Conditions in Indonesia put SE Asia at stake<\/p>\n
By Marvin Ott<\/p>\n
SINGAPORE: Since the fall of Soeharto's New Order regime, a
\nquestion has been heavy in the air: Can Indonesia survive as a
\nviable, coherent nation?<\/p>\n
The bloody secession of East Timor, followed by communal
\nwarfare in Maluku and elsewhere, put the issue into high relief.<\/p>\n
Now comes the murder of four United Nations relief workers in
\nWest Timor by a militia gang while Indonesian security forces
\nstood by -- virtually advertising the collapse of Jakarta's
\nauthority in that province.<\/p>\n
The concerns over Indonesia's future are shared by its
\nneighbors, and for good reason. The future of Southeast Asia is
\nat stake.<\/p>\n
Imagine the region over the next decade with a cohesive,
\npolitically stable and economically successful Indonesia.
\nContrast that with an Indonesia that continues to exhibit the
\ncurrent systemic disarray.<\/p>\n
The unease in capitals from Bangkok to Washington comes from
\nthe realization that the latter scenario cannot be ruled out and
\nhas become realistic enough to warrant serious analysis.<\/p>\n
What forces have held independent Indonesia together and what
\nis the state of those critical variables?<\/p>\n
The fact that Indonesia exists at all is something of a
\nmiracle. This sprawling archipelago with 17,000 islands and
\nseveral hundred distinct ethnic groups is an unlikely country.<\/p>\n
Providing all this complex diversity with a distinct national
\nidentity would be a daunting challenge.<\/p>\n
The consolidation that Indonesia has achieved can be traced to
\na number of factors.<\/p>\n
Colonialism: The Netherlands bequeathed Indonesia's
\nindependence generation the concept, and the reality, of a single
\narchipelagic state ruled from Java.<\/p>\n
Nationalism: The great achievement of Indonesia's first
\npresident, Sukarno, was the creation and nurturing of
\nnationalism. He understood that a common nationality could not be
\nbuilt around the Javanese language. Nor could it be built among
\nnon-Muslims around a formula that enshrined Islam as a state
\nreligion.<\/p>\n
He persuaded his colleagues in the independence movement to
\nadopt a market language from the small Riau Archipelago as the
\nnational language and to embrace an essentially secular formula
\n(Pancasila) that honored religion without giving sectarian
\npreference.<\/p>\n
This process has left a consensus among elite opinion that
\nIndonesia must remain one, undivided whole.<\/p>\n
Political acumen: In 1965, Sukarno had to relinquish power to
\nSoeharto who also proved to be a master of the political game.
\nIndonesian unity came to be embodied in one man.<\/p>\n
The army: With the defeat of the Indonesian Communist Party,
\nthe Indonesian army became the strongest, most influential
\ninstitution in the country.<\/p>\n
The army was Soeharto's primary instrument for the exercise of
\ngovernment authority and protection of the regime. The army
\nrepressed armed secessionist movements in the "outer islands"in
\nthe 1950s, as well as a militantly Islamic insurrection (Darul
\nIslam), and established what was effectively a parallel structure
\nof authority alongside the civilian government.<\/p>\n
Economic development: For the first two decades of his rule,
\nSoeharto used a formula of military control combined with
\ntechnocratic, Western-oriented economic policies to put Indonesia
\non the road to modernization.<\/p>\n
By the mid-1980s Indonesia was on everyone's list as one of
\nthe Third World's economic success stories. Soeharto struck an
\nimplicit bargain with the Indonesian populace -- unchallenged
\nregime authority in return for improved economic circumstances.<\/p>\n
International support: A key part of the New Order formula was
\ngenerous economic assistance from national aid providers like
\nJapan and the United States, as well as international financial
\ninstitutions. The Soeharto regime enjoyed genuine goodwill -- and
\ndeference -- from its Southeast Asian neighbors.<\/p>\n
Communal tolerance: There was a pervasive climate of "live and
\nlet live" when it came to sectarian and ethnic differences. Key
\nto this was the character of Javanese Islam which produced a
\nsyncretic, absorptive culture very different from the Islam
\nprevailing in much of the Middle East with its sharp distinctions
\nbetween believers and infidels.<\/p>\n
It was this Javanese ethos that enabled Sukarno to implement
\nPancasila.<\/p>\n
Anyone who assessed Indonesia in the mid-1980s by these
\ncriteria would have found little to criticize.<\/p>\n
But arbitrary centralized power is ultimately subject to Lord
\nActon's dictum: "All power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
\nabsolutely."<\/p>\n
By the mid-1990s, the cancer of corruption had penetrated to
\nthe heart of the Soeharto regime. The Asian financial crisis
\nprovided the spark that set the whole rotten edifice aflame.<\/p>\n
So where do things stand today? If we apply the same criteria,
\nmost of the key indicators are negative. Since 1997, the army has
\ndemonstrated repeatedly a toxic combination of brutality and
\nineptitude. A once-respected national institution has been
\ndiscredited.<\/p>\n
Since 1997, the economy has not only stopped growing, but also
\ncontracted dramatically.<\/p>\n
The dreams and aspirations of millions of Indonesians have
\nevaporated. Communal tolerance has been eviscerated. Many of the
\nkey pillars that have supported Indonesian unity have been
\nweakened severely.<\/p>\n
What is there left?<\/p>\n
International and regional support remains solid. Indonesia
\nbenefits from the fact that none of its neighbors is interested
\nin fomenting disunity in the archipelago. But private foreign
\ninvestment has been a major casualty of the tumult of the last
\nthree years.<\/p>\n
What about nationalism -- the pervasive consensus among most
\nof the 210 million inhabitants that they are in fact Indonesians?
\nNo one knows how strong that sentiment still is. A great deal
\nrests on the answer.<\/p>\n
That leaves one final element -- the political factor.<\/p>\n
In a fragile, but highly centralized polity like Indonesia,
\nthe political skills of the President are a key to national
\ncohesion and stability. When President Abdurrahman Wahid was
\nselected, no one thought Indonesia was getting a leader expert in
\neconomic policy or military affairs. It was hoped that he would
\ndemonstrate political skills of a high order.<\/p>\n
But the predominant image has been of a leader who is erratic
\nand arbitrary. The picture is complicated by the fact that
\nIndonesia has been thrown into the deep waters of democracy.
\nAfter 35 years of authoritarian rule, instituting democracy is
\nlike removing the lid on a pressure cooker -- explosive.<\/p>\n
The factors that support Indonesian national unity are far
\nweaker today. At the same time, Indonesia has made the painful
\nand necessary transition towards democracy. Whether this
\ntransition will produce a stable, unified Indonesia or not
\ndepends heavily at this juncture on the political performance of
\nPresident Abdurrahman.<\/p>\n
The writer is professor of National Security Policy at the
\nNational War College. The views expressed are personal.<\/p>\n
The Strait Times\/ Asia News Network<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/conditions-in-indonesia-put-se-asia-at-stake-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }