{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1106181,
        "msgid": "compromise-or-impeachment-1447893297",
        "date": "2001-05-10 00:00:00",
        "title": "Compromise or impeachment?",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Compromise or impeachment? The headline article in The Jakarta Post of May 3, 2001 cited the President's speech: \"The government, in this case, the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches, each has its own business\". Of course, this must mean that the House of Representatives (DPR) should not supervise the President and that the censure made by the House is unconstitutional.",
        "content": "<p>Compromise or impeachment?<\/p>\n<p>The headline article in The Jakarta Post of May 3, 2001 cited<br>\nthe President's speech: \"The government, in this case, the<br>\nexecutive, the legislative and the judicial branches, each has<br>\nits own business\". Of course, this must mean that the House of<br>\nRepresentatives (DPR) should not supervise the President and that<br>\nthe censure made by the House is unconstitutional. According to<br>\nPresident Abdurrahman \"Gus Dur\" Wahid it is the People's<br>\nConsultative Assembly (MPR) that exercises supervision over the<br>\nPresident. The Post has quoted him as saying: \"The MPR's main<br>\ntask is to monitor the government so that it will not deviate<br>\nfrom the right course\".<\/p>\n<p>Gus Dur has failed to understand the 1945 Constitution when he<br>\nthinks that the 1945 Constitution purely adheres to the threefold<br>\ndivision of political authority as introduced by Montesquieu,<br>\nnamely power separation. In fact, the 1945 Constitution adheres<br>\nto the principle of power division complete with checks and<br>\nbalances. Article 14 of the Constitution will illustrate this. It<br>\nreads: \"The President grants clemency, amnesty, abolition and<br>\nrehabilitation\". This is an example of the President's<br>\nintervention within judicial affairs. Then, pursuant to Article 5<br>\nof the Constitution, the President reserves the right to<br>\nestablish laws (a legislative function) with the approval of the<br>\nHouse.<\/p>\n<p>On the other hand, the House also carries out its supervisory<br>\nand budgetary functions, apart from its legislative function as<br>\nset forth in Article 20A:1 of the Constitution. The MPR does not<br>\nperform its function of exercising control over the President as<br>\nthis function is performed by the House, as all House members are<br>\nmembers of the MPR (Stipulation of MPR No. III\/1978).<\/p>\n<p>Gus Dur is right that under the 1945 Constitution, the<br>\nPresident can only be held accountable by the MPR and not by the<br>\nHouse. However, it must be noted that the House censure is not a<br>\ndemand for the President's accountability. Theoretically it is<br>\ntherefore acceptable for the President not to respond to it.<br>\nHowever, if the President ignores this House censure, the House<br>\nmay ask the MPR to convene a special session to demand that the<br>\nPresident present his accountability report.<\/p>\n<p>So, the belief that a demand for the President's<br>\naccountability report can only be made at the end of the<br>\nPresident's term of office is entirely incorrect. It would really<br>\nbe a golden opportunity if you could siphon off billions of<br>\nrupiah and have to account for it only five years later.<br>\nAccording to Prof. Sri Soemantri, the 1945 Constitution does not<br>\nadhere to the pure presidential system. The President can be<br>\nreplaced due to his own demise, or at his own request or<br>\nviolation of the prevailing Constitution (broad gudelines of the<br>\nstate's course and the laws). It must be noted that this system<br>\nalso applies in other countries adopting the presidential system.<br>\nEstrada in the Philippines and Richard Nixon of the United States<br>\npreferred to resign rather than be impeached by Congress.<\/p>\n<p>In Gus Dur's case, there is a suggestion of a compromise.<br>\nAkbar Tandjung has proposed that Gus Dur serve as head of state<br>\nand Megawati as head of government, a proposal that the editorial<br>\nof the Post of May 3, 2001 lent support to. However, this<br>\nproposal could only be effective if the Constitution were<br>\namended. The problem is whether the Constitution should be<br>\namended only to deal with an immediate problem. If Akbar's<br>\nproposal is set forth only as a formal decision of the MPR, it<br>\ncould be declared null and void from a legal viewpoint and Gus<br>\nDur, in his position as President, could reject it on the grounds<br>\nthat it violates the Constitution.<\/p>\n<p>So, either Gus Dur should be impeached in a special session of<br>\nthe MPR or voluntarily step down. Finally, however, a proposal<br>\nmade by a reader of Media Indonesia (Mr. Marsongko), as quoted by<br>\nthe Post in its May 4, 2001 edition, is worth considering:<br>\nMegawati becomes President and Matori Abdul Djalil the Vice<br>\nPresident.<\/p>\n<p>M. IKHSAN<\/p>\n<p>Jakarta<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/compromise-or-impeachment-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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