Conflicting paths to peace in troubled Aceh<\/p>\n
Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Sociologist, Civil Society Alliance
\nfor Democracy (Yappika), Jakarta<\/p>\n
Militaristic politics will destroy the egalitarian values of
\nthe Acehnese. War will lead to their character assassination --
\nthe Acehnese may be branded with a stereotype in connection with
\ntheir acquaintance with fundamentalist Muslims.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, many forms of bombing as well as arms-related
\nmurders occurring from outside Aceh including Jakarta have been
\nblamed on the Acehnese. Yet the Indonesian regime is also known
\nas a party responsible for various crimes against humanity, both
\nin war and conflict areas, and in places where non-governmental
\norganizations (NGOs) emerge to fight for human rights in
\nIndonesia's political order. All of this will echo loudly
\nthroughout the world.<\/p>\n
The most tragic thing about the armed conflict in Aceh is the
\nhuman destruction. Data compiled by a number of Aceh NGOs shows a
\nrapid increase in the number of crimes against humanity toward
\nthe Acehnese from 2000 up to late 2002. These crimes against
\nhumanity can be broken down into arbitrary arrests (419 in 2000
\nto 981 cases in 2002), murder (524 to 1,113 cases), forced
\ndisappearances (140 to 267 cases), torture (549 to 1,706 cases)
\nplus violence against women and children. Even more of these
\ncrimes were committed between 1976 and 1999.<\/p>\n
These collected figures are the tip of a very broad and deep
\niceberg. The space for NGOs, victims as well as the community to
\ntake notes of, investigate and to report these crimes is becoming
\nincreasingly small.<\/p>\n
So, what is the meaning of a political contract if it will
\nbecome an instrument of the state to destroy all of those
\ninvolved? The state has lost its significance, as it has killed
\nan increasing number of people and destroyed their life systems,
\nincluding their economy.<\/p>\n
The armed conflict has lasted 26 years and negotiations began
\nonly in 2000. Despite all the losses there remains a strong
\nconviction within the military elite that a negotiation can never
\nsolve the separatist question in Aceh. The answer is only war.
\nThis military settlement has dominated the views of Indonesian
\nbureaucrats and politicians.<\/p>\n
This conviction is not without its historical reasons. History
\nshows that Indonesia's colonial war could only be settled by
\nmeans of guerrilla warfare. This is why all agreements involving
\ncease-fires with colonizers, such as the Linggarjati agreement
\nand the Roem-Royen treaty, all with the involvement of a third
\nparty, were in effect only brief and later disrupted by
\nmilitaristic action.<\/p>\n
The Dutch, writes historian Anthony Reid, said their action
\nwas a policing act intended to stop disorder, and they declared
\nthe treaties no longer binding to them.<\/p>\n
In its fight against the Dutch the Indonesian Military
\nretreated to safer places, pursuing a scorched-earth policy on
\nthe way and waging guerrilla warfare. Pierre Heijboer even said
\nthat some Britons, Chinese and Japanese were subjected to robbery
\nand murder. It was this guerrilla warfare waged by the Indonesian
\nside that served as a milestone in the political history of its
\nmilitary, reinforcing the belief that it was actually the
\nmilitary's settlement that released Indonesia from the clutches
\nof the Dutch on Dec. 30, 1949.<\/p>\n
Strong belief in a militaristic settlement continues to shape
\nthe main strategy to solve the armed conflict in Aceh, reflecting
\nthe constant dualism in Indonesia's peace approach to conflicts.<\/p>\n
On the one hand, it wishes to sit at the negotiating table --
\nwhile its military elite decide to go on with military operations
\n-- so that the implementation of every agreement cannot happen.
\nAn exception to this was the first negotiation, the Humanitarian
\nPause.<\/p>\n
This treaty was signed on May 15, 2000 and ended with terror,
\ntorture and the murder of members of the monitoring team as well
\nas a number of humanitarian and human rights activists plus the
\narrest and harassment of negotiators of the Free Aceh Movement
\n(GAM). The historical cycle, Indonesian style, had repeated
\nitself. Before, it was the Dutch colonial rule that was subjected
\nto this practice. Today, it is practiced against GAM.<\/p>\n
Therefore, a negotiation does not pave the way for the
\ntermination of violence, in the perspective of renowned peace
\nworker Johan Gaitung. The above dualism does not give room at all
\nfor efforts of reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution.<\/p>\n
The end of violence may open up larger public space for
\ncivilians to reconstruct the crimes against humanity. A very
\nphenomenal example, following the removal of the Military
\nOperational Region (DOM) status on Aceh on Aug. 7, 1998, was the
\nopening up of a chance for the Acehnese to indict the Indonesian
\nMilitary and even keep them under control. This really crushed
\nthe image of the military and their political position in
\nIndonesia's political system.<\/p>\n
The armed conflict in Aceh surely has a broad destructive
\nrepercussion with respect to the right to live and the political,
\neconomic and cultural system of civilians in Aceh and in
\nIndonesia. Violence contributes very basically to the destruction
\nof all aspects of life, even if committed under the name of
\nnationalism or territorial integrity. The armed conflict in Aceh
\nhas contributed chiefly to the conflict involving members of
\nsecurity forces, including among the police and army or within
\ncertain army\/police units.<\/p>\n
Likewise, the war has contributed to the weak condition of our
\nlaws -- for example the tribunal for human rights violations --
\neither linked with the war in East Timor or in connection with
\nthe shooting of students, and the May 1998 tragedy in Jakarta.
\nThe law has become subordinate to military politics.<\/p>\n
The armed conflict in Aceh has contributed to the escalation
\nof terror, armed crimes and murders conducted by unknown people,
\ndrug trafficking, the spread of counterfeit money and the level
\nof corruption in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the end to violence cannot be solved by the armed
\ngroups alone. It is a problem of the civilians in Aceh and has
\neven become a political and economic problem faced by the nation
\nand is related to their own image. Besides, it has become a
\nproblem, at least, for the nations in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
The world community needs to encourage and pressure all
\nparties relying on violence to bring the war to an end. In this
\nway, civilians will gain the required space and strength with
\nwhich they can implement the reconstruction, reconciliation and
\nresolution to design Indonesia's civilized political, economic
\nand cultural order.<\/p>\n
The article is based on the writer's paper prepared for a
\nRegional Workshop on Understanding Conflict in Asia, held in
\nJakarta on Oct. 29-31, by the Bangkok-based Forum Asia and the
\nAlliance of Independent Journalists.<\/p>",
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