeping
\nforces will promptly destroy prointegration militiamen.<\/p>\n
Second, we will see thousands and thousands of refugees
\nfleeing East Timor. Another human drama likened to Kosovo's will
\nbe seen by the international community.<\/p>\n
Third, Habibie's chances at the presidency are almost nil.<\/p>\n
There is another sorry consequence which is no less crucial.
\nThe loss of East Timor could trigger the independence-minded
\npopulation in Aceh to reaffirm their struggle. Three days after
\nTimorese cast their ballots, thousands of Acehnese gathered in
\nthe capital and proclaimed their steadiness to defend Acehnese
\ndignity at whatever cost. The central government will see more
\nviolence and explosive situations if a strong-arm approach is
\nused to stem those struggles.<\/p>\n
And what about ethnic sentiments in Irian Jaya and Maluku?
\nCould anyone, even Gen. Wiranto, guarantee that East Timor's path
\nto independence will not affect Irianese and Maluku people to
\nfollow the same path?<\/p>\n
Things are getting worse nowadays because the Habibie regime
\nis keen to take the \"easy option\" in regard to ethnic violence
\nacross the country. Now that thousands and thousands of people
\nhave died and so many \"God houses\" and buildings have been
\nburned, no single criminal has been brought to court and
\nconvicted. People are wondering what the hell is Habibie doing in
\nhis palace?<\/p>",
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